Marine Corps Gazette



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

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Marine Corps 1961

The Marine Corps Association Newsletter

An unofficial digest of news of interest to our members

Volume 45, Number 10 | Marine Corps Gazette | October, 1961

New Problem for Marine Corps: How Do You Spend More Money?

Congress more than doubled the Marine Corps funds for buying new military hardware this fiscal year. Now what? Will you be seeing brand-new gear before 30 June 1962? The answer is "yes and no"—and maybe.

Last year there was only $91 million in the procurement pot. This year the request started at $165 million, ended with $264 million granted, almost a triple jump. Planning problem now is to spend it rapidly, but wisely. That spending is under forced draft.

It's the biggest buying year since Korea for the Quartermaster General. Other contracts are being placed by Army and Navy with Corps dollars. Here's a breakdown of the major spending areas and some of the main items: (All figures in millions of dollars.)

Ammunition and Ordnance		$106.3
7.62mm ammo	$13.3	
M79 Grenade Launcher & ammo	$ 1.7	
M72 (LAW)	$ 7.2	
155mm SP howitzer T196E1 (30)	$ 3.5	
90mm gun tank M48A1 (58)	$ 6.7	
LVT-E1	$ 4.1	
Guided Missiles and Equipment		$ 26.9
HAWK AA missiles & equipment	$14.0	
REDEYE AA missiles & equipment	$12.0	
Communications and Electronics		$ 85.2
New family of portable single side-band radios (AN/PRC-41, PRC-47, TRC-74)	$22.6	
Digital data transmission system DIDAC (was BASICS)	$ 4.8	
Air defense radar AN/TPS-34	$23.5	
Communications central, AN/TSC-15	$ 1.9	
Support Vehicles		$ 20.1
About 1,000 "Mechanical Mules." (M274)		
About 800 "Mighty Mites." (M422)		
Engineer and Materials Handling		$ 31.4
Modern medium tractors	$ 7.0	
High-speed tractors	$ 3.2	
Crane shovels	$ 4.1	
Rough-terrain fork lifts	$ 3.4	
Amphibious Assault Fuel Systems	$ 4.8	
LVT fuel ferry	$ 1.1	

How long will it take to get these items in the hands of troops?

Ammunition and Ordnance average a lead time of about a year, once the contract is let. You can get a bayonet faster, but a new item like the self-propelled 155mm howitzer will take several years to deliver. Chances are dim that you'll get either the M72 LAW or M79 Grenade Launcher this

(See **Money and Marines,** next page)

Delivery of 7.62mm Arms

Delivery of the NATO-ammo family of 7.62mm weapons (M14 rifle, M60 MG, M73C MG) remains on the same schedule as announced here in Aug '60.

FMFLant will issue M14, M60 beginning 1 Oct. MCRD, Parris Island, and Basic School already have some.

FMFPac gets them next year, it's hoped by September. Non-FMF units will get delivery in 1963, and Reserve units in 1963 and 1964.

The M73C MG (to be mounted in tanks and LVTs) has "slipped" a couple of months. Reason: minor mount trouble. It should be back on schedule soon. As far as the Marine Corps is concerned, there's been no delay in promised delivery dates of M14 and M60.

SNCO Promotions

GySgt Selection Board sitting 2Oct61 for about 12 weeks will be different than any previous board meeting to pick SNCOs.

For first time in near 186 years enlisted Marines will have a hand in making selections.

CMC okayed recommendation, first voiced at 1960 SNCO Symposium at CamPen, that senior SNCOs (SgtMaj/MGySgt) be allowed to serve. New policy also puts company grade officers and WOs on annual GySgt and SSgt Selection and Review Boards. Object: To get a wider range of experience at grass root level, i.e. Marines who have actually worn the boots they will be picking junior SNCOs to fill.

1stSgt/MSgt board just out, picked 327 1stSgts and 308 MSgts. Quotas announced earlier: 446 and 300, respectively; 3,550 Marines were eligible.

Money & Marines, Contd

year. East Coast units are getting the M14 rifle, M60 MG, and M73C MG this year (see separate story), but it's from a previous order.

Guided missile delivery time can vary greatly. HAWK has been in production, but REDEYE is still in late stages of development. It could easily hit a snag. You're not likely to draw one soon.

Communications and electronics gear has a very long lead time of from one to two and one-half years. Some items require much checking out after delivery and before issue to the troops. Early next year you can expect to see two significant new items, already delivered, but still being checked out. The AN/TPQ-10 close air support radar will add an important night and bad weather air support capability. Each Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS) is to get three. Also pending issue is the compact AN/KPQ-1 counter-mortar radar for artillery. (Newsletter, Apr '60.)

Support vehicles are easiest to buy, many being "off-the-shelf" items. Most of them will be on hand by June 1962.

Construction and materials handling equipment is partly off-the-shelf, too, but some items have to be specially made. It's hoped you'll have the new tractors by June 1962. The new medium will replace old models in Pioneer, Engineer, Service, and artillery units. It can move dirt by both pushing and pulling, loads and carries dirt, and can even pull stumps. The high-speed tractor (25 mph) is rubber-tired, goes to Pioneer and Engineer units only. The whole "buy," when delivered, is a real boost to engineering and shore party capability.

In spite of long lead times on many items, you will get a significant amount of new gear. The final budget increase ($67 million) was exclusively for items that can be delivered by 30 June 1962. With other previous items that can and will be expedited, the Marine Corps is buying for delivery this fiscal year more than last year's budget provided. And an even bigger amount is buying items that you can expect to see later in 1962 and in early 1963.

Summary: Buying military hardware is something like moving the old-style 4 mph TD-18 tractor—if you want to get there sooner, you should have started earlier. But real progress is being made and you'll see big results in 1962.

Looking Ahead

Artillery Marine **Capt P. E. Wilson** has designed a sub-calibre device for Honest John missile launcher that allows realistic practice firing without depleting stock of high-cost 762mm rockets. (See *Drawing a Blank*, page 5.)

MCLFDC (Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center) says device fills a training need, has recommended that MCSC (Marine Corps Supply Center), Barstow, Calif., assemble a test item per Capt Wilson's specs.

Basically, the sub-caliber device consists of a 4.5-in rocket launcher single tube mounted in a yoke and clamps so it can be fastened to top of inert 762mm training rocket.

Capt Wilson "brainstormed" his idea first with Marines of 1stHARB (Heavy Artillery Rocket Battery), got many details to firm up his conclusions.

► A new air refueling system compactly housed in 16-ft aluminum pod, is being tested at Pax River (Md.) Naval Air Test Center. Designed by Beech Aircraft, cigar-shaped unit was slung under a B-26, successfully refueled four of Marine Aviation's newest fighters and attack planes: F9F, F4H, A4D, and F8U.

► Navy has awarded two contracts (more than $8 million) for airborne Doppler navigation systems that may show up on Marine helicopters, reconnaissance and attack planes. Getting: Ryan Electronics of San Diego, Calif.

► Field tests of a new chemical by Army Medical R&D Command found it gave excellent protection against land leeches that inhabit jungles of SE Asia, also skeeters that swarm in mangrove swamps. Called "Deet," it's likely to be issued to Marines.

► 2dFSR (Force Service Regiment) is testing a monster vehicle (65-T load capacity) capable of hauling any piece of gear in use by USMC. Cost: $79,000.

Time Saver

MCRDs are turning to automation in January to help speed up recruit processing.

How? By using standard equipment usually connected with volume mailing of letters and magazines (like old GAZETTE). The equipment, made by Addressograph, stamps names and addresses on metal plates.

HQMC planners have added other information to go on the plate, e.g., blood type, serial number, religion (there's room for up to 18 items). The address goes on, too—in this case, the number of the recruit's platoon.

Plates are prepared initially in Recruit Receiving, will be used to record information on a sheaf of forms necessary to "enroll" a recruit in bootcamp. Now, as in the past, typewriters have been doing this. The new equipment will replace an estimated 20% of Marines who man the typewriters.

Planners say bootcamp operation is another in a series of projects to evaluate Addressograph for Corpswide use. They believe the system will prove ideal for personnel accounting in the field. Equipment is lightweight, easy to operate, fool proof. "Anyone who can fire an M1 can operate Addressograph."

Optimum personnel accounting via Addressograph, however, is a long way from being in the barn. Planners say they have only begun collecting data that will eventually lead to more uses for the equipment.

Combat Course

Fourth Annual Unit Combat Marksmanship Competition 19-21 Sep '61, brought together at MCS, Quant top rifle squads of three MarDivs, 1stMar Brig. CMC was slated to hand over MCA Trophy, won by 1stSqd, 3dPlt, Co "C", 1stBn, 7th Marines in 1959, (there was no competition last year) to the new champs at Sunset Parade, MB, 8th&Eye, 22Sep61. These squads competed:

1stMarDiv	2dMarDiv	3dMarDiv
3/1/G/2/1	2/1/G/2/2	3/1/H/2/3
1/2/B/1/5	1/2/G/2/6	1/3/I/3/9
3/3/M/3/7	2/1/A/1/8	

1stMarBrig: 1/2/H/2/4

Pattern of competition: Clad in full combat gear w/body armor, squads move to individual objectives (after landing from helicopter) on squad leader's signal, assault on his command, set up perimeter defense, commence pursuit by fire. Squads use live ammo against pop-up targets.

In 1959 competition FMFPac units made a clean sweep of first three places.

Physical Fitness: Case Study in Command

Some Marines still can't believe that CMC does not intend to call all the plays from the bench. The nationally-famous physical fitness program provides a case study in the art of high-level leadership: Direct *what* and *when*, but leave the *how* up to local commanders.

Marine Corps Manual (Para 1500.4) establishes responsibility. CO is responsible for physical shape of his unit. Physical fitness directive provides a minimum-standards test. It's not a training program. That's where local initiative comes in. And you should be able to do better than the minimum standard.

Program has been enthusiastically endorsed by SecNav; all services are expected to follow. More important, Navy Department order avoids extensive detail and a rash of detailed reports.

Without frequent reports, how do you insure your policy is being carried out? Inspect. And here are some things the IG will be looking for:

- Physical Readiness test by a random sample of your Marines.
- A look at your Physical Readiness program.
- A look at your Physical Readiness *program* for Marines over 40 who are exempt from the test.

You can expect a training bulletin emphasizing the need for continuing programs for those over 40 or otherwise test exempt. You can also expect added emphasis on the Organized Reserve program.

But you won't be told *how* to do your job. Already CMC has received several letters suggesting that successful local programs be disseminated in detail to the field. G-3 is pleased with these local programs, likes the initiative. But CMC orders will continue to tell the field *what* to do, *when* to do it, and leave the *how* to commanders.

And unless over-ruled by higher authority in some specific case, you can expect to see this same leadership approach used right down the line, and especially in training matters.

Shooting the M14

Any FMFLANT units that rushed through requal to avoid firing the M14 rifle being issued this month probably guessed wrong.

First comparative scores (by Basic School) between the M1 and M14 favor the new weapon. About 50.5% of those firing scored sharpshooter or expert, an increase of 7.5% over the M1. There were 19% M14 experts, only 12.5% with the M1. Why?

- M14 is better in least steady positions. It has light weight, good balance, recoils straight back and up. (M1 tends to go up and to right.)
- M14 has almost no alibis so far; the magazine laughs off dirt.

Even though coaches had only three days familiarization, above factors favor the "average" shooter. Experienced shooters will have problems. The lighter rifle and lighter round don't do as well at 500 yards. You have to remember to remove the magazine when it's empty, or end up with two in one hand. (Loading two magazines with five rounds each is the only change planned in the qualification course.) Also, short-armed Marines can't get left elbow under piece in prone position.

Biggest M14 problem so far is an optical illusion. Bore is chrome plated, very shiny and corrosion resistant. This highlights normal tool markings, makes it look pitted. Even more startling, the light makes the bore look "bulged." Inspecting the M14 will be a problem.

A few other bugs were also found in the first production models, all quickly corrected, except one: DIs had better go easy in promising to buy new rifles if recruits can break theirs doing manual of arms. Recruits at PI, issued M14 for movie scene, managed to break some plastic handguards. Handguard costs 42¢, can be beefed up. But technicians are shaking their heads and muttering in their beer wondering how boots shatter plastic that survives even hammer blows.

Summary: The M14 shoots just a little better (and oftener) at combat ranges, unsteady positions but it's no earthshaking improvement over the combat-tested M1. Its main advantage is that every rifleman becomes an assistant BAR-man. He carries the proper magazines and can easily learn to fire the modified M14.

Inspector General

FMF units can expect a visit by IG every other year. It's one way CMC keeps tabs on combat readiness; his eyes and ears, so to speak. Visits are rotated annually between ground and air. Last year it was ground, this year it's air. 1stMAW has already been inspected. 2dMAW is due this month, 3dMAW in January.

In case of 1stMarBrig, it gets the old double whammy since it has both ground (4th Marines) and air (MAG-13) Marines.

Last year 1stMarBrig was first unit inspected for combat readiness. It was on the IG itinerary again this year.

While IG is primarily interested in tactical readiness, old style spit-and-polish is observed. Percentage is about 70/30. Time spent on military-type inspections could be cut even more, says a member of IG staff. "While we welcome request masts, in many cases the Marine's problem could be solved by his CO or even 1stSgt."

At 1stMAW (reports *Torii Teller*) an inspecting officer asked a young Marine: "Son, do you know what request mast is?"

"Yes, sir," came the reply. "It has something to do with the Catholic religion."

Paper at Work

Blank forms save time, make reporting easy. They also cost money (about $500,000 per year). Since 1949 HQMC Management Engineering Br has reduced 4,100 forms to 2,000. And there's still room for improvement.

Many existing forms are obsolete, seldom used, or can be combined. Before asking for reprints, forms originators should ask themselves these questions:

Where is this form used and why?

When is it used and why?

Who uses it and why?

How is it used and why?

If answers to these questions are unsatisfactory, MgEng says to "deep six" the form. If you decide to keep the form, still another question is asked:

How can this form be redesigned to do a better job?

Call for Regulars

Call has gone out (MCO-1120.17) for certain reserve ground officers, including those serving with aviation, to apply for regular commissions. Eligible:

Year group 1959 w/date of rank between 5Jun58 and 3Jun59.

Year group 1960 w/date of rank between 4Jun59 and 8Jun60.

No quotas had been announced as of press time. Last year 272 from year groups 1958-59 applied, 123 were selected, or 45%.

Marines at Work

FMF, kicking off fire power in lieu of footballs, began fall training with a bang. At Mt Fuji it was a muffled bang—one shot from a tank gun (3dTk Bn) before 1,000 protesting farmers moved into range, held up firing of **Col C. B. Drake's** 12th Marines for a few days. Japanese government intervened, soothed the farmers, then it was back to work for artillerymen, 1/9 and Det from VMO-2. More working Marines:

• On San Clemente Island, **BGen L. J. Fields'** ForTrps (w/VMO-6 Det, MACS-1 and HMR(L)-361 helicopters) rolled howitzers, 155mm guns, Hawk and Terrier missile launchers in Exercise WAGONMASTER. Infantry was simulated, an employment of "minimum number of items of equipment" to achieve these training objectives:

√ Train and test service/combat support for division and wing.

√ Integrate SAM firing, including ships (controlled by TAOC [Tactical Air Operations Center] ashore).

ForTrps involved: **Col L. E. Poggemeyer's** 1st FAG (1st and 4th 155mm HowBtrys, 3d 8"HowBtry, 4th 155mmGunBtry); 2d LAAM Bn (Marines and Hawks airlifted via GV-1), Det, 1stMAAM Bn; Det, 1stSerBn, D/7th Eng, 5th DentalCo, 1st HospCo.

• New SOLANT AMITY Marines embarking 14Sep61 for Gold Coast were: **Capt J. W. Davis'** F/2/6. Landing Force commander: 2dMAW's **LtCol J. D. Boldman.** It's a talented crew, includes bandsmen, drill team, folk dancers.

• Sixth Fleet afloat battalion is now 3/2 under command of **LtCol Sam Davis,** relieving **LtCol W. C. Noren's** 3/6 which made a last pass at Turkish beaches.

• It was a different kind of work for **Capt R. R. Blair's** L/3/8 w/Det from 2dPionBn, MP Co, MedBn and comm Marines who sailed aboard *Antietam* and *Shangri-La.* Mission: Hurricane rescue (Carla). Also aboard: 28 helicopters, 174 Marines from MAG-26. Overall CO: **LtCol L. E. Midkiff.**

• Marines and Sea Bees worked side-by-side in rain and shine to lay SATS mats at Bogue Field (halfway between CamLej and CherPt. Operation began with crating at CherPt, ended at Bogue Field with mats riveted in place. 8thEngBn and MCB (Mobile Construction Bn)-8 (Davisville, R. I.), on a two-week schedule, doubletimed, finished operation in 5½ days. (For more on this kind of teamwork see *Sea Bees—1961,* page 32.)

Sad, Sad Story

Poor **Capt Putteroffer.** Transferred from Japan, he spent 30 days delay enroute, landed in D. C. for duty, immediately hunted up a realtor, selected a house, plunked down a hefty down payment, enrolled the kids in school, kissed his wife, then reported to HQMC ready to go to work. Tilt! "Sorry, sir," a clerk told him, "your orders were modified. You are to report for duty at Cherry Point. Didn't you know?"

Of course **Capt Putteroffer** didn't know. Instead of keeping CMC informed of his whereabouts at all times (like the MarCorPersMan prescribes in Para 9151), he kept putting off sending that postcard, or telegram. CMC couldn't reach him to tell him about the change in orders.

The upshot was, **Capt Putteroffer** got back only part of his down payment, paid out extra money to get his family to CherPt.

It happens all too often, says personnel department, "at least 20 similar cases so far this year."

What to do? Follow instructions in the manual to the letter. Send that postcard. Address: CMC (Code DF), Headquarters, Marine Corps, Washington 25, D. C.

You may or may not go to extremes of one Marine on record:

Capt **D. I.** (for **Do It**) **Wright** also had orders to HQMC. First he took 30 days leave in Japan, visited Kyoto, Tokyo, Kobe; flew to Seattle, proposed to his girl, was accepted, got married, started a slow trip east, stopping each night along the way. It's a honeymoon, remember? From the day of his detachment **Capt Wright** sent CMC daily a postcard, or night letter, saying where he was, where he expected to be the next few days. Sort of an itinerary. In Duluth, Minn., he stopped at his aunt's house to show off his bride. Waiting for him was a terse wire from CMC. Can you guess the rest? Instead of HQMC, Capt **Wright** was pegged for Quantico. If he hadn't gotten message he might have shared some of **Capt Putteroffer's** troubles.

Know what he did? Forewarned, he arranged to leave his bride with Aunt Sally, rejoin her after Junior School. Poor **Capt D. I. Wright.**

Home Sweet Homes

Getting out? A University of California professor has reported average property value of homes insured by FHA in 1959. Highest averages by states in 1-2-3 order: Alaska ($31,000), Hawaii ($20,634), California ($16,417).

Shipping over? Housing looks bright. By end of FY '63, base housing (not including MCAS) will total 8,106 Public Quarters. These are units already in being or funded for. Planners also are asking for more units:

Where	When	Number
MCSC, Albany	FY 63	90
MCB, CamPen	FY '63	400
	'64	200
MCB, CamLej	FY '64	300
MCS, Quant	FY '64	200

For MCASs BuWeps has asked for these units:

Kaneohe	FY '63	325
	'65	475
New River	FY '63	150
El Toro	FY '63	100
	'64	300
	'65	400

Shooting Fronts

Camp Perry Wrap-up:

Marine shooters carried home these trophies from 1961 National Rifle and Pistol Matches:

President's Cup—Won by **WO E. D. Duncan, MCAS,** El Toro (his second), setting a new match record.

Wimbledon Cup (Farr Trophy)—Won by **SSgt O. D. Reid,** Truckee, Calif.

Marine Corps Cup—Won by **Cpl A. P. Miral,** Ewa Beach, Hawaii.

Rumbold Trophy—Won, hands down, by MarCor Gold Team: **GySgts R. B. Neal, B. L. Harshman, SSgts J. A. Titterton, M. S. Dunham, Sgt H. B. Russell** and **Cpl J. B. Tamlin.**

Coast Artillery Cup—Won by **Cpl R. S. Kline.**

Pistol? Havva no. But future looks good. The son of Army MSgt H. L. Benner, perennial National Matches pistol champ now coaching plebes at West Point, is a Marine Pvt at Parris Island.

Meaner Bullpup

Pilots using Bullpup (air-to-ground missile) mission simulators say that the Ground Pilot Trainer has nearly doubled their hits. "Miss distance" is displayed automatically on TV-like screen following each simulated mission.

More on Bullpup: First launch of GAM-83A from Air Force F-105 was successful.

Bullpup, in its GAM-83A version, carries 250-lb conventional warhead. USAF and Martin Co are developing GAM-83B, which will carry a nuclear warhead.

News Roundup

We're still swamped with news we think you ought to know about, have cut it to the bone. If you want to know more about any of these, WRITE US:

Overseas mailing deadlines for Yule packages: Surface, 20Nov61; Air, 10Dec61. Marksmanship Branch (G-3) has a present wrapped, ready for mailing to 3dMarDiv. It's the new FMF Combat Infantry Trophy won by 3dMarDiv in Marine Corps Matches in '60 and '61 but never delivered.

1stMAW Marines raised $550.00 to send their Iwakuni newsboy, Tatehiro Ooki, to Hawaii after he lost out on vacation trip sponsored by *Stars and Stripes* (on a technicality). Ooki passed up Hawaii trip, will use money for a college education. . . . All MarCor bases are following lead of CamLej and Quant in assigning PubQuarters since Para 50311.3 in new SupMan spelled out policy: You go on housing list of new duty station as of day of transfer from old one. . . . Quotas for new WOs (Phase I) were not announced by press time. Selection board is meeting 15Oct61. Two interlocking factors will figure in quotas: How many billets will need filling by end of FY '62, and how many TempO will revert to permanent WO status. A possible clue to quotas: 30Jun62 is deadline for making 1,300 WOs (see *New Look in Warrants,* NEWSLETTER: July '60). At end of FY '60 there were less than 900 on active duty, many of these nearing end of trail. FY '61 selection boards picked 185 Phase I applicants, 116 Phase II. Estimated retirements since 1Jul60: about 100. . . . Kaneohe-based VMA-212 is phasing in A4D. First two planes arrived from Barber's Point with **LtCol J. Lowman** and **Maj L. L. Harpe,** Sqd CO and ExO, respectively, at controls.

MCAS, CherPt, winning safety pennants like **NY Yankees** take the other kind, hoisted its seventh consecutive Achievement in Safety Award gonfalon after recognition by SecNav; (for NY Yankees, their 26th since '03).

Armed Forces Enlisted Benefit Association completing its fourth year of operation, showed a 47% hike in membership during past year. Non-profit AFEBA offers low cost insurance to enlisted Marines, loans for emergency or educational purposes. . . . **Col R. D. Miller,** first Marine to serve on board of United Services Automobile Association, was rewarded for his service with a handsome plaque prior to his detachment as CO, MB, NAS, Corpus Christi, Tex. . . . 19 Oct '61 is "Credit Union Day" throughout US, Canada, 50 other countries. Object: to promote financial solvency. Simple checklist: Avoid high cost credit, easy payment plans, revolving credit. Don't be an IB (Impulse Buyer). Dicker—don't follow suggested retail prices. Buy by grades and net weights. Toughest job: convincing Mrs. Marine. . . . Recent survey of new Marines (at MCRDs) shows 70% enlisted as a result of contact with Marines, former Marines, friends or relatives of Marines. **Col E. W. Ritzau,** CO, HqBn, MCS, Quant, is passing along this information in form of a letter to all of his leave-taking Marines. Sample sentence: "By your own good conduct and alertness, you can influence young men of our nation in their choice of service."

USMC, USN, USAF have their heads together to try and come up with optimum tactical fighter plane possible within "state-of-the-art." High on list of specs: a plane that can operate from both carriers and small, austere airfields in remote areas, in other words, SATS. Plane would be multi-purpose, i.e., capable of armed recon, attack, strike and fighter work. DivAv is primarily interested in fighter aspects as a possible follow on for F4H in 1970's. . . . CMC is making a youth physical training program developed by RS, New York available to all US high schools. More than 100,000 boys in NYC area took part in the local MarCor program last school year. . . . MAG-31, formerly of Miami, Fla., is being reactived 1Nov61. New home: MCAS, Beaufort, S. C. . . . Fitting out 30Oct61: all new LPH 2 (*Iwo Jima*), bringing total LPH count to five. Others: LPH-8 (*Valley Forge*), LPH-6 (*Thetis Bay*), LPH-5 (*Princeton*) and LPH-4 (*Boxer*). Two more are building. . . . Newest all-Marine Camp on Okinawa: Camp Hansen, named for Pvt D. M. Hansen, who was posthumously awarded Medal of Honor. Current tenants of 6,000-Marine camp: 3dTkBn; 3dMarDiv Schools.

Pitching to Marines

1st term reenlistments, up 8% over last year, may jump even more. A pitch to Marines via spot announcements and 15-min recorded musical shows will soon be aired by radio stations servicing areas in which major bases are located. Meanwhile, new MCO 1133.2D spells out new policy for Career Advisory Programs:

HQMC no longer wants to see Individual Reenlistment Interview Report. Forms will still be completed, however, kept in files for now-and-again check on local Career Advisory Programs (probably by IG).

Major commands (there are 19 listed in the order) must submit semi-annual report of reenlistments, reasons why qualified Marines did not reenlist.

Manual for Courts-Martial

If you think your Manual for Courts-Martial has been getting out of date due to decisions of the Court of Military Appeals (COMA), you're right.

Proof is in the August 1961 *JAG JOURNAL,* which contains over 270 "unofficial" changes. It's printed in a form you can slip into the back of your copy as a "pocket supplement."

You can get a personal copy for 15¢ (check or MO) from: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. There's a 25% discount on lots of 100.

Units may submit requests to: CG, MCSA, Philadelphia, Pa.

Why "unofficial"? MCM won't be changed now by all services because new legislation changing UCMJ is pending in Congress. It could be passed this year, but more likely next year.

Drawing a Blank

Recent 50% cutback in blank ammo wasn't temporary; it will get worse. Plan now to use your allowance carefully. Reasons:

- Marine Corps spends $3 million a year on blanks, prefers to get more of the real thing.
- New 7.62mm blanks cost three times as much as M1 blank ammo.

Double Time

Boots at Parris Island and San Diego will be double-timing more than ever. CMC has directed that recruit training be cut from 90 days to 80 days. The 358 training hours considered essential will be preserved.

Main reason for rushing the cadence: estimated savings of 1,000 man years and at least $1.7 million.

OCTOBER 1961

VOLUME 45

NUMBER 10

50¢

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Marine Corps Gazette

Professional Magazine for United States Marines

Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps.

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

NORAD ON THE ALERT

Inputs from BMEWS Provide Instantaneous Missile Data Direct to NORAD Headquarters

From our vast outer defense perimeter, over thousands of miles, to the nerve center of the North American Air Defense Command at Colorado Springs, the most advanced concept of data handling and checkout is being utilized in the BMEWS system. The stakes are high, for the purpose is defense of the North American Continent.

At BMEWS installations operated by USAF Air Defense Command, computers read out missile tracking data from giant radars. This information is simultaneously relayed to NORAD's Combat Operations Center.

The Radio Corporation of America is prime systems contractor for BMEWS. At the COC, RCA's Display Information Processor computing equipment automatically evaluates missile sightings, launch sites and target areas. By means of data processing and projection equipment installed by RCA and a team of other electronics manufacturers, the findings are displayed on huge, two-story high map-screens in coded color symbols, providing the NORAD battle staff with an electronic panorama of the North American and Eurasian land masses.

The handling of BMEWS inputs at NORAD is an example of how RCA data processing capabilities are assuring the high degree of reliability so vital to continental defense.

Out of the defense needs of today a new generation of RCA electronic data processing equipments has been born. For tomorrow's needs RCA offers one of the nation's foremost capabilities in research, design, development and production of data processing equipment for space and missile projects. For information on these and other new RCA scientific developments, write Dept. 434, Defense Electronic Products, Radio Corporation of America, Camden, N. J.

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MESSAGE CENTER

For letters of professional interest. Length: up to 250 words (one typed page). Rates: up to $25.

Dixie's Pixies

► The other day, while directing a visiting Reserve officer to a training site, I noticed a "Rebel Flag," on a United States Marine guidon staff sticking out of his USMC truck. This was a very large and conspicuous flag. I commented that I did not think displaying this flag was authorized. I was informed that, if I didn't like it, I could fight the company that was carrying it.

I didn't like it but I didn't fight the company either. I reported the incident to higher authority. It seems as though there are no orders governing the display of the "Rebel Flag" anywhere a person or persons may desire to display them.

I am a MARINE and I have loyalty to only one flag—the Flag of the United States of America authorized by Congress. I see no reason to display another flag on a federal base, or any other federal property.

If the original Rebels had shown as much spirit as these "Professional Rebels," the Rebel Flag might have been our National Color. It's not. It is my opinion that this flag should be banned from federal property, especially military bases.

CWO W. O. Koontz
409 Boxwood Rd.
Oceanside, Calif.

Firing Line

► The attitude of Sgt Hickey is all too typical of administrators, clerical specialists and others who are either insufficiently coordinated, too delicate or too darned lazy to hie themselves out to the range unless forced to do so by regulation or a CO who realizes his responsibility to prepare his men in time of peace for their own defense in time of war. This type invariably refers to all competitive marksmen as "jocks" and to shooting as a "sport." If it's such a helluva lot of fun why don't we see more of these typewriter-types out "enjoying" themselves more often? The only guys who have an authority to put a label of this type on shooting are those who carry an NRA Master's classification or wear a Distinguished Marksman's Badge. They have the authority gained by experience and accomplishment.

Several fallacies, readily discernible to the experienced shooter, are used as bases for even more fallacious conclusions in Sgt Hickey's dissertation:

He states that "there is a tendency to confuse competitive shooting with marksmanship in combat." As a matter of pure fact there is a great deal of similarity. Anyone who can shoot well in top flight competition amid the tremendous pressure generated will be well prepared for combat marksmanship. He will also have infinitely more confidence in the weapon with which he is armed. Anyone who is unable to recognize any transfer of skills between the sustained fire stages of the National Match Course for rifle, the timed and rapid fire stage of the NMC for pistol, the Infantry Trophy Rifle Course and combat utilization of these weapons is completely devoid of imagination. (As Gunnery Officer on a unit of the Pacific Fleet I was able to prove this contention to my CO by using the members of my pistol team as pointers and those of the rifle team as trainers and sight-setters on main-battery mounts. Resultant local control exercise scores were the highest ever fired by that ship before or since.)

"Top-notch shooters are too often notoriously poor instructors. This coupled with the natural hesitation to divulge 'trade secrets' results in the average Marine learning from the team shooter only what he could glean from FM 23-5 anyway." This statement makes anyone who knows the Marine "team shooters" see red! I don't know which "team shooters" Sgt Hickey includes in this indictment; I have shot with and against the majority of the "top-notch" Marine shooters including McMillan, Jones, Pietroforte, Clay, Thorne, and many others. They are among the most helpful and willing individuals I have ever known.

LCDR G. E. Trotter
USN RTC, Michigan City, Ind.

► Congratulations to Capt McMillan, 1stLt Woods and to GySgt W. C. Hickey for fine articles on team shooting (GAZETTE: Aug '61. An equally big kudo to GAZETTE for presenting both views in companion articles.

There is merit in both stands but I believe the most logical point made was Sgt Hickey's contention that in the long run the Corps' prestige will be maintained in the future, as it has been in the past, by the ability of all Marines to handle their weapons effectively at all times rather than through the ability of a few Marines in the Olympics.

GySgt J. F. McAllister
Hdqts, 6th MCR&RD
Atlanta, Ga.

► Re: GySgt W. C. Hickey's article, *We Don't Need Team Shots*—"Amen."

CWO G. J. DeCaro
CamPen, Calif.

► In regards to GySgt William C. Hickey's article, *We Don't Need Team Shots*—a very hearty "Amen."

SSgt E. W. Cooke
MCRSS, Charleston, W. Va.

Historical Documents Sought

. . . Do you have an attic with a box full of old military publications, documents, and possibly correspondence, which relate directly to the evolution of Amphibious Warfare?

The Marine Corps Educational Center needs material for its Historical Amphibious File. The Educational Center will preserve such documents in the donor's name. Please write: The Director, Marine Corps Educational Center, MCS, Quantico, Va.

New Subject

► In shooting M1 rifle, I find that the shell ejects to right rear when loading and firing one round at a time. But when a clip is inserted with more than one round, the shell ejects to right front. What causes the difference?

1stLt A. A. Hawkey
301 Alderwood Rd.
Oceanside, Calif.

Know Thyself

► Referring to answer 7 on page 12 of August GAZETTE, how many services are there?

I suggest that Extension School see July GAZETTE. I say again, "Know thyself."

Maj J. Angus MacDonald
5218 Light St.
N. Springfield, Va.

MSTS Rebuts

► I have read with interest the article by LCol John F. Bolt, USMC, entitled *Why Marine Inflight Refueling?* (GAZETTE: May '61). This is a useful study of the logistical side of flight operations.

I noted the statement on page 27 that, "It cost $750 to fly an FJ-4B from Hawaii to San Francisco, $12,000 to ship an F8U-1 via MSTS." This figure is not completely accurate, and I fear that if it is not corrected the general reader will obtain a distorted view of the cost of ocean transportation.

The F8U-1, with wings folded, has a cubic measurement equal to approximately 350 measurement tons. The published tariff of the Military Sea Transportation Service shows a charge of $10.70 per measurement ton, or $3,745 for the ocean transportation of the aircraft concerned. It is admitted that the cost of loading and discharging is not included in this figure, and would add several hundred dollars to the total cost.

The Military Sea Transportation Service operates ships, but does not have responsibility for, nor authority over, the terminals at which these ships are loaded or discharged. While I realize that LtCol Bolt is concerned with the total time that the aircraft was unavailable for flight, the implication that the use of a ship was the reason

Question of the Month

(Maximum words: 250)

Keeping track of individual equipment (782 gear) can be a serious problem. What's the best way to mark this gear for ID purposes? $25.00 for best answer by 1Dec61.

Submitted by LtCol R. C. Peck, CamLej, N. C.

(Continued from page 8)

for 39 days of "down time" is unfortunate. Even counting the waiting time alongside the ship (which is not the responsibility of MSTS), the total time involved in surface transportation was 12 days.

Careful research has failed to verify the cost of transportation quoted by LCol Bolt, or to indicate where the figure of $12,000 might have originated. The disparity between the tariff rate of $3,745 and the quoted cost of $12,000 is so great that a correction appears to be in order.

The Marine Corps GAZETTE is an excellent military publication, and I congratulate you upon its attractive appearance and the high order of professional merit of its contents.

VAdm Roy A. Gano
Commander, MSTS

Ed: LtCol Bolt says his $12,000 figure is for round trip, includes ferry via road and barge, loading, unloading, preservation, de-preservation, other "extras." A check with LtCol A. W. McCully, S-4, MAG-13, would seem to bear this out. He writes that though unable to pin anyone down as to exact cost ". . . I did find a commitment whereby several aircraft would be carried for a set price. I did some deducting and came up with a figure of $5,000, one way shipping charge" only. . . . Also, due to certain characteristics of F8U the aircraft takes more space, therefore costs more to ship [than some fighters].

Overloaded

► Careful figuring of the basic load (*The Marine's Combat Load*, GAZETTE: Jul '61) is meaningless when in the same column you have Marines armed like this: Rifle w/ ammo, 15 lbs; BAR w/ammo, 40 lbs; rifle, ammo, three cans MG ammo, 60 lbs; flame thrower and pistol 75 lbs.

A column, like a convoy, is tied to the speed of its slowest unit. G-4 can most obviously help here by providing transportation for the heavier weapons, but problem of how best to provide for carrying these things on foot is much bigger, as it would involve some rather drastic changes in the TO/TE of the infantry battalion. To plan how to do it, though, would not be difficult. An imaginative lieutenant could do it in an afternoon. The trick is simply that to carry 35 lbs and 15 lbs alternately is about equivalent to carrying 25 lbs all the time. My best effort along these lines (certainly not the best possible) resulted in an average load of 30 lbs in weapons, ammo, and special equipment in addition to the basic equipment, with no load varying more than four lbs from the average. This sounds heavy, but it has the virtue of being realistic, since it includes everybody.

Pfc D. W. Vanston
D/1/3, 3dMarDiv
FPO, San Francisco

Man of the Hour

► My comments are in regards to Baseplate McGurk. I wonder how many readers like myself have often passed up Baseplate thereby missing some meaty offerings?

Mention of selecting DIs (BASEPLATE MCGURK: Aug '61) sent cold chills up my spine when I recalled the obvious short-sighted COs who sent men to DI School when I was OiC there. In all fairness, many COs made great sacrifices but the word "Shanghai" was too often used around campus.

Granted, what with demands from Sea School, Embassy Duty, Recruiting, I&I, etc., for outstanding men, the cry becomes tiresome. But no billet in the Corps is more important than that of the DI.

Give the DI all the prestige you can muster—if he is less than perfect his CO will act accordingly.

Properly, the DI is Baseplate's man of the hour.

Capt W. C. Butler
322 Wilma Ave.
Steubenville, Ohio

Joint Operations

► Maj Sparks' article *Operation Arbela 1962* (GAZETTE: Jul '61) was interesting. I think his idea of integrating the 3-4 section is worthy of further consideration. Logistics provides the means for carrying out tactics; one without the other is like a lost sheep.

In this day and age I am surprised the author limited the operation to the participants listed. He states, "Transportation, rather than supplies per se, was our chief concern." May I be so bold as to recommend that in an operation of this type—limited war and brush war—that all avenues of transportation be exploited. I am referring to the Air Logistics Service (ALS) which operates in the area of AKKAD. ALS is operated by USAF, flying C-130 type aircraft. They would be able to maintain an aerial supply line from Mediterranean bases to the SATS airfield at El Adom, and later to the field at Issus, in addition to operating aerial resupply missions.

Joint operations under a unified command is the key to a successful campaign.

Capt C. R. Dunbaugh
Marine Liaison
APO 323, San Francisco

Uphill All the Way

► A fact proven in our last "police action" was that many Marines suffered and died because they were not physically fit.

When are we going to wake up? Do we have to learn again the hard way? I'm pretty sure Gen Shoup will not tell each one of us personally to stay in shape. He has to depend on his officers and SNCOs but it looks like only 50 percent can be counted on.

I suggest we ask ourselves this question: Could we lead an attack up a hill and be ready to fight at the top of it?

MSgt Marion Carcirieri
H&S CO, 3/3
3dMarDiv
FPO, San Francisco

Ed: CMC said this in connection with Physical Readiness Test:

". . . ability to pass the test at any time is considered as the minimum required to comply with the spirit of this order." Also see MCA Newsletter, page 4.

On Their Own

► It's about time we knocked off some of the oversupervision of our small unit leaders. Let's give training back to the platoon leaders. Capt Pickett's excellent article, *Recon for Regiments* (GAZETTE: Apr '61) is a must if our Marine Corps is to function effectively in small wars. These are the lieutenants' and sergeants' wars—let's train them for operating away from their parent units. Make them accept such responsibility and use their initiative by turning them out on their own to accomplish independent missions. They would appreciate it, I'm sure. Surely, there will be mistakes made but give them the chance to make them now and not when the chips are down.

Best small unit training of this type I have ever experienced was with 2/22 in WWII. We were training for jungle operations in the rain forests of Samoa. Emphasis was on fire team, squad and platoon tactics with a liberal dose of scouting and patrolling. One problem involved a three-day platoon patrol to a remote part of the island. My company commander furnished me with a map, gave me a brief Op Order stating my mission and time of return to the company area. Then I was strictly on my own.

After setting up patrol base I gave each of my squad leaders a separate mission and sent them on their separate ways. They were on their own for two nights and one day. Each squad leader was instructed to accomplish his reconnaissance in time to meet me at a designated time and place on the third day for return to camp.

This one exercise did more to exercise platoon intiative, woodcraft, self-reliance, scouting and patrolling and small unit leadership than any exercise I have experienced since. The confidence of the men and the *esprit* of the platoon upon the successful completion of this problem was outstanding. We had been given a chance to operate on our own, which we appreciated. It was to stand all of us in good stead later in combat when we were truly on our own with no S-3 or Company CO peering over our shoulder.

LtCol Dean N. McDowell
Yale NROTC Unit
Yale University

Att: Old Devil Cats

► VMA 212 is trying to make its historical record more complete and can use the help of the Old Corps. Information on exploits of VMA 212 during WWII and Korea will be greatly appreciated.

We are particularly interested in pictures pertaining to activities and Marines of the squadron. All pictures will be handled with care and returned as soon as they are reproduced.

Please send all articles and pictures to:

1stLt A. D. Miller
VMA 212, MAG 13
1st Marine Brigade
FPO San Francisco, Calif.

On Relief

► Do elements of the Marine Corps make proper use of plastic relief maps stamped out by the Army Map Service and described in its Bulletin 29? Recently while teaching military history I've run onto a map-conscious regular captain, a master-scrounger in the reserve, and two Basic School students, all apparently seeing a sample plastic relief map for the first time. I'm sure that my own midshipmen students who are destined for the Marine Corps would draw genuine satisfaction from the word that such useful visual aids are commonplace in the Corps.

Incidentally, since my recent birthday I'm now old enough to learn, so when some vigorous fellow writes to say that plastic relief maps are legion in his unit, will he include logistical information?

W. H. Russell
Associate Professor
US Naval Academy

Hercules can haul almost

Trucks, tractors, troops. Jet engines, jet fuel, jet pilots. Missiles, rockets, guidance systems. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard. Whatever, whoever, wherever – Hercules has what it takes to get the job done.

Destination may be a crude landing strip freshly hacked out of the jungle. Or a snow field at the South Pole. Makes no difference. The Lockheed C-130 Hercules can land and take off on just about any reasonably flat, clear spot on the face of the earth – so it can take its vital cargo close to the action without delay.

Hercules is the true airlifter – built for the big work. Its huge rear doors swallow tons of freight

Loads from the rear

Carries 92 troops

Refuels fighters



st anything–almost anywhere

in seconds – straight onto the truck-bed height cargo floor. And these doors can be opened in flight to permit king-size paradrops.

Fourteen models of the big propjet are now in service, or soon will be, for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard – and for the air forces of Canada, Australia, and Indonesia.

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Drops big equipment

Launches target drones

Lands on snow & ice

Extension School CHALLENGE

BASIC

1 At battalion level, the staff group which has cognizance over all personnel, intelligence, operation and training, and logistic functions is known as the:

a. Personal staff.
b. Executive staff.
c. Special staff.
d. Administrative staff.

2 After completing his estimate of the situation and arriving at his decision, the commander of a unit:

a. Issues an order.
b. Evolves a plan to effect his decision.
c. Analyzes the enemy's probable course of action.
d. Prepares recommendations for his own possible courses of action.

3 In preparing an overlay for a field problem, the color _____ would be used with the appropriate symbol to represent a minefield:

a. Blue.
b. Green.
c. Red.
d. Yellow.

JUNIOR

4 The organic artillery regiment of a Marine division provides the division with:

a. A balanced artillery force.
b. A minimum amount of light artillery.
c. Light and medium artillery sufficient to meet the division's normal requirements.
d. Fire support from light and medium conventional artillery and the heavy artillery rocket (762mm-Honest John).

5 Once an FMF unit has been assigned to a unified or a specified command, it may be transferred therefrom only by the authority of the:

a. Secretary of the Navy.
b. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
c. Secretary of Defense.
d. Commandant of the Marine Corps.

6 Which of the following is the primary consideration in the employment of tactical nuclear weapons?

a. The degree of tactical advantage which will result from their employment.
b. Economy of their employment.
c. The requiremeint for a very high assurance of not producing militarily significant fallout.
d. The establishment of requirements which will adequately provide for troop safety.

7 Which type of aircraft is the most susceptible to damage from nuclear weapons effects for any given yield?

a. Propeller-driven atack and fighter aircraft.
b. Jet aircraft of all types.
c. Helicopters.
d. None of the above; all aircraft require the same safety radius.

8 In the event that a helicopter support team cannot supply requested items to a supported unit, a request for the items is transmitted to the helicopter transport. If the items are not available from that source, through which of the following would they be obtained? (Select those applicable.)

a. Shore party.
b. Fixed-wing air units utilizing free fall or air-landed delivery methods.
c. Floating dumps.
d. Adjacent HSTs.

SENIOR

9 As the G-4 of the landing force, you are preparing recommendations concerning the task organization of various force service units for the G-3. As general guides you realize that force service support units are: (Select those applicable.)

a. Usually task organized for employment in combat.
b. Individually organized on a functional basis.
c. Attached to a division service support unit if located in logistic support areas.
d. Normally employed in separate logistic support areas from those containing the division service support units.

(Answers on page 68)

★ ★ ★ ★

A Captain says of Special Operations Courses:
"Very good, very interesting. The lessons on desert and anti-guerrilla operations were a pleasure to study."



BOEING VERTOL 107'S

STEEL SPAR ROTOR BLADES

BUILT TO TAKE PUNISHMENT IN ANY ENVIRONMENT

The broad usefulness of the Boeing Vertol 107, world's only "mission module" helicopter, is augmented by rotor blades designed for dependable service in even the most unfavorable environments. With heat-treated steel D-spar forming the leading edge, Boeing Vertol rotor blades have good fatigue strength and great resistance to surface scratching and nicking. Steel loses little weight due to normal sand and rain erosion, thus Boeing Vertol rotor blades with hundreds of hours difference in service time can be used on the same rotor.

Proved thus far in more than 260,000 hours of accumulated service, the Boeing Vertol steel spar rotor blades have demonstrated excellent performance under difficult conditions in many places. Greenland, Labrador, Alaska, Northern Canada, the Sahara Desert and Far East jungle operation have proved the blades in a broad spectrum of temperature, erosion and corrosion environments. The steel spar rotor blades, incorporating latest state-of-the-art advances, are furnished as standard equipment on the versatile Boeing Vertol 107. They provide all-weather dependability and long life, with interchangeability that simplifies spares provisioning, maintenance and overhaul.



VERTOL DIVISION
MORTON PENNSYLVANIA
BOEING

From the Director



BGen W. T. Fairbourn

MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Organized Reservists are ready to step in beside regulars in time of national emergency. What about Class III? Their answer, "ready, willing and able!" They know what's expected of them, they'll act accordingly.

Pick up your daily newspaper, and you'll find headlines asking, "What Next?" Whether we will be called upon in the defense of our nation is a question reservists and regulars alike face squarely everytime they read their papers, or switch on their radios or television sets.

One fact is undeniable, however; that is the ability of the Marine Corps Reserve to fulfill its mission: to bolster the ranks of the regulars in time of national emergency.

We have just completed the most outstanding period of annual field training ever achieved. Commanding Generals and troop leaders of the regular establishment have commended our reservists for the performance of their training. We have been leading up to this performance over the past several years. Constant surveillance of our units, increased emphasis on home armory field exercises, and "quality control" of our enlistees have contributed greatly toward this excellence.

The critiques of annual field training arriving at HQMC from field commanders indicate this new high in Reserve training. Stacked against previous reports, they show every indication of hard-charging organization which has a job to do and does it with minimum loss of time. "Nonproductive time" is a nasty phrase in the Marine Corps Reserve program.



Marine Reservists of 2dReconBn, Toledo, Ohio, fought as aggressors during "Operation Patriot" at Camp Lejeune, N. C.

We know the Organized Reserve is ready. But what of the volunteers? They are the reservists, the Class IIIs, who retain their rank and affection for the Corps, but don't draw a dime for it. They are, by far, the largest group. The strength of Class III Reserve is four times that of the Organized Reserve. Are they ready, too?

We know that many of them are. This is attested by the response to the President's address to the nation in July, in which he outlined the world situation. We have received letters, cables, and wires from reservists who have offered their services. "Ready, willing and able," a master sergeant in California reported. Reservists and former Marines, ranging through field grades, have indicated their desire to serve. This is a healthy response, and one that clearly marks the caliber of citizens who fill our ranks.

This response is gratifying since it is indicative of a willingness and desire to serve.

For some, it would be the third time they have dropped their civilian robes and stepped forward to be counted. Others, who have served on active duty and are in an obligor status, would face the problems, inherent to recall, for the first time. Regardless of their status, our reservists *know* what is expected of them and will act accordingly.

This helicopter will never be the same...

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Recent improvements in the Automatic Hover System have made the HSS-1N an even more dependable weapon for anti-submarine warfare. Six months of day-and-night test flights on ASW missions demonstrated substantial gains in mission reliability over the earlier HSS-1N. In its official report, the Navy scored the over-all AHS reliability 91.5 per cent. In addition, the improved Automatic Hover System proved it could operate successfully around-the-clock under extreme weather conditions and visibility as low as ¼-mile.

Every HSS-1N—and all other military versions of Sikorsky's famed S-58 helicopter—will benefit with the improved Automatic Hover System. So, too, will the new Sikorsky twin-turbine military aircraft. At Sikorsky, we're as much concerned with making our present aircraft more effective and useful as in creating the VTOL flight systems of tomorrow.

SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT DIVISION OF UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION

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

NAVIGATION — Raytheon in 1958 developed a highly sophisticated Doppler Navigation System for the U.S. Navy's A3J. This system was the forerunner of an advanced Raytheon Doppler System now operational in the U.S. Air Force's B-58.



TERRAIN AVOIDANCE — Raytheon designed and is producing the U.S. Air Force's only operational low-altitude target acquisition radar. It is currently installed on the Strategic Air Command's B-52 intercontinental bomber.



BOMB-NAVIGATION SYSTEMS — Raytheon developed and produced an integrated radar-radome for the high performance B-58. With the Raytheon Doppler System (the most accurate in use today, despite severe environmental conditions) these radars are vital elements of the Hustler's bomb-navigation system.

Raytheon brings proven capability to t

Experience and achievements give ample proof of Raytheon's ability to develop and produce operational equipments that would enable high-performance aircraft to carry out the deep penetration-low altitude attack mission: ■ Raytheon Doppler navigation radars for the A3J and B-58 ■ Raytheon terrain avoidance radars for the B-52 ■ Raytheon bomb-navigation radars for the B-58 ■ Raytheon low altitude guidance systems for interceptor missiles.

Add to these Raytheon's selection as prime contractor-systems manager for the U.S. Army's and Marine Corps' HAWK and the



to the low altitude attack mission

U. S. Navy's SPARROW III missile systems; as producer of the 2nd generation Polaris' advanced guidance system; and as systems manager of the ARPAT Terminal Defense System program.

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WORDS & PICTURES

• Our Cover . . .

. . . and this issue spotlight those forgotten Marines, Force Troops. Cpl T. L. Kronen worked hard to group a cross-section of them for a portrait. Unit separation? He swears they're at prescribed tactical intervals, claims foreshortening makes them look close.

• Marine Corps Gazette (-) (Rein) . . .

. . . that's this issue. Divisions and Wings get the credit, Force Troop units just get listed as that little "(Rein)". But without them the operation often wouldn't go. Comes combat, Force Troops often support two landings in a row, while one division rests and regroups. Astutely recognizing (after Gen L. F. Chapman called us on the carpet) that our Reports from the Ready Forces were neglecting Force units, this issue resulted. Besides, we'd asked for better coverage of Force Troops in the first place, didn't get it. Even so, all Force Troop elements aren't fully covered, particularly Force Service Regiments (FSR).

• The Latchstring's Out . . .

. . . we'd like to hear more about Force Troop problems and solutions. Current Phase II Troop Tests propose some wholesale revisions. There must be at least two schools of thought on these issues, probably 27, among FSR troops. How's to spread your ideas around? That's what we're here for.

• No Professional Book Club . . .

. . . we've decided. Why? You members don't agree enough on what book to buy, our Bookshop records show. If you need a conscience to prod you into improving yourself, here's what we'll do: 1) Carry periodic notices in Professional Scrapbook of new professional books; 2) Recommend a new book of the month which we'll stock in our Bookshop at a fat discount. Incidentally, take note of our Bookshop policies (inside back cover). We can assure prompt service only on items we advertise. You might, or might not get faster service dealing direct with a mail order book service. Also, we make no profit on such orders.

WRITER'S CORNER

• A New Writer's Guide . . .

. . . is available. Revisions mostly involve a change in how the Editorial Board operates. Right now the Board is considering the Feb 1962 "slate" of articles. How do articles get on the "slate"? By a preliminary screening (two board members.) If you send in a full-length article today, the earliest it could be expected to see print would be March 1962. The average lead time will be more than six months. We work faster on letters and short items, of course (three to six months).

• Writer Incentive Award . . .

. . . this issue goes to Capt A. J. Croft. His article, Commando Course, begins on page 53. Note that this $100 monthly prize goes to the best article by a Marine. It's in addition to regular rates of payment.

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Single concept:

Road to Disaster

By George Fielding Eliot

1346: More Knights

HISTORY IS REPLETE WITH EXAMPLES OF THE DISASTROUS results which attend solidification of military thought within the mold of a single concept of war. At times this solidification has taken place in the mind of one man who has had the power to compel adherence to his concept, or the magnetism to inspire unreasoning acceptance of it. At other times, a predominant group or class of individuals has evolved such a concept and given it their allegiance. In either case, the eventual result has generally been the same: defeat at the hands of an enemy sufficiently observant and adaptable to take advantage of the fixation and confront it with the unexpected.

Fixation on a single concept of war, whether in strategy or tactics, is indeed a negation of the time-honored principles of mobility and surprise. It invites an enemy possessing an ounce of originality, or even ordinary horse sense, to employ these principles against it. We shall here present a few outstanding historical examples of this process, in the hope that they may serve as a warning against any such tendencies being allowed to develop in our own military policy—especially in this nuclear age when recovery from initial defeat may prove not to be purchasable at any price in blood and devotion.

The record suggests all too clearly the possessive character of such fixations. Facts—even the facts of repeated failures—are disregarded. Again and again we find error persisted in, at frightful cost, by minds persuaded that the cherished concept itself *cannot* be wrong; that failure has been the result of not using enough force or of some tactical mistake; that next time all this will be put right and triumphant success will follow.

Let us first review three instances of this possessive tendency—one from the almost legendary age of chivalry, one comparatively recent but prior to the appearance of nuclear weapons or modern air power, and one that is right with us today. These three examples may be entitled, respectively: Pile on More Knights—Pile on More Fire Power—Pile on More Megatons.

Pile on More Knights—By the middle of the 14th century AD the elaboration of plate-armor, added to the virtual monopoly by the gentry of the right to bear arms, had reduced tactical decision on the battlefields of Continental Europe to the outcome of a simple head-on collision between two masses of armored horsemen. Footmen for the most part (except in the Swiss cantons and certain "free cities") were ill-armed feudal levies, permitted to fight only in a menial capacity. Their fate was decided by whether or not the chivalry of their side won. With victory, they mopped up the battlefield and did such plundering of the dead and wounded as opportunity permitted; with defeat they were mercilessly slaughtered by the chivalry of the other side. Indeed they were often enough ridden down by their own lords and masters for no greater offense than being in the way. In either case they had little chance of defending themselves against horsemen encased in plate armor.

That "common men" could have any real effect on the outcome of a battle was an idea utterly foreign to all continental notions of the day. Winning battles was the responsibility and the privilege of the knightly class. Their weaponry was designed chiefly for the purpose of enabling them to meet other knights in the shock of mounted combat. Maneuver was out of the question for men whose bodies were burdened with up to 100 pounds of metal, mounted on armored horses

WWI: More Firepower

Post-WWII: More Megatons

A distinguished military writer returns to the Gazette and pins down an historical truth—that reliance on a single concept of war is playing the enemy's game

bearing another 30 or 40 pounds. Thus there seemed small need for the noble knight to burden his noble mind with tactical—much less strategical—detail. Skill in horsemanship and in personal combat was prized; he who excelled in these accomplishments was accounted a great warrior. "The ultimate product of the armorer's craft," writes Lynn Montross, "was the creation of a mobile human fortress—a man defended not only from foemen but from the invasion of ideas."

In England, however, something new had been added. The English had their knights and squires in plate-armor, but their armored cavalry had a battle partner —missile-armed infantry, equipped with a long bow and its clothyard arrows. This weapon had, in the words of Sir Winston Churchill, "developed to a point where even the finest mail was no certain protection. At 250 yards the arrow hail produced effects never reached again by infantry missiles at such a range until the American Civil War." The English archers were chiefly drawn from the sturdy yeoman class of small farmers; they were professional soldiers, regularly enlisted and paid and organized in companies. Moreover, experience with the longbow in the bitter Welsh and Scottish wars had taught the English knighthood the need for working out tactical combinations and something approaching a tactical doctrine for the combined use of armored cavalry and archers to the best effect.

"Of all this," says Churchill, "the Continent, and particularly France, our nearest neighbor, was ignorant. . . . It was with a sense of unmeasured superiority that the English looked out upon Europe towards the middle of the 14th century." The events of the Hundred Years' war, in which the English object was to enforce the claim of their Plantagenet kings to the throne of France, fully justified that sense of military superiority. The chivalry of France simply refused to understand what they were up against, refused to accept—in the face of accumulating and bloody evidence—the idea that gentlemen in coat-armor could not sweep "low-born" yeoman infantry off the battlefield. In the first serious trial-at-arms—Crécy in 1346—the English King, Edward III, a sound tactician though no great strategist, set up a defensive position with a solid armored phalanx of dismounted cavalry in the center and archers echeloned forward on both flanks. The French knights simply flung themselves, in disorderly masses as they reached

the battlefield, straight at the English center, and were slaughtered by the archers on the flanks.

Ten years later, at Poitiers, the pattern was repeated—with the variation that the French armored chivalry attacked on foot, having come to the conclusion that the sole secret of English success lay in the use of their knights as dismounted pikemen! Again the arrow-hail did its deadly work. A small English mounted reserve provided the decisive maneuver element, and a French army far superior in numbers was utterly routed. The French King was taken prisoner.

More fighting on this same pattern followed. In 1420 the French King recognized King Henry as heir to the French throne and Regent during his lifetime. The stubborn adherence of the French warrior-class to their single concept of war had brought France to the final shame of subjection to a foreign monarch. Not all Frenchmen accepted this disgrace. Fighting went on. And at last the French—their spirits revived by the inspiration of the Maid of Orleans—found in Dunois a general-in-chief who knew how to use maneuver and surprise. Further, he had the imagination to apply a new weapon—field artillery, worked by despised commoners—to his tactical need for firepower capable of dealing with the English archers. By the end of 1453, the English had been driven off the Continent except for the bridgehead of Calais. The doctrine of Pile on More Knights had cost France a bitter price indeed. It was finally abandoned by a general who saw the futility of trying to fight the small English professional armies on their own terms and had the originality to develop a tactical doctrine which enabled the French to use their superior numbers effectively.

Pile on More Fire-Power—After the Marne operations in 1914 had checked and rolled back the German invasion of France, the flanks of both the German and the Anglo-French armies were extended to the Channel coast in a series of operations in which neither side gained decisive advantage. Solid lines of field fortifications, gradually increasing in depth on both sides, then confronted each other all the way from the sea to neutral Switzerland. The new trench-warfare conditions were entirely outside the experience of either the British or the French senior commanders. What they wanted was a "breakthrough" into "open country"—i.e. a return to the maneuver situations with which they were familiar. Unfortunately some of the earlier attempts to do this, notably the British attack at Neuve Chapelle in March, 1915, set the wrong pattern for the future.

Liddell Hart's Analysis

The artillery preparation at Neuve Chapelle was short but intense. "Complete surprise was obtained," notes B. H. Liddell Hart, "and most of the first positions captured, but control broke down, reserves were late in coming up, and the opportunity of exploiting the initial success vanished. . . . The cost of this success might have been offset by the benefits of its experience. But both (Sir Douglas) Haig and the Allied Command as a whole missed the true lesson, which was the surprise obtainable by a short bombardment that compensated for its brevity by its intensity. . . . Instead they drew the superficial deduction that volume of shell fire

To Allied GHQ of WWI it was heresy to question the "more firepower" concept. From left are Lloyd George, Sir Douglas Haig, French Field Marshal J. J. Joffre, UK Munitions Minister M. Thomas

was the key to success." This deduction gradually hardened into a fixed concept: Pile on More Fire-Power. The defensive qualities of machine guns and barbed wire, and of field fortifications echeloned in depth; the folly of attacking on narrow fronts with insufficient reserves at hand to exploit possible success; and above all the crowning fact that prolonged artillery preparation forfeited all hope of surprise—these basic essentials were ignored. As casualties mounted, while attack after attack heralded with optimistic forecasts ended in ghastly failure, the concept of Pile on More Fire-Power became almost an article of faith with the responsible higher commands. Only by final success could the price already paid for it be justified.

There were those who, as the tragedy developed, began to question the validity of the basic concept of Pile on More Fire-Power. To the orthodoxy of the High Commands, these questioning minds were heretical, and deserved the penalties of heresy. Notable among the questioners was Gen. Allenby, who tried to apply the surprise possibilities of a short bombardment to his 3d Army's attack at Arras in the spring of 1917. "GHQ was profoundly shocked," notes Allenby's biographer, Lord Wavell. Allenby was forced to modify his proposal, and also his subsequent interest in the concentrated use of tanks. An air of relief was evident at GHQ when Allenby was removed from the Western Front to the Middle East Command, where he made his reputation by showing what can be done with scanty resources by the application of mobility, surprise, and imagination to the tasks of war.

The means to do just this on the Western Front, too, had become available in 1916, when the first tanks began to roll off British production lines. The key to

offensive victory on that front was to be finally found in the combination of armor and infantry, with surprise maximized by launching the tank attack with no artillery preparation at all—not even for registration. But at GHQ, there was at first little confidence in tanks. They were parcelled out as infantry support in small units. Not until November 1917 was a major tank attack at last permitted (at Cambrai) and then initial success, which was stupendous, was frittered away because reserves to exploit it were wanting.

Churchill's Indictment

Sir Winston Churchill, in *The World Crisis*, says bitterly: "Accusing as I do without exception all the great allied offensives of 1915, 1916 and 1917, as needless and wrongly conceived operations of infinite cost, I am bound to reply to the question, What else could be done? And I answer it, pointing to the Battle of Cambrai, *This* could have been done. This in many variants, in larger and better forms, ought to have been done, and would have been done if only the Generals had not been content to fight machine-gun bullets with the breasts of gallant men, and think that that was waging war." The great British attack of August 8, 1918, where 600 tanks fully supported were launched by surprise, proved at long last the worth of the infantry-armor team. It had taken three years of bloody struggle to restore mobility to the battlefields of the Western Front; for two of those years the tactical means had been at hand, but the tactical imagination to apply the means was stifled by the reigning concept of Pile on More Fire-Power. Bitter indeed was the price paid for this concept by the British and French peoples.

Pile on More Megatons—We are living today with a deeply-entrenched and centralized fixation about our national strategy which stems from the original air power concepts of Giulio Douhet and William Mitchell (Pile on More Bombs) as developed to fit the conditions of the nuclear age. Today we may call this fixation Pile on More Megatons. Its devotees admit the missile to partnership with the plane, and speak no longer merely of air power but of aerospace power.

The cornerstone of this concept is the belief that victory is to be sought by launching the maximum possible volume of destructive bombardment against the hostile heartland, to wipe out the weapons systems by which the enemy can do the like to one's own country, the bases from which they operate, and his means of making more: to destroy both his ability to make war and the will of his people to do so. In this concept, air power or aerospace-power is the supreme offensive, and therefore decisive, element. Other forms of military power must be regarded as secondary and auxiliary to this shining warrior.

Hence, in the formulation of national strategic policy and its implementation through the budget process, it is contended that every other military consideration must be subordinated to the capability for massive long-range bombardment—in these days, nuclear bombardment.

This is, of course, sheer rationalization. It does not rest on any sound basis of proven fact or accepted experience. So far as experience with strategic bombing goes, the lessons of WWII are all we have to guide us. In that war strategic bombing did not prove to be the all-powerful, decisive force which had been pictured by Douhet and others. It failed to overcome Britain. It helped to weaken Germany, but the defeat of Germany followed the defeat of her armies in the field. It provided the *coup de grace* against Japan, but only after Japan—an island nation with limited domestic resources—had been defeated and isolated by sea-power. In all these cases, post-war arguments by the advocates of Pile on More Bombs (or Megatons) have contended stoutly that they were right all along, that more weight given to their concept would have won more quickly and at less cost. Much controversy has raged around these contentions.

The fundamental error of Pile of More Megatons lies, as with all single fixations of its kind, in its rigidity. It assumes that one form of power can do everything, or almost everything. It refuses to accept true partnership in a team in which various forms of power shall be harnessed for a common effort. And it distorts the record of experience in the attempt to show that, when forming part of such a team in the past, it did all the work that really counted and could have done even better if it had been allowed to.

We Lack Nuclear Experience

When we come to consider nuclear bombardment, we are in the realm of pure rationalization unhampered by experience. This should warn us to be even more careful about accepting untested concepts at face value. Save for two bombs dropped on Japanese targets in 1945—very small and primitive affairs as today's weapons go—nuclear weapons have never been used in war. Neither have long-range ballistic missiles (unless the German V-2s can be so described), nor missile-firing submarines. What the results of an exchange of nuclear weapons between two fully-armed powers such as the U.S. and the Soviet Union would actually be, or what effect on human beings and human reactions might follow, we have only very limited and conjectural criteria to enable us to judge. What the enemy thinks on this subject we can only try to guess, though his thinking validates or invalidates all our theories on deterence.

Yet we do have some nuclear-age experience with

"When we come to consider nuclear bombardment, we are in the realm of pure rationalization unhampered by experience. This should warn us to be even more careful about accepting untested concepts at face value."

deterrence, deriving from the cold war, and it is not without value. We have reason to believe that our monopoly of nuclear weapons and of long-range delivery systems, in the years immediately after 1945, prevented the Soviet Union from using their overwhelming ground-force superiority to support the expansion of their dominance of Europe beyond the point at which they believed atomic retaliation might follow. As their own nuclear capabilities increased, so did their industrial capabilities. The two went hand in hand, so that as nuclear striking power gave them a better counter-balance to our weaponry, they also acquired an ever-growing commitment in the shape of hostage targets. The validity of their industrial and scientific accomplishments as proof of the overall values of Communism as a way of life has been widely accepted by many minds, both in their own dominated area and among uncommitted peoples; along with this acceptance comes their own rising belief that time is on their side, and consequently a diminished tendency to risk all on a nuclear gamble.

Caught in a Diplomatic Bind

But along with this has also come what seems to be an increased sense of security in taking lesser risks. The sputniks and the luniks have carried far and wide the conviction that the world balance of power is shifting in Soviet favor. Opportunities based on exploiting this conviction are being eagerly pursued. To the realization that the major risk must be avoided is added, with cold Communist logic, the belief that we must think so too. Moreover, we are more sensitive to charges of aggression. We are caught in a diplomatic bind on the colonial issue between the sensitivities of our European allies and the "emerging" peoples of Africa and Asia, to say nothing of the feelings of our neighbors in Latin America. On top of all this, we have a new Adminstration. Here, then, may be new and golden opportunities for a Red policy of limited risk, which if boldly pursued in a series of carefully gauged ventures may pay rich dividends.

In fact, we are all, the Communists no less than ourselves, groping cautiously forward into the unknown, with the horizon obscured by clouds our visions cannot penetrate. It is not a time for hard-and-fast assumptions as to the future conduct of war, much less for immobilizing our military policy by adopting any single-track concepts as to what the next war will be like. Rather it is a time for careful forethought, for exploiting to the very fullest our geographical advantage of global freedom of action, based on superior access to the sea and to over-sea air space, and our far wider experience in distant seaborne and airborne operations.

What we require is not a single form of power, a single concept of war to which all else has been subordinated, but the utmost of flexibility in order swiftly to react to unexpected moves by the other side, and to confront our opponents, on occasion, with unexpected moves of our own.

This means, primarily, a new and active policy in which we shall not rest content to abandon all initiative to the Communists and confine ourselves to reacting to their moves. The kind of military establishment required to support such a policy must, as above noted, be based on the principle of freedom of action: to which the single concept of war is anathema. Pile on More Megatons cannot serve as the military support of global activities designed for the preservation of freedom and the defeat of hostile challenges to freedom. Indeed we shall have to modify some other well-worn shibboleths too. One that comes immediately to mind is the concept, now strongly entrenched in NATO thinking, that the ground troops with their tactical aviation form the NATO shield, while the nuclear striking force is the terrible swift sword. This may continue to have some application to NATO's special western-front situation. Elsewhere over the wide range of our global responsibilities, the exact reverse is the case. The deterrent nuclear striking-power of a relatively invulnerable nuclear force is our shield, which enables us to use the sword of amphibious or air-lifted power to deal with local threats and exploit local superiority born of our mobility. This is an interesting reflection, for the development of amphibious warfare has suffered much in the past at the hands of single-track thinking.

Amphibious Warfare is Dead—WWI saw only two major amphibious operations in the European theater: the Dardanelles campaign in 1915, and the German attack on the islands in the Gulf of Riga in 1917. The first was a failure; the second a success. Yet because of the tremendous controversy over the setback at the Dardanelles, highlighed as it was by personalities such as Churchill, Kitchener and Fisher and bv the heated strategic debate between the "Westerners" and "Easterners," amphibious assault *as such* was given a bad name. The Royal Commission brought together in 1917 to inquire into the reasons for the Dardanelles defeat solemnly recorded its judgment that "from the outset the risks of failure attending the enterprise outweighed its chances of success," and much more which in the light of subsequent careful analysis turns out to be nonsense. Of course 1917 was not a good year for such an inquiry. One very plain reason for failure at the Dardanelles (aside from obvious shortcomings in planning and execution) was that the commander on the spot, Sir Ian Hamilton, was repeatedly denied the rather minor margin of additional resources which might, on more than one occasion, have changed defeat into victory. The cause of these denials was the growing obsession of Pile on More Fire-Power; men gripped by this fixation resented with ferocity any subtraction of troops or ammunition for other purposes. In 1917 these men were desperately concerned to prove that they were right, had always been right. Their hatred for "sideshows" was a living thing. Amphibious warfare, it was

solemnly proclaimed, was dead—doomed by the rapid fire of modern weapons, by the submarine, and by the airplane which in future would deny the amphibious operation its crowning advantage of surprise.

de Seversky's Big Mistake

The funeral ceremonies of amphibious warfare were celebrated again and again during the period between the two world wars, not just by the die-hard "Westerners" of WWI but by the eager devotees of the new fixation, Pile on More Bombs. Whatever might have happened at the Dardanelles, these latter proclaimed, was now old hat. Modern air power had doomed amphibious attack for good and all. It wouldn't just perish on the beaches, it would never get there. Air power would sink it on the way. Even after Pearl Harbor, at a time when the patient between-war efforts of Marine Corps planners were just beginning to show a few buds of promise, Maj. Alexander P. de Seversky wrote trenchantly: "The idea that navies can carry war to hostile shores across the ocean under the protection of air power brought along on armadas of aircraft carriers is wholly unrealistic . . . There are . . . considerations which make such an undertaking utopian and doom it to failure if directed against any nation with even a minimal amount of defensive aviation." Yet WWII, from start to finish, produced amphibious operations, both in the Pacific and in Europe, on a scale never before dreamed of—and with a record of almost unbroken success. The unhappy exception was the British attempt to restore the situation in Norway, because once again they had not prepared and planned for amphibious operations and developed their Marines and naval aviation accordingly. "It seems we have to learn the old lessons over again with each new generation," wrote Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes (who had served at the Dardanelles) with understandable bitterness. However, the three major amphibious landings in which the British participated later in the war (North Africa, Sicily, Normandy) were admirably planned and conducted, and British land, sea and air forces bore their full share of the burden. Surprise was achieved in all three cases, says the British official historian, Capt. Roskill, R.N., "contrary to all expectations." Meanwhile American amphibious offensives drove across the Pacific and broke the power of Imperial Japan.

The echoes of the last shot had scarcely died away when somber voices were heard to proclaim that we would never see another amphibious assault—not in the nuclear age. Inchon followed in 1950. Today the vertical envelopment concept is being perfected to deal with conditions, nuclear or non-nuclear, which may be encountered in the future. The devotees of Pile on More Megatons are prophesying doom, but it is precisely because our military establishment is as yet so organized that competitive concepts and plans can be developed and tried out that we have come through two World Wars, plus Korea, as well as we have, and can face the future undismayed.

Here indeed is the very pivot to which our future hopes are keyed. Here is the chief lesson to be drawn from all the historical analysis above presented. We are confronted by enemies with little or no experience in wars of global mobility, with the long-range extension of their power overseas or through the air, with oceanic warfare and major amphibious operations. As long as these concepts are major elements in our own strategic planning, our enemies are faced by strategic factors they do not understand. If, however, we channel our main effort into the single concept of Pile on More Megatons, we shall be offering our opponents free of charge a priceless advantage: the advantage of a readily calculable risk. We shall be assuring them against being suddenly confronted by the unexpected.

We shall be doing exactly what the French chivalry did 600 years ago, what the Allies did on the Western Front in 1915-1917—making everything simple for the enemy by immobilizing our planning and denying ourselves the capability of surprise. The Plantagenet kings of long ago knew their opponents, were confident that the French would conform to a well-established pattern. All they had to do was to set up their spear-hedge, flank it with archers and wait to cut down the full-headed frontal attack. When at last Dunois did confront them with the unexpected, the English gains of three-quarters of a century soon evaporated. The Germans in 1915-1917 expected no tactical surprises from the Allies; when at last they got one on August 8, 1918, the shocked Ludendorff called it "the black day of the German Army." Which it was—two years and a million or so casualties later than it might have been. Part of the cost was, as already observed, the failure of a highly promising amphibious operation: the price for that was still being paid in Norway a quarter-century later.

Flexibility is the Answer

The soundest approach to a viable national strategy, geared to the service and support of national objectives, has always been to relate political decision to the full spectrum of professional military advice. The narrower the area of choice open to the political leadership, the more calculable—for the enemy—are the factors of decision. As war increases in complexity, as alternatives multiply in substance and in detail, the greater is the need for a people who seek to deter a powerful enemy from making war by fear of inevitable consequences to accentuate that fear by a strong infusion of X-factors. In the current power-balance, as between the USSR and the US, narrowing our reaction capabilities to the concept of Pile on More Megatons is playing the enemy's game. Confronting the Kremlin with all the uncertainties and risks of a global war of movement adds up to a far higher and more effective level of overall deterrence, whether the act we seek to deter is nuclear assault on North America or a brush-fire war in Africa. USMC

There've been some changes made in Force artillery since the last time you looked, and more are in the making. Here's a quick look at today's hardware—and some of tomorrow's. Want more? See "FMF 1965," Page 58.

Force Artillery

By LtCol Nels E. Anderson

Two new weapons which may see service in Force Troops are the Self-Propelled M110 8-inch howitzer (on opposite page) and the Self-Propelled M107 175mm gun (above). The current 8-inch has a heavy turret. The new one doesn't and is only a little over half as heavy. Note that the 8-inch and the 175mm gun use same carriage.

FORCE ARTILLERY PROVIDES THE BIG PUNCH—THE "thunder and lightning" for the Fleet Marine Forces. It does this with large caliber weapons of great destructive power, either high explosive or nuclear. This is nothing new, though. Except for the nuclear, the Marine Corps has had Force Artillery since the old corps artillery battalions of WWII. Many changes have taken place since then, however, in organization, weapons, and concepts of employment.

In order to get a clear picture of Force Artillery and its purpose, one should first be familiar with the basic artillery of the Marine Corps—the artillery regiment of the Marine division. This is the organization that provides primary fires in support of infantry.

The regiment is armed with light artillery only (4.2 mortars and 105mm howitzers), but recent reports of Troop Test reorganization add 155mm howitzers. These will be the weapons of the general support battalion. Apparently the addition will take place in the near future. The change is heartily endorsed by Marine artillerymen. Reorganization will give the artillery regiment three battalions of 105s for direct support and one battalion of 155s for general support. Even with the increase in firepower, many artillery tasks are still beyond the capabilities of the artillery regiment or would divert it from accomplishment of its primary mission. That's where Force Artillery fits into the picture.

The mission of Force Artillery can be simply stated: "To provide large caliber, long range, nuclear or non-nuclear fires for a landing force and its subordinate elements." The organization specifically charged with this mission is the Field Artillery Group, of which there



are two. One supports FMFLant units and is located at Camp Lejeune; the other supports FMFPac units and is based at Twentynine Palms. Each of these Groups is a mix of medium and heavy cannon artillery and heavy rocket artillery. The basic unit of the Group is the battery, which is capable of operating independently of Group control and is often so employed.

The smallest weapon in the Field Artillery Group is the 155mm howitzer, a weapon classified as medium artillery. This is a towed cannon which can fire a 95-pound projectile 14,955 meters. There are eight weapons in the battery, organized into two platoons. The fires of the battery are normally used to "thicken" and add weight of metal to the fires of the artillery regiment. As stated before, the 155mm howitzer probably will be added to division artillery, and deleted from Force Artillery. (Ed: 155mm how batteries also "own" 4.5-in Rocket Launchers for special use.)

The 155mm gun, a self propelled weapon, is an outgrowth of the famous "Long Tom" of WWII. Performance characteristics are just about the same as the WW-II weapon in that it fires a 95-pound projectile 23,400 meters. This is the longest shooting cannon artillery piece the Marine Corps has. Like the 155mm howitzer battery, the gun battery has eight weapons which also are organized into two platoons. These platoons can be independently employed for limited periods. The 155 mm gun, because of its long range, normally engages in counter-battery fire, performs harassing and interdiction missions, and fires on targets beyond the range of other artillery. The Marine Corps is the only service with this weapon.

The nuclear side of the Force Artillery mission is accomplished in part by the 8-inch howitzer battery. This battery employs a self-propelled weapon that uses the same carriage as the 155mm gun. The 8-inch howitzer has a dual capability, firing either nuclear or conventional rounds. It is an extremely accurate weapon and is best used on targets which require destruction. Its high explosive projectile weighs 200 pounds and is the heaviest in Marine Corps artillery. The range of this weapon is 16,930 meters.

The 8-inch battery has a unique organization among artillery units, having three platoons instead of the normal two. Each platoon is equipped with two howitzers. The platoons are capable of employment independent of the battery, which frequently happens. An example is the 8-inch howitzer platoon which is part of LANFORMED in the Mediterranean.

The other nuclear delivery punch in Force Artillery is the heavy artillery rocket battery, commonly called "Honest John." The HJ is a free flight 762mm rocket which uses standard artillery methods to reach its target. This rocket generates about 90,000 pounds of thrust, which propels a 1,500-pound warhead a maximum range of 25,900 meters. The diameter of the warhead is 762 millimeters. It can be fragmentation, chemical, or nuclear. The battery has two platoons, each equipped with two launchers. The launcher is merely a straight rail mounted on a long wheelbase truck modified for this purpose.

The Field Artillery Group, with its batteries of varied calibers, could be employed as a single artillery organi-

LtCol Anderson is a cannon cocker by trade, has been since WWII when he commanded batteries in 22d and 15th Marines. Here he takes a look at Force Artillery today, projects a picture of what's to come, but doesn't forget that most readers won't have his artillery background. His report deals in artillery basics, is geared to give all Marines an idea of the heavy firepower backing up a beach landing and the move inland. He served three years as a member of US Army Artillery Board, Ft Sill, Okla., is currently ExO, 2dFAG, ForTrps, at CamLej.

zation in which the Group headquarters would perform the functions of command and tactical fire direction. Employed in this manner, the Group would operate as landing force artillery, accomplishing general support missions as directed by the landing force commander.

The Group can also be attached to a division for particular operations. In such situations it would also function as general support artillery. The more likely employment, however, is attachment of certain batteries or platoons to Marine Expeditionary Forces or units as required for their mission. Examples of this type employment are the previously mentioned 8-inch platoon with LANFORMED, and the artillery batteries from the Group at Twentynine Palms with the 3d Marine Division. The batteries (or platoons) can be task organized with other artillery units for support of certain maneuvers. For example, an artillery groupment composed of a direct support battalion (105mm howitzers), a battery of 155mm guns (self propelled), and a platoon of 8-inch howitzers could be formed and placed in support of, or attached to, an RLT making a motorized-mechanized envelopment. This "tailoring" of Force Artillery to fit particular situations exemplifies economy of force and flexibility in employment.

Weapons Coming Up

Several new developments will soon greatly increase the effectiveness of Force Artillery. Coming along are weapons which the Marine Corps has already contracted for or is examining for possible adoption. In the cannon line, for example, three new weapons are about to take their place on the line. The first of these, the self propelled 155mm howitzer, is definitely slated to replace our towed 155mm howitzer. Other weapons are being studied to determine their feasibility for use as Marine Corps artillery.

The self propelled 155mm howitzer will not simply be the old howitzer on a new carriage. Rather it will be a new type of weapon in that it will contain a muzzle brake, something new in U.S. artillery. The ammunition will be a redesign of the old. Modification will add several thousand meters to its range. The weapon will also have a 360-degree "on carriage" traverse capability. This, coupled with the increase in range, will greatly extend the coverage of the general support battery or battalion.

The 8-inch howitzer is also undergoing a complete face lifting. The new weapon will merely mount an 8-inch tube on a set of tracks. There will be no turret like the present weapon has. The overall weight and size of the howitzer will be reduced to slightly more than half of our present 8-inch. This reduction will facilitate landing and occupation of positions in amphibious operations.

The most likely candidate to replace the 155 mm gun is an entirely new weapon—the 175mm gun. The 175 is also a self-propelled weapon, mounted on the same carriage as the new 8-inch howitzer. The range of this gun, in the neighborhood of 30,000 meters, will enable us to reach way out and attack targets which heretofore enjoyed a degree of immunity from our fires. This means our counter-battery capability will at last be adequate to take care of the long-range artillery of potential enemies.

Improved Rockets

In the rocket field there are three significant new developments. The first of these is a new launcher and rocket soon to be issued to rocket batteries as part of an overall improvement program. The rail of this launcher will be considerably shorter. This, in addition to making it easier to prepare the rocket for firing, will make the launcher less conspicuous when travelling. The rocket itself will have an improved propellant, increasing range.

The most important development in the Honest John family is an entirely new lightweight launcher designed primarily for helicopter transport. This launcher will provide new capabilities to the rocket battery and broaden its concept of employment. Heavy artillery rocket units will now be able to accompany helicopter landed amphibious forces and provide immediate support; the rocket launcher can be positioned in heretofore inaccessible locations; mobility and flexibility will be greatly enhanced.

This then is force artillery—an organization capable of delivering devastating firepower whenever and wherever required and in any amount desired. The Force has a variety of weapons to accomplish any assigned task and is willing and able to trade blows with any artillery in the world today. USMC

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Bird with a Bird-Brain

PIGEONS TRIED OUT as guidance systems for missiles during and after WWII—but flopped. The Naval Research Laboratory figured pigeons could be made to think targets shown on a screen were grains of corn, a guidance system hard to jam. The official report read:

"It was found that the pigeons' peck frequency was sufficient to guide a 300-foot-per-second missile, and that—under favorable conditions—their tracking ability varied between 30 and 80 per cent. Their tracking ability was, however, limited to targets that were easily visible in daylight and at visual range."

—Electronics Digest

FORCE



These trucks look a lot alike but they're not. One's a 5-ton, the other's a 2½. Samey-same with Force and Division MT Bns. They're both in the mobility business but Force can do things Division can't.

By 1stLt Thomas W. Thompson

MEN AND THEIR EQUIPMENT, IN THE RIGHT AMOUNT and at the right place and time, are essential to success in combat. Motor Transport's mission is getting them there.

But why is Force Motor Transport needed? Why must we use the 5-ton truck? Aren't 2½-ton trucks good enough? Each infantry battalion has its own organic motor transport. If more is needed, Division has a whole battalion of six-bys. So what does Force Motor Transport do? What, exactly, is its mission?

These questions are common. They deserve answers. Some background is necessary, however, to understand MT's place in the logistic support picture. Today's tactics have created a growing problem in battlefield transportation. The amount of rations and water used by Marines is no less than in past conflicts. We need more fuel, ammunition, and replacement parts than ever before. Artillery and aviation are good examples. In order to achieve helicopter transportability, our assault units have had to give up some of their own motor transport. Threats of nuclear warfare create a need for dispersion. This means Marines and their supplies have to go faster and farther. Motor Transport today must do more—with less.

In order to do this, each vehicle, from mechanical mule to helicopter, must be used as effectively as possible. To obtain good support, the leader has to understand the limitations and capabilities of the vehicles he can call upon. The type of vehicle found in a motor transport unit is tailored to the unit's mission. Each unit has a different mission. The Force Motor Transport Battalion and the Infantry Battalion Motor Transport Section were designed for different jobs. It is bad practice to try to use them interchangeably. Rather, each should be used for the work it was intended to do.

The mission of Force MT Battalion is to provide for the transportation of supplies and equipment of the landing force, and troops as necessary. How is it organized and equipped to do this job? In what ways are its mission and equipment different from those of the Division MT Battalion?

First, Force MT supports all elements of the landing force. Division MT provides for the Division's needs just as the Motor Transport Section supports the infantry battalion. The Force MT Battalion, on the other hand, moves supplies and equipment for the wing and other force units as well as division. It is organized and equipped quite differently than its sister battalion in the division. Providing general rather than organic support, it is called upon to do a quite different job.

Division MT is a flexible organization used for a variety of jobs. It can haul troops, supplies, or do

Force Troops' heavy gear uses a lot of gas. This 1200-gallon tanker takes care of organic refueling.



Five-ton wrecker can handle heaviest rolling stock

Ten trucks in each company mount .50 caliber MGs

division's housekeeping hauling. It does all of these jobs efficiently. Force MT Battalion was created to do heavy hauling, primarily over the beach to inland supply points. The Battalion can do the same general type of hauling that Division does. It can't do the job nearly as effectively.

The Division MT Battalion is organized around three truck companies of 30 trucks each. It operates 2½-ton trucks. Force MT Battalion is built around four truck companies, also of 30 trucks each. Force uses the M-54, 5-ton truck. Although the 5- and 2½-ton trucks are similar in size and appearance, their capabilities are quite different.

What the Differences Are

The 2½-ton truck is a tactical vehicle well designed to meet the division's needs. It is a good general cargo truck with cross country capability. It has an excellent troop capacity. In one lift, the Division MT Battalion can carry two Infantry battalions and their equipment.

The 5-ton truck was designed for heavy hauling. It is tailored for beach operations and travel over extended distances. It has a more powerful engine than the 2½-ton truck and heavier springs. These increase the weight carrying capacity of the truck to twice what its smaller cousin can handle. The 5-ton truck can also tow large items like 155 howitzers or bridge trailers, even while carrying a full load in its bed. Oversized tires and power steering give the truck excellent handling qualities in sand. The 2½-ton truck often bogs down in deep sand, especially when heavily loaded. The 5-ton actually performs better in sand under a full load than it does empty. A 78-gallon gas tank permits the M-54 to cruise over 300 miles without refueling.

With these capabilities, it seem the M-54 would be a better all-round vehicle than the 2½-ton truck. That's not the case. Although the 5-ton is able to replace two 2½-ton trucks, when used to carry heavy compact items, its cube capacity is almost the same as that of the

smaller truck. Its troop capacity is the same as the 2½-ton's. Fuel and maintenance requirements are greater. This is in keeping with the vehicle's larger size. It is a difficult vehicle to transport. Too large to load aboard an APA or AKA, is can be transported only by an LSD or LST. (The M-54 can be loaded aboard some AKAs but the vehicle is almost always damaged in the attempt).

The 5-ton's Specialty

When used to haul heavy supplies, rations, ammunition, and water from the beach to inland dumps, the 5-ton comes into its own. This is the purpose for which it was built. Used in this way it can replace two or more of division's 2½-ton trucks, freeing them for other jobs. When used to haul troops, or to make housekeeping runs, however, it is no better than the smaller truck—and much more expensive to run.

The Force MT Battalion is organized into an H&S company and four truck companies. Each truck company is capable of independent operations. Company headquarters includes its own administrative, medical, and maintenance sections. Jeeps, M-38A1, and a radio jeep, AN/MRC-38, are used as control vehicles. A 1200-gallon tanker, 2½-ton truck M-49, provides organic refueling. The company has a 5-ton wrecker, which is able to recover the largest pieces of rolling stock and many tracked vehicles. Each company has two truck platoons of 15 M-54's each. An additional M-54 is retained by compnay headquarters for administrative duties. Twenty-two 1½-ton trailers greatly increase the company's lift capacity. Ten M-54s in each company mount .50 cal. machine guns for air defense. Thus, this company is well equipped for independent operations and is ideally suited to do overland hauling of heavy equipment and supplies.

Even when used efficiently within the limits of its mission, the Force MT Battalion falls short of providing all the support the air-ground task force needs under combat conditions. What are these shortcomings? What are we doing to improve our support?

A recent staff study revealed the following deficiencies. Our vehicles, large as they are, are not large enough to transport very bulky equipment, particularly some items found in the air wing—helicopter blades, for example. This equipment is essential. It must be moved. We must change in order to move it.

We also need greater troop capacity in our vehicles. We must be able to mass and disperse our combat power rapidly. We must improve our capability to do this. A lot of time is lost on the beach, transferring from landing craft into the trucks, which carry supplies to inland dumps. We need a unit which can ferry supplies and equipment from the ships direct to inland supply points.

1stLt Thompson, Univ of Wisconsin, Class of '59, has been in motor transport all of his Marine life. Even while awaiting Basic Schoo! (2-59) he spent a month in MT Co, ServBn, MCS, Quantico. Since Mar '60, he's been in 8th MT Bn, with frequent side trips to various schools, including those dealing with motor transport or embarkation. His interest in wheels extends to his private life—he owns a '55 Jaguar, claims sports cars as a hobby. He squeezed in writing this article while serving as Asst Bn S-2/3, H&S Co CommO, ABC DefO, Career AdvO.

Recommended Reorganization

The study recommends we reorganize to accomplish these missions. In the next few years we can expect these changes: The present four-company battalion will lose one truck company. Only one of the remaining companies will continue to operate the M-54 exclusively. Its size will be increased to include 60 of these trucks. A transport company will be formed, composed of 30 M-54s and 30 M-52 5-ton tractors and 12-ton trailers. Its mission will be to provide transportation for very large items of equipment, and mass troop movements. A third company will be organized around 60 5-ton amphibious trucks. Loading at sea, these trucks will ferry supplies and equipment direct to inland dumps. This company will give the landing force true amphibious logistic support.

We have seen that Force Motor Transport is organized to support the air-ground task force in major amphibious operations. It is equipped to do heavy hauling from the beach to inland dumps. Now we foresee changes which will allow us to provide even better support. The commander's knowledge of our place in the overall transportation picture, intelligently applied, insures maximum use of our capabilities. We exist to serve. We are yours to command. USMC

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An Offal Lot of Cleaning

A group of Marines, at a "People to People" program on Okinawa listened to information given out by the Mayor through an interpreter on the city government. Also furnished was an English copy of the current city budget. Then came the question and answer period.

"I note," said one astute Marine, "that 'Sanitation Expenses' are only one percent of your total budget. This appears a very small sum for the sanitation problems facing a city this large."

The interpreter relayed the question to the Mayor; the Mayor talked at length with his staff and the whole program was held up a good 15 minutes. We expected a long, complicated reply. Finally the interpreter returned to the rostrum.

"In answer to the last question the Mayor states that the city does a lot of cleaning up for very little money . . . next question please."

$15.00 to SgtMaj J. W. Arnett



Seabees – 1961

Today's Seabee is a different breed than the WWII type at left but he's just as handy to have around. Although the Seabees don't belong in Force Troops, they're not out of phase in this special issue since they provide similar heavy service support for Marine landing forces. Here's what they do, how they do it.

By LCdr L. E. Stiffler, CEC, USN

A NEW SEABEE HAS ARRIVED. GONE IS THE WWII GUY who was part of the most un-military outfit ever integrated into a war machine. In his place is a gung-ho sailor who works hard and is concientious, but who acts like and is a military man in construction "greens."

In the spring of 1959, Marines at Camp Lejeune saw something new. Three hundred officers and men of US Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 6 (MCB 6) had reported to the 1st Infantry Training Regiment for training in defensive tactics.

But let's back-track a little for the people who were not lucky enough to get into WWII. During the very early stages of that conflagration, it became painfully clear that the standard method of Navy overseas construction, using civilian contractors, had to be changed. Not only were civilians untrained in bearing arms, but they were prohibited from doing so by the Geneva Convention.

So the Navy recruited experienced construction men, gave them infantry training, and sent them to the Pacific, the Atlantic, Alaska, and anywhere else they were needed. For almost four years, Fleet commanders demanded that the Bees build—and fast. They did. By the end of the war they numbered about one-third of a million men.

By 1945 the Seabees organizationally had almost died. Two lonely construction battalions, NCB 104 at Coronado and NCB 105 at Little Creek, were all that supported the Fleet. NCB 124 at Adak and NCB 103 at Guam were essentially Public Works Departments. Small construction detachments were scattered about in both oceans to handle small jobs.

A revived awareness of the needs for advanced base construction occurred shortly before Korea. The modern Seabees got their start in 1949 when MCB 1 was commissioned at Little Creek as support for DEEPFREEZE I. Soon thereafter the Korean conflict created a need for more Seabees. Eleven MCB's and one CBMU were formed and employed in support of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets.

About this same time, NBCs 104 and 105 were redesignated and assigned new missions. They became Amphibious Construction Battalions (ACBs) for direct beach support of amphibious landings. Elements of these Seabees supported the fighting troops during Korea.

The roles of these two major CB types have continued relatively unchanged to the present. The MCB is an integrated, self-supporting command composed of about 540 officers and men. It has the capability of light-to-medium construction with a high degree of mobility. The ACB is somewhat larger, having about 680 officers and men, and performs special tasks for the Naval Beach Group during landing operations. More complete explanations will be set forth later.

After the armistice in Korea, Seabee units were decreased in personnel and equipment, but only two MCBs and the CBMU were decommissioned. In 1960

Seabees now get infantry training at Camp Lejeune or Camp Pendleton. Subject here: mine detection



CB Command Relationships

one of those MCBs was reactivated. The Navy now has eight full-strength MCBs, two half-strength MCBs, two ACBs, and a Seabee Support Unit for DEEPFREEZE. Two type commands supervise these units: Commander, Naval Construction Battalions, Pacific Fleet (COMCB-PAC), and Commander, Naval Construction Battalions, Atlantic Fleet (COMCBLANT).

The fortunes of Naval Construction forces are tied to those of the Marines as much now as ever before. Several years ago, it became apparent to COMCBLANT that one of the major assignments of an MCB in limited war would be direct support of aviation elements of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). To meet this requirement the Bees would need extensive training in defensive tactics so they could protect themselves in forward combat areas.

Infantry Training Course

As a beginning, MCB 6 underwent intensive training for six weeks in the spring of 1959 at Camp Lejeune. This instruction included markmanship training and familiarization with the weapons in the MCB, defensive infantry tactics, various types of specialized training, and a battalion defense exercise. Since then all of the Atlantic battalions have received similar training at Camp Lejeune. Pacific battalions receive the same instruction at Camp Pendleton.

In addition to combat training, an effort is being made to create a versatile, mobile construction unit geared to requirements of today and the future, rather than those of WWII. Analyzing the requirements of the modern amphibious force for construction support, the Bureau of Yards and Docks became keenly aware that an MCB patterned after the venerable WWII Naval Construction Battalion, which needed eight or more LSTs for embarkation, would not provide the support required. A smaller, more flexible, and more easily moved unit was indicated.

Such a unit is evolving. The MCB of recent peacetime years was a reduced-strength unit operating with half the full complement of a WWII P-1 Functional Component (NCB) of approximately 1,100 officers and men. The new MCB, though, will be the equivalent of this reduced unit in personnel and will be included in the Functional Component System. It is to be capable of the type of construction traditionally undertaken by Seabees, but its quantitative capability will necessarily be reduced. Instead of large-scale construction of airfields of conventional modern design and scope (8,000-foot concrete runways), the new MCB in support of Marine Expeditionary Forces will rehabilitate existing, battle-damaged airfields, or will build expeditionary airfields of the SATS or SELF types.

In establishing the equipment complement of the MCB, air transportability and cross-country mobility are important considerations. The new unit will have maximum transportability consistent with its mission and the ability of modern construction equipment to combine dirt-moving capacity with mobility.

The organization of the new MCB will permit the battalion to operate efficiently as two or more separate



Simplified diagram shows basic organization of the two CB types. The ACB has about 680 officers and men, is limited to support of landing operations (pontoon causeways, fuel delivery systems, beach facilities, etc.). The MCB numbers about 540 officers and men, supports the Navy as well as Marine Corps, can take on light construction of various types, builds roads, airstrips, etc.

units, each of which might, for example, be assigned to maintain an expeditionary airfield from which Marine Air would provide tactical support for ground forces.

Mobility and flexibility are key words (for the new MCB.) Although it will have a TO and TE the battalion will be capable of modification to meet any construction or support requirement. By a judicious reduction of equipment, material, and supply items, a specially tailored MCB will be able to move in support of Marine operations on a single 1173-class LST. Compare this to the WWII requirement for eight LSTs.

The MCB is not restricted to support of Marine units, but can be called upon to construct the Navy's advanced bases—the same mission it has always had. Many additional task assignments, though, have been given to the Bees. Today, for example, they have the capability of disaster recovery, including nuclear decontamination. Each battalion has highly trained recovery teams capable of rescue, decontamination, and emergency rehabilitation.

Seabees are now thinking in terms of airlift, overland movement through unimproved terrain, and construction for space projects. The MCBs are living up to their motto, "Can Do."

But let's not stop with the MCBs. Seabees serve with the Fleet in other roles. In many instances they are concerned with Marine operations and support. What Marine has not seen Amphib CBs putting in pontoon causeways during a beach landing operation?

The mission and tasks of the ACBs are somewhat different than those of MCBs. While the mobile battalions are assigned the primary mission of construction support, ACBs are limited to landing operations with whatever construction is required to support Naval Beach Groups. Specifically, the Amphib CBs install and operate ship-to-shore fuel delivery systems; provide, install, and operate pontoon causeways; rig and operate pontoon lighters and transfer barges; develop and improve facilities and accomplish beach salvage.

The ACB is the only CB unit not composed predominantly of CEC officers and Group VIII enlisted men. The command is vested in CEC officers, but because of the large requirement for pontoon work and other water borne effort, a number of line officers and non-group VIII deck ratings are assigned.

Seabees are not channeled into ACBs or MCBs as a career, but are transferred between the two so they can benefit in training and experience from the variety of tasks assigned the different units. ACBs also receive infantry training, but not on the rotational basis established for the MCBs.

Seabee Maintenance Units

Next in line is the Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit (CBMU). The most recent of these units in existence was CBMU 101 in Korea. It was decommissioned shortly after the armistice was signed. The CBMU is basically a wartime unit, and is essentially a military public works department for advanced bases in combat zones. A CBMU moves in and operates a base after it has been constructed by the MCB. Unlike the MCB and ABC, the CBMU is not usually capable of integrated and independent operations, unless specifically augmented for that purpose. It is a commissioned unit, complete with personnel and equipment. It has a complement of seven officers and 270 enlisted men. As the advanced base nears completion, the CBMU is assigned to the Base Command for public works operations.

Many more Seabee organizations are provided to perform specific tasks. These may be specially tailored detachments, trucking companies, harbor clearance units, and automotive, construction, and weight-handling components.

In the Functional Component System, additional specialized equipment and material components are available for heavy excavating and hauling equipment,

Nope, not Marines—Seabees training. Battalion A,B & C Companies can operate as rifle companies

Togetherness

While we in the Marine Corps have gone our merry way, writing CBs into various plans for operations short of general war, and for general war itself, this was done without any real knowledge of what we were talking or writing about.

It is possible, through reading various TOs, to gain a superficial knowledge of a subject. But real, useful knowledge can only come from intimate association.

Since WWII, we in the Marine Corps have not associated with CBs in such a manner that we understand their capabilities—and they our requirements.

—LtCol G. L. H. Cooper
Force Engineer, FMFLant
1959

rock drilling and blasting gear, rock crushing and screening plant, asphalt plant, and bituminous surfacing equipment.

And finally there are all of the Seabees, the men themselves, on shore duty and other special assignments around the globe. Some are on duty with foreign aid programs; some are in schools. All are still training to work with the Fleets.

The TE for these various units can be complicated or simple depending upon what the units are designed to be and what work will be accomplished. Tailoring for specific jobs is the rule rather than the exception in peacetime operations.

But what about the future? Where will Seabees stack up in time to come? Let's take a look at what the Seabees planners are thinking of. First and most important, the Seabees will live up to their reputation—they will build anything, anywhere, anytime, and have it done faster and better (and while you're waiting, they'll feed you steak and ice cream). If necessary, they can do their fair share of fighting, too.

The Bees are training and planning for operations with Marine Expeditionary Forces in any area of the world. They will go from the tropics, in sand or jungle, to the arctic, building and maintaining as they go. MCBs are working toward movement by air—and airdrop if required—of equipment, material, and men. They will be able to move over any terrain—mountains, swamps, rivers—with enough equipment and men to support Marine air elements wherever they may be.

The Bureau of Yards and Docks is constantly testing, evaluating, and experimenting with new equipment, methods, and techniques to make the support of MEF units by Seabees more effective and less expensive.

Want a Moon Base? Ask the 'Bees

The CBs have been building tracking stations, launching pads, and missile facilities. If someone wants a moon-base, there will always be a Seabee or two to volunteer to build it.

Let's not forget the Seabee Reserve. Many civilian construction men, trained in Seabee Reserve Companies all over the US, are ready for recall to active duty in emergency. Under the Selected Reserve system, Reserve MCBs meet at Davisville, Rhode Island, or Port Hueneme, California, each year for two weeks training as integrated units. When recalled to active duty, these Reserve MCBs will go into the field ready to do the same job as their active duty counterparts.

What can Seabees do? Practically anything. Want a SATS field set up? They will do it. Want a modernistic enlisted men's club? They can do that too. They cover all phases of Naval and Marine construction. The mission of CB units is simply to build, to defend, to recover, to develop, and where required in an emergency, to act as combatants. Hence, their motto, *Construimus Battiumus* (We build, we fight). USMC

Cdr Stiffler, Director, Planning Div, BuDocks, was XO, Naval Mobile Construction Bn 6 from '57-'59. As XO of MCB-6 in '59, the commander found himself with the first Atlantic Seabee Bn to undergo unit training at Camp Lejeune. Author of various technical and military papers for the "Civil Engineer Corps Bulletin," he has also written for the "Navy Civil Engineer." Cdr Stiffler has earned a BS degree in Engineering from Carnegie Inst of Technology ('48), and MSE from Princeton University ('55).

Force Troops, FMFLant

When the going gets rough, our Divisions and Wings need help from Force Troops to stay in action. Here's what Force Troops FMFLant can deliver. Force Troops FMFPac's report begins P. 41.

Part I: Mission, Organization, Readiness

BY TRADITION AND MISSION THE MARINES ARE a force-in readiness. Inherent in this concept are adaptability and flexibility. Providing the means to meet these requirements in FMFLant is the business of Force Troops.

As part of the ready forces of FMFLant, Force Troops units are the major source of heavy combat support, heavy combat service support, and specialized technical support not organic to the 2dMarDiv or 2dMAW. This support is essential for sustained combat operations ashore by these commands.

Since some Marines may not be familiar with the organization of Force Troops, a review is appropriate.

In Force Troops, FMFLant, are six battalion-size units, ten company-size units (three in cadre status), and three specialized teams. The 2d Force Service Regiment is attached to MCB, Camp Lejeune, while in garrison. Its personnel assignment and career advisory programs, however, are administered by Force Troops. A brief description of each organization follows.

Headquarters and Staff

Headquarters, Force Troops, is essentially an administrative command. The Hqs coordinates and supervises the activities and training of many diversified units. It insures their readiness to augment elements of the Marine Expeditionary Force, brigade, or unit, and to perform independent missions.

BGen Wood B. Kyle succeeded BGen L. F. Chapman, Jr., as Commanding General on 30Aug61. Col L. A. Ennis is Deputy Commander. Col J. F. Mallard is Chief of Staff.

Heavy Combat Support Units

The 2d Field Artillery Group is the largest combat support unit in Force Troops. It is organized into a headquarters battery and four firing batteries. Its mission is to provide medium and long range heavy artillery support, either conventional or nuclear. Organic weapons include the 155mm howitzer, the 155-mm self-propelled gun, the 8-inch self-propelled howitzer, and the Honest John rocket.

The 2d Tank Battalion contains the only true all-purpose armor available in FMFLant. Its mission is to provide armored support to Marine Expeditionary Forces. The Battalion is equipped with the M48 medium tank, the M67 flame tank, and the M103 heavy tank.

The 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion is one of the most heavily-committed units in Force Troops. Its tractors can land, transport to inland objectives, and logistically support troops and artillery. The Battalion is capable of landing the assault elements of four infantry battalions simultaneously.

The 2d Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), is unusual among Marine Corps organizations. Its primary mission is to provide tactical air and naval gunfire control personnel for US Army Pentomic divisions or for Allied divisions in amphibious operations. Equipment of this unit is essentially electronic—radios and radar beacons.

Heavy Service Support Units

Among the heavy service support units is Force Service Regiment. This regiment is capable of providing sustained logistic support for MEF units up to division/wing size. It requisitions, stores, and issues all classes of supplies to supported units, provides third and fourth echelon field maintenance, and assumes full responsibility for Force Level logistic support.

The 8th Engineer Battalion is capable of performing engineering missions world-wide, with only slight changes in equipment for varying terrain and climates.

Heavy combat fire support is Force Troops specialty. Clockwise from top left: SP 8-in howitzer, Honest John, SP 155mm gun, towed 155mm howitzer, and 4.5-in rocket launcher.

BGen Wood B. Kyle, CG

The battalion has the personnel and equipment to improve and maintain advanced temporary tactical airfields and to construct temporary camps. It also provides specialized demolition services, engineer reconnaissance, erection and operation of ferries, and water supply.

Vieques, Puerto Rico, is an essential training base used extensively the year around for combat training. Camp Garcia, on Vieques, is under command of Force Troops. A detachment of the 8thEngBn is continuously stationed at the camp for maintenance and housekeeping duties.

Closely related in skills to the Engineer Battalion, but an independent command, is the 2d Bridge Company. This unit maintains fixed panel and floating bridge equipment and provides technical supervision in bridge erection. Labor is provided by using units. These bridges will support the heaviest loads in the FMF. Recently, the Company tested the lifting of 60-ton capacity rafts into position by helicopter.

The 8th Motor Transport Battalion's mission is to increase the tactical mobility of a landing force through transportation of personnel and cargo. The Battalion consists of four heavy truck companies. One company is in cadre status. (Ed: For more on MT, see *Force Motor Transport,* P. 29).

The 8th Communication Battalion is one of the most heavily committed heavy service support units in Force Troops. It provides communication facilities for tactical headquarters and subordinate units. Specialist teams can be furnished as required to divisions, wings, or Force Troops units. The battalion has three operational companies, each with a separate mission: Communication Company, Communication Support Company, and Radio Relay and Construction Company.

Specialized Technical Support Units

Several Force Troops specialist units perform intelligence functions. The 2d Force Recon Company has the two-fold mission of conducting pre-D-day and distant post D-day reconnaissance. It also provides terminal navigational guidance and landing assistance to assault waves of helicopters.

The 2d Composite Radio Company has a diversified communications-electronics capability. Its equipment is helicopter transportable.

Other important Force Troops specialist units include the 2d Force Photo Interpreter Team, the 2d and 4th Composite Interrogator-Translator Teams, the 2d Topographic Company, and the 2d Counter-Intelligence Team.

To test the effectiveness of Force security measures and to provide realism in training, a cadre unit, the 2d Provisional Marine Aggressor Company, maintains equipment and a nucleus around which a larger aggres-

Force Troops, FMFLant

Organization, Command, Staff

Col L. A. Ennis
Deputy Commander

Col J. F. Mallard
Chief of Staff

LtCol A. J. Barrett
Asst CoS, G-1

Capt H. R. Marshall
Asst CoS, G-2

LtCol W. P. Dukes
Asst CoS, G-3

Maj E. O. Murray
Asst CoS, G-4

2d Field Artillery Group	Col F. R. Schlesinger
Hq Btry	
2d 8-in How Btry	
2d Hvy Arty Rkt Btry	
2d 155mm How Btry	
2d 155mm Gun Btry	
2d Tank Battalion	Maj M. L. Raphael
H&S Co	
"A" Co (Med Tk)	
"B" Co (Med Tk)	
"C" Co (Hvy Tk)	
2d Amphib Tractor Bn	LtCol J. P. Treadwell
H&S Co	
AmTrac Co (2)	
8th Engineer Battalion	LtCol W. L. Batchelor
Hq Co	
Svc Co	
Eng Co (3)	
EOD Plat	
8th Motor Transport Bn	Maj F. O. Olson
H&S Co	
Trk Co (3)	
8th Communication Bn	LtCol V. M. Johnson
Hq Co	
Comm Co	
Comm Sup Co	
Radio Rel & Constr Co	
Headquarters Company	Capt R. N. Ingrando
2d Force Recon Company	Maj D. H. Twomey
2d ANGLICO	Maj W. E. Ottmer
2d Composite Radio Co	Maj P. W. Barcus
2d Bridge Company	Capt L. E. Goodwin
2d Topographic Company	Capt R. R. Thomley
2d Provisional Aggressor Co	1stLt G. Gibbs
2d Separate Surgical Co	CWO W. Kozma, Jr., USN
2d Hospital Company	Lt N. Hauser, USN
4th Dental Company	Capt H. M. Fridley, USN

sor force can be organized for use in field exercises.

Finally, there are four separate companies whose missions are to provide specialized medical services. Two of these companies, the 2d Hospital Company and the 2d Separate Surgical Company, are in cadre status.

The 2d Dental Company is attached to the 2dMarDiv and provides its dental support. The 4th Dental Company provides dental support to Force Troops. These companies are pioneers in field dental practices and are continually developing and adopting new equipment and techniques.

Schools in Operation

In addition to its combat functions, Force Troops supports FMFLant in a training role by operating two schools, the Atomic, Biological and Chemical School (ABC School), and the Communication School. Marines from all commands in FMFLant attend.

Resume of Fiscal 1961 Activities

To disprove the erroneous idea that Force Troops units wait for higher echelons to request their support, here's a summary of their activities during Fiscal Year 1961. Routine but continuous commitments included the following:

- Every infantry battalion deployed to the Mediterranean (LANFORMED) included elements of 2dAmphibTracBn, 2dTankBn, 2dFldArtyGrp, 2dANGLICO, and 8thEngBn.
- Every infantry battalion deployed for training in Vieques (PHIBTRALEX) included elements of 2dAmphibTracBn, 2dTankBn, 8thEngBn, 8thCommBn, and 8thMTBn. Elements of 2dANGLICO were included if required.
- Every SOLANT AMITY force included elements of 2dAmphibTracBn, 8thCommBn, 8thMTBn, 8thEngBn, 2dANGLICO, 4th DtlCo, 2dTopogCo and HqsCo, Force Troops.
- The 8thEngBn provided the Camp Garcia detachment at Vieques and had one company of engineers deployed there at all times for field training.

In addition, elements of 2dAmphibTracBn, 2dTankBn, and 2dFldArtyGrp supported summer training of reservists and midshipmen at Little Creek, Va. They also hosted organized reserve units at Camp Lejeune.

So no one would be overlooked, ambitious training programs were conducted at Camp Lejeune (on both the Force Troops and unit levels) with only one objective: to increase combat effectiveness of supporting units.

In addition to providing support to deployed units mentioned above, a Force Troops CPX was held in the first quarter of FY 1961. This three-day exercise stressed night operations and ABC training.

During this quarter the Commanding General also continued his semi-annual inspections of personnel, buildings and grounds of all Force Troops units. Individual companies were given mount-out readiness tests by the Force Troops staff.

In the second quarter, mount-out readiness tests were conducted on selected units of battalion or group size. Various deployed units were relieved, which doubled support commitments temporarily. During the quarter the 2dFldArtyGrp conducted a motorized march to

Fort Bragg, N. C. There it underwent two weeks of intensive field training. The training area at Fort Bragg offered ample opportunity for the "big guns" to unlimber their tubes and fire maximum ranges. Batteries lived "off the land" as they displaced at frequent intervals in realistic maneuvers.

An embarkation readiness exercise known as EMBREADEX 1-60 was conducted in early November. This was an amphibious training exercise utilizing landing craft of the US Army Transportation Command from Fort Eustis, Va. The exercise required all units to complete embarkation planning details, preparation, and movement to a staging area—all that would be necessary for an actual mount-out.

In the third quarter of FY 1961 two Force Troops level exercises were conducted.

The first was "Operation PANTANOS," which had as its objectives: night training, cold weather training, and displacement in burdensome terrain.

The second exercise was a Force Troops CPX, a communication exercise designed to test crypto procedures and an improvised code to decrease transmission time. Valuable experience was gained and has since been incorporated into new procedures.

In the fourth quarter of FY 1961, the Commanding General once again began semi-annual command inspections and personally commanded a landing exercise in the Mediterranean.

One unit of Force Troops merits special recognition —2d Force Recon Company. This unit is constantly on the move. It has journeyed to St. Thomas Island, Key West, Bridgeport, Calif., New London, Conn., Fort Bragg, and other locales to train in various terrain and climates. Purpose is to make sure the company is ready to deploy anywhere, anytime, to carry out its assigned mission and make clandestine entries from the air or sea.

Other units of Force Troops were and are deployed on classified missions. These obviously cannot be enumerated. However, this sample listing should show that Force Troops is highly skilled, well-trained, and ready to mount-out for combat at any time. USMC

Part II: Programs to Improve Readiness

THE COMMANDING GENERAL AND HIS STAFF INSURE that a high state of combat readiness is maintained in Force Troops, FMFLant, by a series of rigorous proficiency tests or inspections. Each test is followed by a critique in the field with officers of the unit inspected taking notes for remedial action. No formal written report is required.

Tactical Proficiency Test

The Tactical Proficiency Test consists of a field training exercise for each unit lasting about three days. In some instances smaller units are combined with larger units and tested simultaneously. The primary purpose of this test is to assess the unit's ability to discharge all its combat functions in the field. Particular emphasis is placed on dispersion, camouflage, security, tactical integrity, and efficiency in displacement. Also emphasized are ABC training and perimeter defense, including various warning alarm systems. Check-lists are prepared by all general and special staff officers. On the third day of each exercise detailed inspections insure that all combat functions are covered.

Tactical Night Operations Test

In keeping with CMC policy on night training, Force Troops has come up with a training method which has been quite successful—a field exercise in which day and night activities are reversed. All combat functions are conducted during darkness and in complete blackout. This includes feeding of chow, maintenance of equipment, training, execution of the unit's primary mission, and displacement. These exercises are conducted for a minimum of three nights and two days, with proficiency tests on the third night. To insure nothing is overlooked check-lists are again used by the staff in detailed inspections.

Surprise Mount-Out Readiness Test

The mount-out readiness test is conducted periodically by Force Troops Headquarters without prior warning. Company-size units are given 24 to 48 hours to move personnel and combat equipment from garrison to a staging area at a constructive port of embarkation. Battalion-size units are given 48 to 72 hours to perform the same task.

Purpose of these exercises is to test individual units

Frequent night training exercises were conducted

(including personnel, equipment, supplies, and stocks of supplies) to see if they can be ready for combat in a specified time on short notice.

Every unit in Force Troops has been tested for mount-out readiness during the past year. All have passed the test with excellent results. This state of readiness has been attained mainly by similar inspections in previous months.

Force Troops also mounts out elements of its units as platoons, batteries, or companies to determine their ability to operate separately from their parent commands. This type of test poses problems that don't arise when the entire unit mounts out. These problems are minor, however, and deficiencies are easily corrected.

Embarkation in MSTS Shipping

To achieve maximum mount-out flexibility, Force Troops units must be capable of embarkation in any type shipping available. This includes not only all types of Navy amphibious shipping but also all types the MSTS shipping. MSTS shipping is the most probable means of movement for Force Troops units. To be ready, Force Troops has been preparing for contingency MSTS embarkation.

Mounting out in MSTS ships presents many new problems. Most of these problems are generated by the type, amount, and weight of vehicles and equipment to be lifted. Many MSTS ships don't have the boom lifting capacity required. In other instances the ships may have suitable booms on only one or two hatches. Often the stowage space under these booms is not adequate due to low overhead clearance.

There are other problems—and no simple solutions. However, Force Troops has improved its embarkation readiness considerably by loading various units in MSTS ships—on paper. In addition, all personnel have been trained in methods of loading vehicles, equipment, and cargo in merchant ships.

Supply Readiness

Supply readiness requires command attention. Accordingly, a series of inspections on supply accounting records and operations was conducted recently by the Commanding General and his staff. These inspections resulted in tremendous improvement in the supply readiness of the various units. They now have a better understanding that supply is a command function—not just a responsibility of the Supply Officer or the Responsible Officer.

Additionally, to improve supply readiness, a special school has been set up at Force Troops headquarters to indoctrinate supply personnel on current developments and procedures. Selected officers and SNCOs attend.

Quarterly Briefings

In Force Troops, with its 19 diverse units, a uniform approach to achievement of combat readiness is difficult. To meet this problem Force Troops employs a device known as the Commanding General's Quarterly Briefing. The system has been operating over two years with excellent results.

This is the way it works. Quarterly, in accordance with a published schedule, each unit commander hosts the Commanding General and his staff at the unit's headquarters. The commander and his staff brief the CG on training programs for the past and coming quarters, operational planning, combat readiness, and problem areas. This briefing is followed by a general discussion. Many problems are solved on the spot with timely discussion and command decisions.

Recon Training

In order to select and train personnel for the complex duties of Force reconnaissance, the 2d Force Recon Company has developed an annual training cycle which includes both formal schooling and on-the-job training.

The annual cycle begins in June with the input of medically qualified volunteers. After screening, selected personnel are permanently assigned to the company and attend Basic Airborne Training at Fort Benning, Ga. When qualified as parachutists, they return to Camp Lejeune and continue their reconnaissance training.

Bouyant ascent training is accomplished at the US Submarine Base, New London, Conn., during a two-day period in August. In September, the company deploys to the closed submarine base at St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, for amphibious reconnaissance training.

The company returns from the Carribbean before Christmas and conducts GMST, cold weather, amphibious entry, and recovery training. An advanced parachute, jumpmaster, and fixed-wing recovery training course lasting two weeks is usually conducted in the spring.

The training year ends with participation by the entire Recon Company in a major amphibious exercise. In this exercise the reconnaissance team is employed on realistic, extended missions designed to furnish intelligence information to the amphibious task force and/or landing force commander.

Conclusion—Ready

These programs to improve readiness, a rigorous training schedule, and heavy operational commitments have made Force Troops, FMFLant, what it is today—a team of support units ready in every respect to execute any task assigned. USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

Courtesy Call

Shuffling through his paper work the adjutant was interrupted by a tall, well-dressed young man carrying a briefcase. Flashing a smile the stranger extended his hand and introduced himself as Bob Jones. Then he opened up an expensive cigarette case, offered one to the adjutant and asked if the Colonel was in. Impressed, the adjutant escorted the visitor into the Colonel's office.

There was a few moments of silence, then the red-faced Colonel burst out through the swinging doors. "Get that guy out of my office," he growled, "he's a PFC cook reporting in from PI."

$15.00 to Charles B. Haslam

Force Troops, FMFPac

Force Troops FMFPac has got some gear they don't have yet in FMFLant—anti-aircraft missiles. Part II of this report, beginning on P. 44, features a rundown on both Terrier and Hawk.

Part I: Mission, Organization, Readiness

By LtCol Bevan G. Cass

THE CLOSE OF FISCAL YEAR 1961 FOUND FORCE TROOPS, FMFPac, ready in every respect to carry out its mission —to provide combat support and combat service support units for Marine divisions and air wings.

Located at MCB, Twentynine Palms, Calif., Force Troops units have available the training facilities of the world's largest Marine Corps Base. It encompasses 932 square miles of mountainous and desert terrain. If Camp Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, and Quantico were placed within the boundaries of the base, there would still be more than an equal area left over. Size is stressed because of its importance to long range artillery and ground-to-air missile units. The base is divided into an administrative area, seven major firing ranges, and six impact areas for artillery and missile firing. It is well suited for extensive maneuvers utilizing all supporting arms except naval gunfire.

FY 1961 presented a variety of events to improve and test the readiness of Force Troops units. These included activation of all cadre units, completion of "package training" for the Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalions, and maneuvers at Twentynine Palms, Camp Pendleton, El Toro, San Clemente, and the Pacific Missile Range at Point Arguello. Other highlights included the first firing of both Terrier and Hawk missiles at a Marine Corps installation, and participation in numerous exercises.

Air Defense

Changes in organization, equipment and doctrine in ground anti-air warfare units were rapid during the year.

BGen Lewis J. Fields, CG

Last summer gun-type anti-aircraft artillery weapons were laid aside, and the 1st LAAM Battalion armed with the new Hawk missile was organized. Training of this unit was accomplished through the "package program." Input of technicians into formal schools of varying lengths on radar, missile, and missile launcher maintenance and operation was programmed so personnel in the various schools would all graduate at the same time. Then the technicians were joined at Fort Bliss, Texas, by the officers and section chiefs of the Battalion for unit training. At Fort Bliss the Battalion picked

Force Troops, FMFPac

Organization, Command, Staff

Col Robert W. Boyd
Assistant Commander

Col George B. Thomas
Chief of Staff

Asst CoS, G-1	LtCol B. G. Cass
Asst CoS, G-2	Capt R. W. Tufts
Asst CoS, G-3	LtCol A. G. Daddazio
Asst CoS, G-4	LtCol C. E. Fulton
Hq Co, ForTrps	Capt W. M. Elder
1st Field Artillery Group	Col L. E. Poggemeyer
Hq Btry	Capt E. E. Backus
1st 155mm Gun Btry (SP)	Capt J. R. Kostelecky
3d 155mm Gun Btry (SP)	Maj W. T. Hickman
4th 155mm Gun Btry (SP)	Maj E. S. Schick, Jr.
1st 155mm How Btry	Capt C. M. Reitz
4th 155mm How Btry	Maj C. A. Webster
3d 8" How Btry (SP)	Maj L. S. Hollier
4th 8" How Btry (SP)	Maj J. C. McIntosh
1st Hvy Arty Rocket Btry	Capt H. B. Crosby, III
1st Medium AA Missile Bn	Maj E. D. Oglesby
H&S Btry	1stLt R. E. Norman
"A" Btry	Capt P. J. Haenelt
"B" Btry	Capt R. M. Proudfoot
"C" Btry	Capt T. G. Davis
"D" Btry	Capt S. M. Gipson, Jr.
1st Light AA Missile Bn	LtCol H. E. L. Zastrow
H&S Btry	Capt L. "B" Myers
"A" Btry	Capt R. H. Russell
"B" Btry	Capt R. C. Yezzi
"C" Btry	Capt C. R. Franklin
"D" Btry	Capt M. S. Jolley
2d Light AA Missile Bn	LtCol W. R. Morrison
H&S Btry	Capt R. S. Soehner
"A" Btry	Capt L. W. Parker
"B" Btry	Capt J. R. Harmon
"C" Btry	Capt W. J. Sullivan
"D" Btry	Capt R. P. Capatosto
Support Battalion, FMFPac	LtCol J. M. Weidner
H&S Co	Capt C. J. Thro
Maintenance Co	Maj J. Erwin
Supply Co	Maj B. D. Jones
"D" Company, 7th Engr Bn	Capt R. M. Camper
5th Dental Co	Capt (DC) E. J. Lofgreen

up its missile and missile handling equipment, trained as a unit, and conducted its first missile firing exercise. The 1st LAAM Battalion completed "package training" in September 1960 and returned to Twentynine Palms.

This same package training program was completed by the 2nd LAAM Battalion in February 1961.

Landing exercises and frequent air defense exercises with units of the Navy and 3d Marine Air Wing have improved techniques and capabilities for conducting and controlling integrated anti-air warfare operations.

Major exercises included LONGHAUL, PHIBLEX 40-60, and GREENLIGHT. These exercises also proved the amphibious capability of the Terrier and Hawk Battalions. Successful landings of these and other amphibious forces were made across Camp Pendleton and San Clemente Island beaches.

The most recent major exercise emphasizing integrated air and missile control was GREENLIGHT held in May and June of this year. This operation tested tentative doctrine for integrated control of surface-to-air missiles and aircraft in the early stages of an amphibious operation from afloat and ashore. Control was passed to a combined Counter Air Operations Center/Antiaircraft Operations Center labeled a Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC). The 1st MAAM Battalion had previously participated in this type training. Therefore, the more recently activated 1st and 2nd LAAM Battalions were assigned bigger roles. These battalions can soon be expected to achieve a state of readiness equal to that of older FMF units.

On 15 June 1961 the Antiaircraft Group Headquarters, with its Headquarters Battery, was deactivated and its colors retired. To provide continuity and coordination, an Antiaircraft Officer was added to the Force Troops G-3 Section to assist in carrying out the planning function previously accomplished by the Group Headquarters.

Also during June orders were received for the deployment of the 1st LAAM Battalion during September 1961. At the same time the Missile Systems Maintenance Platoons of the Force Service Regiment were attached to the battalions. First through fourth echelon maintenance of missile-peculiar equipment became the organic responsibility of the battalions.

Field Artillery

In the fall of 1960 all three cadres in the Field Artillery Group were activated and a 100% of TO manning level was authorized, giving the Group a strength of 82 officers and 1540 men. It consists of the following units: Headquarters Battery; 1st 155mm Howitzer Battery; 4th 155mm Howitzer Battery; 1st, 3rd, and 4th 155mm Gun Batteries; the 3d and 4th 8-in Howitzer Batteries (SP); and the 1st Heavy Artillery Rocket Battery. In addition to these units, the 1st 8-in Howitzer Battery (SP) transplaced with the 3rd 8-in on Okinawa in March 1961 and a platoon of the Rocket Battery deployed to Okinawa in August, 1960.

During the year, normal training at Twentynine Palms included at least one battery field firing exercise a month lasting three to four days. One or two Group field firing exercises were held each quarter, of three to five days each, and four Group firing demonstrations were conducted for official visitors and dependents.

There's lots of room for firing at MCB, Twentynine Palms—932 square miles—and this heavy artillery needs it. Top: Honest John. From lower left: SP 8-inch howitzer, SP 155mm gun, towed 155mm howitzer.

A number of maneuvers and exercises with other units were conducted, including three Group FIREX's with the 11th Marines, and participation in Exercises PACKMULE and GREENLIGHT. In PACKMULE, the concept of splitting the Group staff and forming two general support groups of approximately heavy artillery battalion size was tested. A Field Artillery Group consisting of the following units was formed: 1st 155mm Howitzer Battery, 1st 8-in Howitzer Battery (SP), and the 1st Heavy Artillery Rocket Battery. This provisional group was embarked at Coronado and landed in general support of the Brigade. It functioned throughout the exercise and valuable training was received, particularly in simulated delivery of atomic weapons in support of the infantry by the 8-in and Rocket Batteries.

In GREENLIGHT, only the 4th 155mm Howitzer and 4th 8-in Howitzer Batteries actually embarked and landed in support of the division. However, the Group Headquarters and the 4th 155mm Gun and 1st Heavy Artillery Rocket Batteries phased in at Twentynine Palms and participated in the remainder of the exercise and the FIREX at the conclusion.

As a result of the year's training, the 1st Field Artillery Group has maintained its readiness to participate in combat operations as required by the Commandant, delivering atomic as well as conventional munitions if required. The operational and logistical procedures for delivery of atomic weapons have been further developed as a result of maneuvers and improved equipment and weapons.

Support Units

Force Troops combat service support elements included a Detachment of 1st Force Service Regiment and "D" Company of the 7th Engineer Battalion. The former unit was redesignated and reorganized as the Support Battalion, FMFPac, on 1 July 1961 and transferred to operational control of the Marine Corps Base.

Certainly one of the busiest units in Force Troops was the engineer company. It ranged from San Clemente Island and Camp Pendleton to the San Bernardino National Forest and the far reaches of this desert base, building bridges, barricades, fuel dumps, and firing ranges.

The combat readiness of Force Troops was put to numerous training tests throughout the year, not only in unit and combined maneuvers, but in "mount-out" exercises in which all commands participated. Dead Man's Lake was established as a staging area for embarkation. Dry-land mock-ups of various amphibious vessels were outlined for loading drills. Units were given a 48-hour notice to mount out. Plans and orders were written; vehicles and equipment combat loaded; personnel processed through physical exams and shot series; reassignments effected to replace critical personnel shortages. Then the units moved—lock, stock, and barrel—to staging areas where they were inspected by general and special staff sections before loading on the dry-land ship mock-ups. These exercises proved highly beneficial to all hands.

Readiness is not solely the product of training efficiency but is dependent on the morale, health, and welfare of the individual Marine as well. Throughout the year moral leadership, physical fitness, and career advisory programs were emphasized. Reflecting this emphasis was a steady increase in reenlistment rates which climbed an average of 15% over the previous year and reached an all-time high for first term reenlistments of 50% during November 1960.

As this report was written, plans were being completed for Force Troops participation in a combat support exercise to be conducted on San Clemente Island during September 1961. USMC

(See Part II, Missiles, next page)

Force Troops FMF Pac Report, Part II:

MISSILES

By Maj R. L. Cunningham, Jr.

LAST MARCH MARINES OF THE 1ST LIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT Missile Battalion fired several Hawk missiles from a tactical area at Twentynine Palms. The result: destruction of several drone aircraft targets. Hawk doesn't miss. This type of performance adds to the fantastic expense of being in the missile business. But it proves we have bought what we want: a highly effective surface-to-air missile system suitable for employment in an expeditionary environment.

Of course, Terrier came first. Evolution of the Terrier Land Weapon System from a concept in 1948 to operational use at Twentynine Palms in 1956 involved some tedious pioneering. The end product, however, is one which the Marine Corps deserves to be proud of. Terrier's performance in training at Twentynine Palms, loading aboard ship, and landing over beaches, has proved its worth.

Employing the Terrier and Hawk systems are one Medium Anti-aircraft Missile (MAAM) Battalion equipped with Terrier, and two Light Anti-aircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalions equipped with Hawk. All three battalions are part of Force Troops, FMFPac. A third LAAM battalion is scheduled for activation next year. Each battalion consists of a Headquarters and Service battery and four missile-firing batteries.

A look at the TOs and TEs of these units provides insight into the complexity of the weapons systems and the skills needed to operate and maintain them. Terrier and Hawk Battalions have the organic capability to perform both third and fourth echelon maintenance.

Backing up the regular missile battalions are three Organized Marine Corps Reserve firing batteries training to employ the Hawk. These units are located at San Jose, Fresno, and Pasadena, Calif. No Terrier Reserve units have been activated or are planned.

Due to differences in their fire control systems, Terrier and Hawk firing batteries have differing target engagement capabilities. A Terrier battery is equipped with four dual-armed missile launchers but engages only one target at a time. Hawk batteries have six launchers, each of which may be loaded with three missiles, and may engage two targets simultaneously. After firing at a target, both systems are capable of rapid search, acquisition, and engagement of new targets.

A comparison of missions of Terrier and Hawk firing batteries shows that they complement each other very well. Terrier, with its greater range, provides protection against both low and high-altitude aircraft. Hawk, at lesser ranges, can engage aircraft flying at very low to medium altitudes. Both systems are effective against aircraft flying at slow to supersonic speeds.

Terrier and Hawk firing batteries are designed to operate from widely dispersed locations. Normal support of division-wing operations, however, requires at least a battalion for accomplishment of logistical functions. Considering the complementary capabilities of Terrier and Hawk, a composite task organization containing both weapons is desirable. The most recent example of such employment occurred in Exercise GREENLIGHT (May-Jun 1961). In this exercise a provisional anti-aircraft group was formed with four Hawk and two Terrier firing batteries, plus headquar-

ters and service elements from both type units. The group supported landings of the 1st Marine Division and 3rd Marine Air Wing over Camp Pendleton beaches.

It's virtually impossible to talk about employment of anti-aircraft missiles without discussing air operations. Integrated anti-air warfare involves coordinated employment of aircraft, AA missiles (plus other anti-aircraft surface weapons) and the controlling agencies. Tactical operations in the Force beachhead area are of vital importance, since we can't be assured of opportunities to destroy hostile aircraft and their support facilities prior to landing. The enemy must be forced to run the gauntlet in any attempt to strike our landing forces with aircraft or missiles, and the odds must be high against his getting through. The best way to insure he won't get through is to increase the probability that one of our weapons will get him. This means *both* our fighter aircraft and AA missiles must operate at maximum effectiveness without mutual interference—simultaneously—in the same environment.

When Hawk fires, Hawk hits, and Terrier's no dog either

The means to provide this delicate coordination lies in a controlling agency with positive communications to all participating elements. Development of such a controlling agency involves integrating the capabilities and functions of the Counter Air Operations Center and the Antiaircraft Operations Center. When the Marine Tactical Data System (Air) is operationally ready, the new agency will be known as the Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC).

Development of the TAOC is a joint project of 3d MAW units at El Toro and Yuma, and AA missile battalions at Twentynine Palms. Missile units join Wing units for integrated training of the controlling agency at every opportunity. The Marine Air Control Squadron provides the nucleus of the controlling agency to which anti-aircraft operations personnel and equipment are added. AA liaison representatives also serve in the Tactical Air Control Center and Direct Air Support Center. In the TACC, liaison personnel are available to assist the Tactical Air Commander by keeping him abreast of the status of missile units. Liaison personnel participate in planning, and provide the missile unit commander with current information on the ground and air intelligence situations. The representative in the DASC keeps the CAOC/AAOC and missile firing batteries abreast of what friendly aircraft are doing.

The preceding explanation of what we have in the way of AA missiles and how they operate is necessarily only introductory. It has value only when the limitations of the missile systems are understood in planning for their employment. Consequently, some of these limitations, as they affect landing force operations, must be considered and balanced against the capabilities already outlined.

Before missile firing batteries can be landed, real estate to emplace them must be secured by the assault troops. This means the locataion of suitable missile sites must be considered in planning the scheme of maneuver ashore.

Fire control equipment and missiles present very soft targets. Since the firing batteries should be widely dispersed to take advantage of the range of the missiles, protection of missile sites from hostile ground action is an important consideration in organization of the rear area.

Missile battalions are not capable of single echelon movement overland by organic means. In fact, the relative immobility of an AA missile battalion (compared to a field artillery battalion) can be a considerable liability in a fluid situation. Transportation from Division or Force Troops motor transport units will be required frequently for embarkation, unloading, and overland movement.

The family TV set sometimes suffers an operational failure due to being moved from the living room to the den. Yet, missile systems a thousands times more complex than the household cyclops are rugged enough to withstand normal handling in amphibious operations. Overland mobility of this equipment is somewhat limited. Routes over reasonably passable roads or trails should be chosen if missile services are desired on short order after arrival at the destination. Thus, engineer support to build or improve roads to missile sites, and to help dig in the equipment when emplaced, is another important planning consideration. Eventually air transportation may ease the mobility problem in many cases.

The positive communications required to conduct integrated anti-air warfare adds an additional burden to already over-loaded frequency plans. The harried communicator must prepare for solution of many problems concerned with interference and lack of adequate equipment to back up priority circuits.

But recognition of the problem is half the solution. Accepting the limitations of our AA missile systems, and providing the means to overcome them, will enable the landing force to achieve a degree of protection from air attack never before available. This isn't projected capability—it's available today. USMC



Hawk (opposite page) and Terrier (above) complement each other nicely as anti-aircraft systems

(Last of a Series)



AIMED FIRE

By Jac Weller

In his third and last article on West European fire arms and tactics, our weapons expert author covers three nations whose infantrymen believe in hitting what they shoot at—with a minimum of ammunition

FRENCH INFANTRY UNDER NAPOLEON ATTACKED WITH A SWARM OF SKIRMISHERS (*tirailleurs*) masking narrow but deep and powerful columns. These tactics worked against all continental European armies. The British under Wellington, however, were never beaten by them. For eight years ending at Waterloo, the British infantry outshot the enemy. Riflemen defeated the French smooth-bore armed tirailleurs; line infantry in two-deep formations slaughtered the French columns.

Throughout the last century and a half, Britain has consistently stressed small arms accuracy. The names Wimbledon and Bisley, where the British have held their service championships, are familiar to all riflemen. In dozens of wars, small and large, marksmanship has contributed to British tactical efficiency. In WWII, British snipers frequently gained an important ascendancy over their opponents. In heavy action, their companies and platoons delivered fewer bullets but directed them more accurately.

The Netherlands army is like the British both in weapons and in tactics. In fact, the two were united from 1940 through 1945. They have the same approach to marksmanship today.

Norway has been influenced by British accurate fire ideas, but there are additional factors here. Rugged mountains covered with forests and cut by fjords put a premium on small unit efficiency and accurate small arms fire. The Norwegian people love shooting as a sport and do it well. With a population of less than four million, upwards of 100,000 take part in annual competitions.

British Small Arms

The .303 British rimmed cartridge and the Lee-Metford (later Lee-Enfield) rifle were the best in the world in 1889. Both were kept in service too long; they are still used by British reservists and throughout the Empire. However, the active army is now completely equipped with company weapons chambered for the 7.62 NATO round. The old SMLE bolt action rifle

has been replaced with the FN, called the SLR (self-loading rifle).

The particular model of FN adopted is indicative of England's whole weapons philosophy. All FNs in the German army have a switch allowing burst fire. All British FN's can fire single shots only. Burst fire from a rifle-weight weapon was found to be impractical and inefficient because of its lack of accuracy.

On the other hand, the capability of the FN to deliver fast single shots in the fashion of a SMG has led to the replacement of all SMGs (called carbines in Britain) in rifle companies. The average soldier can score more hits in a given time at short range on several life-sized targets with the SLR than he can with bursts from a SMG. So long as accuracy can be retained, they are delighted to gain the extra power of the 7.62 NATO cartridge over their stepped-up version of the 9mm Luger.

Some Britishers were fearful that the SLR wouldn't shoot so accurately as their Rifle No. 4s. The service rifle championship matches were fired for the first time in the summer of 1960 with the new rifles. Both the average and winning scores were the highest on record, though the only rules changes were reductions in times allowed. The British in their prone rapid match from a standing position now fire ten shots in 30 seconds rather than in the 40 seconds previously allowed.

The British infantry in modern times has relied heavily on ARs. Bren guns firing .303 British ammunition were remarkably reliable. Since the magazine was on top, they could be fired more easily from low cover than any weapon requiring a feed from the bottom. The capacity of their magazines was larger also. Brens weighed over 22 pounds, but their cones of fire were smaller than any other AR save possibly the US BAR using the lower (340 rpm) cyclic rate.

When the SLR replaced the SMLEs, careful consideration was given to a similar AR using a heavier barrel and bipod mount. Actually, several different models were issued experimentally. The heaviest of these, how-

Small unit weapons and combat tactics in:

Britain

Britain's SMG is the Sterling. It weighs 7.8 pounds

Norway



Norwegians firing Luger (08) pistols

Netherlands



Experimental firing with the FN rifle

Britain's rifle is the self-loading FN. It weighs 9.9 pounds, fires single-shot. Magazine: 20 rounds

New general purpose FN machine gun recently adopted by British Army with lightest bipod mounting



Another view of FN rifle with anti-tank grenade. British name for it is SLR (self-loading rifle).

ever, appears to have weighed no more than 14.5 pounds. They were all light, handy, and graceful to look at. However, when hits were counted on targets at 500 yards, none of them did so well as the Brens. The British converted their old ARs to the 7.62 NATO round and produced new ones chambering this cartridge. The 7.62 Bren is even better, in my opinion, than the old. An entire 30-shot magazine can be held in 12 inches or less at 100 yards in one continuous burst. It's customary, however, to fire no more than four or five rounds at a time both in competitive firing and in combat.

The Sterling SMG is now standard in the British services. It's a fine reliable arm and can probably outshoot any other NATO SMG at 200 yards, but is issued to personnel whose primary job is not fighting with small arms.

Netherlands Small Arms

The Netherlands army in 1945 was equipped with British weapons. They have retained the Bren gun still chambered for the .303 British cartridge and also the British Sten SMG firing the 9mm Luger. They adopted the US M-1 Garand, however, and have an acute ammunition problem. They now need two different rifle-type ammunitions, even in their squads.

Early in the summer of 1960, the Dutch army began a realistic and practical set of tests to determine which of several different available rifles was best for their purposes. They appear to have chosen the Armalite AR-10, which is being made in the old government-owned Hembrug factory. This weapon is chambered for the 7.62 NATO round and weighs about 10 pounds. It should not be confused with the much lighter AR-15 chambered for a .223 caliber cartridge recently tested in US services.

Norwegian Small Arms

Norwegian small arms vary considerably. However, the active army uses exclusively the US M-1 rifle, the US BAR, and the German Schmeisser (MP-40) SMG. Organized reserve units have several different rifles and ARs chambered mainly for the .30-'06 cartridge. However, the third national force, the Home Guard, is equipped with many different weapons requiring a variety of ammunitions. The 6.5mm Norwegian Krag is still widely used by these men. There are also other Scandinavian arms as well as US, British, and German weapons.

No mention has been made of pistols; they are of little tactical importance in the British army. Even in armored units and auxiliary forces, carbines are taking their place. The Netherlands infantry has a few pistols, mainly for psychological reasons. Norway considers handguns more important. If they have any tactical value, it's probably because of the quickness with which they can be brought into use. This would be more valuable in a close, rugged country.

Organization and Support Weapons

British companies have no weapons platoon nor heavy weapons squads. Support weapons are organic to battalions rather than companies. They can be more efficiently employed at that level because of specialized skills required. The only exceptions are that each rifle

platoon headquarters has a standard 3.5-inch rocket launcher and a 2-inch mortar.

This mortar is unique in NATO armies. It resembles the Japanese "knee" mortar of WWII, but range cannot be varied by powder differences or by changing the depth to which the shell sinks. There are no adjustable sights. It's surprising, however, how accurately a British NCO can shoot. Within 500 yards, the weapon is as accurate as various light anti-personnel rifle grenades used in other West European armies—and much more powerful.

The Netherlands and Norwegian companies have heavy weapons platoons which are armed with US 57mm recoilless rifles and 81mm or 60mm mortars. Both have 3.5-inch rocket launchers in major company units. The Netherlands has extra Bren guns, some equipped with tripod mounts, but Norway prefers US .30 caliber air-cooled Brownings. Both company headquarters have one .50 caliber HMG.

Weapons Training

A nation desiring to take full advantage of aimed fire must first teach its soldiers to shoot. There is no shortcut; both time and money have to be spent liberally. All three nations do this willingly. They have found an additional requirement also. Young men learn faster and reach a higher level of skill under informal conditions on the ranges. Senior NCOs and even officers give "big brother" type personal attention. They don't necessarily coddle the boys. In fact, the British and Dutch NCOs are unusually good "chewers-out" when required. But each recruit knows his superiors are interested in his individual progress and want to help him. In Britain, a man's pay throughout his army career is dependent on his shooting ability. In both Holland and Norway badges for individual marksmanship are given and worn with pride.

The actual course of rifle instruction given in Britain and Norway varies somewhat from one recruit training center to another, according to facilities and personnel. All soldiers receive, however, the same basic fundamentals and lots of practice. In Holland, the same material is divided carefully into lectures and practice periods which are uniform throughout their army.

In all three armies, the first emphasis is on making recruits into competent shots with rifles and ARs. They then convert these abilities with bull's-eye targets into proficiency at combat-type firing problems. The British have recently remodeled their field exercises along US TRAINFIRE lines. If a soldier begins to shoot poorly, however, he's put back to learn holding and squeezing again. Towards the end of this training, entire squads compete with each other under conditions which are reasonably uniform from one to another, but are arranged on different time schedules so that a squad is not able to anticipate what's coming next.

This same kind of controlled firing is done in The Netherlands. The main training center at Haskam has the most efficient and complicated mechanical arrangements I've ever seen. Maj C. De Ruiter, a great combat rifleman, infantry tactician, and teacher of accuracy, has perfected a target, made mostly of rubber, which falls immediately upon being hit—without danger from ricochets into the pits. It lasts for months.

NETHERLANDS

Netherlands uses US M-1 rifle but also has a few of these AR-10s, which fire single-shot or bursts



Dutch target, made of heavy sponge rubber, falls when hit. Still works after several hundred hits

Netherlander test-firing FN rifle

British Company Tactics

A British rifle company consists of four platoons which can fight independently. Most armies consider the company to be their smallest efficient combat unit. A British platoon, however, has a quarter of the fighting potential of a company and is trained to fight alone. Its headquarters has the already mentioned launcher and mortar. The three rifle squads each have their AR and eight SLRs.

Within each squad, the Bren gun is still the basis of firepower. You have to fire this AR to appreciate it. It's awkward to look at, not too well finished, and not glaringly different from others in statistics. But if you hunch up close directly behind it, it holds beautifully. The British Bren gunners realize their squad responsibility and know how to deliver aimed fire. They expose themselves as necessary to see what they are shooting at. Their short bursts may not sound like the ripping of an MG-42-59, but they can score more hits. The squad's secondary punch, the eight SLRs, is now much more powerful without any loss in accuracy.

Offensively, a British company demands only sufficient support from battalion heavy weapons, artillery, and armor to neutralize similar enemy arms. The current rifle platoons in Britain's centuries-old infantry regiments firmly believe they can outshoot, and out-bayonet if necessary, any other comparable units in the world. A company would normally attack with two platoons in line, a third in close support, and a fourth in reserve. Depending on terrain, the attack would probably be made under cover of their own fire. Even though the weapons of a British rifle platoon are not so varied as some, they have an unusual capacity for solving emergency problems. This is particularly true of the little 2-inch mortar and their plentiful supply of Energa rifle grenades.

Defensively, a British company usually receives some assistance from the battalion heavy weapons group. The mortars (six 3-inch) are generally kept under the battalion CO, but the six 120mm recoilless rifles are positioned according to terrain. The six Vickers water-cooled HMGs are frequently assigned to front-line rifle companies. Three form a section.

These HMGs are remarkably steady. They are still chambered for the .303 British cartridge, but are used for fire similar to US .50 caliber HMG's. The less powerful cartridge, the water cooling, and the lower cyclic rate allows for longer bursts which are particularly useful at long range and at night. Normally, a company CO with a section of HMGs would consult with the officer in charge of it and place these in position to cover the company front and support each other. The platoon ARs and SLRs, however, would still be their major weapons. Col I. W. Gore-Langton, Commandant of the Tactical Wing at the British School of Infantry, explained their point of view.

"We realize that frequently in modern war the enemy isn't visible. However, the real value of one's own infantry is still to shoot men, or at least to concentrate fire in small areas containing motion. During the days, or even weeks, when infantry isn't firing at visible targets, it's really just standing by. Area fire can be delivered more efficiently by other means. When one needs infantry badly—that is, when the enemy is visible —nothing else will take its place. This may last for a

Norway's automatic rifle is the familiar US BAR and these recruits are learning how to shoot it



SMG instruction with the Schmeisser MP-40

few minutes only, but it's what you call the payoff. If our chaps do well aiming at the enemy, we will win. All the rest of the time is really secondary. The infantry has to be there continuously, but its major contribution is its aimed fire delivered at the climax of battle."

The Colonel, whose right sleeve is empty as a result of WWII infantry combat, then went on to explain that practically undirected fire may be psychologically important, particularly with inexperienced troops. He found that three Brens were required to make as much noise as one MG-42. Shooting at men under combat conditions, however, he believes one Bren was as good as two MG-42s.

The Netherlands Company Tactics

Much of the tactical thinking of the Dutch is patterned after the British. A Netherlands company has a heavy weapons platoon, but essentially this is an organizational difference. A battalion has about the same weapons potential in both services. Perhaps the British heavy weapons are a bit more efficiently handled, but they are more numerous in Dutch battalions. The real reliance in both services is on aimed fire from ARs and rifles.

Maj De Ruiter, already mentioned, gave me several interesting observations. His personal opinions in the field of small arms are practically the equivalent of those of his government. In a larger army, he would be a general officer. He directed all small arms training, organized the present methods of instruction, and was in charge of the experiments which led to the choice of the Armalite. He is strong for accuracy. Says the Major:

"Any rifle-weight weapon capable of full automatic fire is disadvantageous in the hands of normal soldiers. In the stress of actual fighting, they will fire bursts and hit little. When the weapon is chambered for a rifle cartridge, you can't fire accurately more than the first shot, save in a prone position, no matter how good you are. Even a SMG isn't really accurate in bursts the way it's normally used. I would like to see the new AR-10, semi-automatic only, take the place of most of our SMGs. They won't be so easy to carry around, but they are much better for fighting."

The Major then made an observation based on his experience during the latter part of 1944. Dutch infantry would open up with bursts from ARs and SMGs as they made the final rush on German positions. The enemy would wait for this sudden crescendo of fire to come out of their foxholes. The spraying of bullets over a general area seldom hurt anyone, but emptied weapons. When the infantrymen were persuaded to hold their fire until they saw something to shoot at, the enemy positions were more easily taken.

Norwegian Company Tactics

Norway is long, slender, and rugged; only the bulbous southern tip has much normal terrain. Much of the country is covered by forests and cut by fjords. The winters are long, snowy, and dark. There are not many Norwegians, nor do they have a really powerful economy. The Russians are their only likely enemies. There are 195 kilometers of common border with the Soviet Union.

The Norwegians look to NATO for ultimate victory if war comes, but realize they can receive only limited help quickly. Even the Russians, however, won't have

Close-up view of Schmeisser SMG. It weighs 10.6 lbs, fires 475 rpm

Norway's rifle is the US M-1 and many are equipped with scopes. Norwegians emphasize sniper shooting

Norwegian recruit firing at 300 meters with M-1

enough men and material to attack in overwhelming strength in Norway and throughout Central Europe too. The Norwegians probably won't have to contend with forces greatly larger than their own.

Norway isn't going to attack anyone; they realize that national survival may depend on their ability to defend themselves. At company level, however, the offense is stressed more than anywhere else in NATO. Local victory will depend on their ability to hit hard and often with small units to keep the enemy (probably more heavily armed but in Norwegian terrain less mobile) off balance. They may fight fairly normal infantry actions in the southern peninsula, but elsewhere the unusual terrain will be the controlling factor.

A Norwegian company is organized, armed, and trained to function independently when necessary. Even in peacetime, company commanders have much to do with the day-to-day living of their units. They take advantage of the pre-induction skills of their soldiers too. It's seldom necessary to teach skiing. A surprisingly large percentage of recruits already know much about hunting and living in the woods; some are sniper class shots. Boys brought up to fishing can handle small craft, which is important even for infantry in this land of abounding coastline.

An independent company offensive in Norway will probably depend largely on the personal weapons of their infantrymen. They like their fine US-supplied heavy weapons and will take full advantage of these if circumstances permit. But in difficult blind terrain where surprise and short, bloody combat is usual, rifles, SMGs, and even pistols are often employed. Accurate sniper fire at medium to long range is also useful because of the excellent cover provided throughout most of the country. There are more US M-1 rifles with scopes attached in Norway than I ever saw before.

Defensively, a Norwegian company will rely more proportionately on its heavy weapons. The countryside abounds in good positions. They like their US communications equipment. They make full use of field telephones and short range radios. In a company defensive position, they will fight as a unit, even where terrain requires an irregular positioning of the various elements. Their heavy weapons fire, however, will be but preliminary to the aimed fire from ARs and rifles. Aided by terrain well known to them, but not the enemy, they will be tough. Germany was never able to take the northern part of the country in WWII, didn't even control large rugged areas in the south.

The Norwegian Home Guard is unusual. Records subject to possible capture by the enemy or subversive forces are kept to a minimum. Organization above platoon level is not attempted. The platoon and squad leaders keep, in their homes, ammunition and heavy weapons. Home Guardsmen have permanent possession of their personal arms. The Home Guard could cooperate with the regular army and its reserves for the defense of the entire nation; it will continue to function even if an area is temporarily overrun by the enemy. These men probably shoot better than any other comparable group in the world.

Conclusions

The three nations we have discussed all have centuries of military experience. In WWII, one was entirely occupied, another 70% dominated, and the third was for months close to defeat. They fought on, however, and were ultimately victorious. They know much of infantry fighting; their older men have heard the awesome noise of MG-42s spitting out bullets 1,400 per minute in their direction. They still want aimed fire, not only from a few trained men using telescope sights, but also from their squad riflemen and AR gunners. They are bending every effort to develop this ability along with other soldierly qualities as the best means of preserving their way of life. USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

Devil Dog

THEY SEPARATED THE MEN from the boys right fast in Officer Candidate's Class in 1942. One Candidate could not learn to give commands properly and was marked for the ax. Before it fell, however, he was given a last chance to march the company to the rifle range.

He lasted halfway. On the return trip his voice was in the upper register and nearly in orbit. Behind the Quantico Brig he squeaked out a shaky "Column Right."

The Brig dog barked. The regular company commander, one platoon leader and a platoon sergeant actually rolled on the ground howling.

And the company broke off perfectly on the only command given on the proper foot all day.

$15 to Navy Relief



Back in 1959 a young US Marine Captain was ordered to England where he attended the rugged . . .

. . . and lived to tell this tale. At first, though, he thought for sure he'd had the bloody course.

Capt Alfred J. Croft

A PATCH OF SOD SHIFTED BENEATH MY FOOT AND I lurched sprawling into the bog. For a moment I lay there exhausted while the slime oozed through my clothing. It was my third ducking of a miserable afternoon.

There was nothing to do but get up and splash wearily on. Less than half way through the endurance course, there were still four torturous miles of forest and swamp between me and the finish line.

On the previous day I had begun commando training and had lost my lunch during the first PT period. Today I was lagging off pace and gasping for breath in the process.

Since arriving in England for a year's attachment to the Royal Marines, I had adhered to a self-imposed conditioning program. Despite this, I was woefully out of shape for the task at hand.

Was I going soft?

Could I ever look another Marine in the eye if I failed the course?

I didn't know it then, but commando training is intended to evoke such spasms of despair—and to provide the wherewithal for dispelling them.

The purpose of the Royal Marine Commando Course is development of individual self-reliance, physical fitness, and *esprit de corps*. To accomplish this, a simple psychology is employed: Confront a man with a challenge more severe than any he has encountered before; train him to master it; force him to if necessary; and once he's licked it, he'll be ready to tackle anything.

So important to the Royal Marines is this philosophy that the Commando Course climaxes all basic training. It is attended by each officer immediately upon completion of the British equivalent of Basic School, and by every recruit after 22 weeks of boot training. As our Corps prides itself in the assertion that every man is a rifleman, Royal Marines boast that every man is a commando.

When I first reported to the Infantry Training Center, Lympstone, Devon, my knowledge of commandos was strictly from Hollywood. An initial briefing soon brought me up to date. The first commandos were Boer guerrillas who harried the British during the South African War. The British appropriated their Afrikaans sobriquet to designate the elite forces created in 1940 for "combined operations" against Festung Europa. After WWII, the Royal Marines were awarded the mission of maintaining commando forces. An accompanying legacy was the commando tradition of tough, resourceful aggressiveness.

"This course won't be easy," the briefing officer concluded. "A lot of bones and muscles will start aching today. Make up your mind to let them hurt—and get on with the job!"

My class was a typical squad of 36 recruits, mostly from London or Glasgow. Their various dialects were bewildering at first, but through the resonant "Rs" and dropped "aiches" I heard the same earthy commentary that reverberates through USMC squadbays. These

Capt Croft wrote "Commando Course" because he believes Royal Marine training offers ideas that USMC can use. He calls his own boot training (in 1950, after WWII service in Army Air Corps) "a stimulating experience." Commissioned in 1951 after nine months enlisted service, he stayed on at MCS Quantico for two years, made it to Korea in time to earn a battle star (as ExO, M/4/11). He got a BS degree from Fordham Univ in 1949, worked as a newspaper reporter (Rutland, Vt., Daily Herald) until summoned to active duty. Right now he's ExO, Artillery Demonstration Btry, at Quantico.

lads were Marines all right. Within a few days I was to make the transition from "the American officer" to "Captain Yank."

Our instructors, a lieutenant and four NCOs, quickly took us in hand. Subsequent experience confirmed my initial impression that they were competent, enthusiastic, and in top physical shape. Assignment to the Commando School staff is coveted, and supervisory personnel are carefully screened. Within seconds, we were doubling toward our first training appointment.

Training areas are at a premium in populous Britain. In this respect Lympstone is fortunately situated. Extensive common land, a maze of rural byways, and the shoreline cliffs of the River Exe are nearby. In addition, the dreary expanse of Dartmoor is only a truck ride away. Every Conan Doyle reader will appreciate the suitability of the wet, windswept moorland for rugged training. So forbidding is the area that even the road-gangs from Dartmoor Prison hooted with glee as we passed. It was heartening to know that our exertions afforded pleasure to someone.

Chief among those exertions were five challenges: the Tarzan course, speedmarching, cross-country movement, battle physical training, and the endurance course. Each of these demands optimum physical exertion and determination. To win a green beret, one must accomplish each feat in the prescribed time and/or manner with full pack and rifle. Repeated practice is scheduled and the training tempo intensifies daily, developing stamina for an all-out effort during the final week. Failure to perform any requirement at the end of the six-week course results in retention at Lympstone until qualification is achieved. Persistent failure results in separation from the service.

My introduction to the endurance course has already been described in part. Trainees must double through 6½ miles of brutal country in order to finish within the required 80 minutes. The half-mile swamp provides the exception to this rule. To traverse it, a route must be improvised from clod to clod. A misstep plunges one waist deep in mire or, as I discovered, on his face.

From the first day, when battle physical training proved too much for my digestive system, that element of the course proved most distasteful. Each PT period consists of violent calisthenics and hand-to-hand combat, interspersed by obstacle course run. 30-foot (unknotted) rope climb, and the fireman's lift. The latter diversion, similar to our battlefield rescue test, is executed at the double over a 200-yard course. With another human being and two sets of gear to carry, that last hundred yards is an agony.

The Tarzan course, a tree top maze of ropes, is guaranteed to tax the simian talents of the ape-man himself. After swinging and cat-crawling for some hundred precarious yards, one is obliged to stop midway along the final strand, hang by two hands and a leg, and regain his initial position atop the rope. Failure to execute this "high regain" results in a 25-foot plunge into a straw pile of minimum density. The Tarzan course was immediately followed by a brisk trot over the obstacle course for a total time of 25 minutes.

On paper, speedmarching is a simple process. Just pack 36 men into a tight formation and move them at the rate of one mile every ten minutes. That's all there is to it. The Royal Marines complicate the situation by routing these jaunts over winding, plunging Devon lanes. Preliminary four- and six-mile excursions are included in the schedule. The final "nine miler" is particularly hard on the legs and lungs, but it demonstrates the necessity for hanging together as a unit—even if it means carrying a few laggards to do so.

Cross-country exercises, on the other hand, test individual speed and endurance. Midway through the course, trainees make a 15-mile map march across the

"Cat Crawl"

moor at night. The final week is climaxed by a 30-mile daylight ordeal which must be completed in seven hours. At this stage, most trainees are in peak condition, and times of six hours or less are not unusual.

Accompanying the overall emphasis on physical stamina is the constant reminder that Marines must be prepared to fight under conditions of exhaustion. Thus, all hands are required to fire five rounds at a bobbing target upon completion of each speedmarch, Tarzan, and endurance course. Five hits deduct two minutes from the total time. Less than four hits add two minutes for each miss.

But the Commando Course isn't all grind. One week, for example, is devoted to cliff climbing and raiding techniques. These are combined into a night raiding problem which is planned and executed by trainees.

Recalling recent experience in Malaya and Cyprus, the Royal Marines stress anti-guerrilla training in a three-day exercise against aggressors. The "terrorists" operate around the clock according to an imaginative script. Ambushes, patrols, searches, and interrogation are cranked into the problem. The citizenry of Dartmoor is surprisingly cooperative, permitting even noc-

turnal kidnappings at a local pub.

No discussion of commando training is complete without a word about the weather. Although fog and rain are commonplace in Devon, training is never cancelled on either account. One blanket and an absorbent poncho are the only amenities provided. On bivouac, trainees must choose between being wet on top or underneath. This dilemma is intentionally introduced. A Marine must learn to accept discomfort and make the best of it. Thus, trainees are obliged to brew a "wet of tea" thrice daily, regardless of climatic conditions. In time, I ceased to miss coffee and happily seared my insides with the great British fortifier whenever the opportunity afforded. Royal Marines maintain that the Commando Course best serves its purpose during periods of foul weather. Whenever the elements prove insufficient, supervisory personnel are quick to improvise alternate harassment.

Small unit tactics, live firing, and camouflage round out the curriculum, along with a series of "I Was There" lectures by veteran campaigners.

Through all of this, trainees are required to appear on dress parade, stand the duty, and attend weekly church formations. With brass to polish, a filthy rifle to clean each night, and laundry to wash, recruits are hard pressed to catch up on all the sleep their bodies crave.

The Commando Course is obviously no holiday. It

"High Regain"

is rough, exhausting, and emotionally demanding. But it almost always accomplishes what it sets out to do—to build rugged, confident, spirited Marines. Once the ordeal is done, the erstwhile trainee dons his green beret with a pronounced tilt and strides into the ranks of his beloved Corps. To this end, the emphasis on commando training is amply justified.

There is a reverse side to the coin, however. Top physical condition attained during the course is seldom maintained. Although PT is stressed in commando units, the initial standard is difficult to preserve.

Hollywood has fed us a lot of tall stories about commandos. "Are they really that tough?" American Marines ask. "Should we run a Commando Course?"

The answer to the latter query is no. Limited to 16 weeks to convert a civilian into a basically trained Marine, we simply do not have the time to incorporate such a course into recruit or ICT syllabi. And Basic School is long enough as it is. Too, much of the training included in the Commando Course is already provided.

"How does the Commando Course compare with the USMC physical readiness test?"

Commando training is tougher. But remember, it is undergone by officers and recruits after five months of intense prior conditioning. Many a Royal Marine, far removed from Lympstone, would have to get himself back into shape before tackling our physical readiness test.

"Could the average boot camp and Basic School graduate pass the Commando Course?" Of course he could! The vital prerequisite is determination. Marines have never lacked that quality.

"What, then, does the Commando Course offer that we can use?" It offers some good ideas.

For example: The problem of maintaining uniformly high standards of physical condition is a difficult one. Yet, we are prone to look for solutions in calisthenics and an occasional hike. Why not mix up the program? The physical readiness test provides a good point of departure. Why not add more spice with endurance course competitions between fire teams, speedmarch races between platoons, and the introduction of Tarzan courses—excellent arm and shoulder developers?

The "I was there" lecture offers possibilities too. Experienced public speakers tell us the easiest subject to talk about is one's self. Here is an opportunity for NCO veterans with little instructional background to start their teaching careers the easy way. Tied in with combat films, such talks would be ideal for troop information periods.

Considering the state of the world, company size anti-guerrilla exercises are worthy of consideration. This facet of military science is all too often relegated to a spare hour in the training schedule.

Like all good training programs, the Commando Course offers ideas. But of primary interest to us is its adherence to the training precepts in which we believe. Like the US, Britain is a prosperous nation somewhat addicted to creature comforts. Yet our brother Marines across the Atlantic have refused to wax fat on their reputations. They persist in demanding the highest standard of discipline and fitness. They know that only tough training can build fighters. Thus, the Leatherneck tradition spans the seas.

Men of many lands have braved the rigors of Dartmoor as guests of the Royal Marines. Few enjoyed the experience at the time. But all, I am certain, departed with two things in mind: First, a sense of appreciation for the effectiveness of Commando training; second, a distinct feeling of personal achievement.

I still have my green beret. I will always cherish it.

USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

Mexican Standoff

After running the recruit sentry through his general and special orders the Lieutenant Officer of the Day started to quiz him on Marine Corps history. "What does the red stripe on the blue uniform stand for?"

"For all the NCOs that died in the Battle of Chapultepec, Sir!"

"Aha . . . did only NCOs die in that battle?"

"No sir! A hell of a lot of Mexicans did too!"

$15.00 to Lt Peter S. Beck

MARINES AROUND THE WORLD

FIRST OF A SERIES

Royal Marines, UK

By Carl H. Strandberg

Britain's Royal Marines were organized 298 years ago this month and here's a short, snappy salute to our seniors on their anniversary. Future issues will spotlight other Marine Corps of the free world. Next in sight if all goes right: Philippine Marines, November, 1961.

OCTOBER 28, 1961 WILL MARK THE BEGINNING OF the 298th year in which Royal Marines have served their nation as part of the Royal Navy. During this period, they have taken part in every sea battle in which the Royal Navy has been engaged, and have fought in every major war on land.

Organized in 1664 during the reign of King Charles II, this proud force was originally known as "The Duke of York and Albany's Maritime Regiment of Foot." Before that the duties of Marines, both ashore and afloat, were performed by various regiments of the British Army, assigned on a rotating basis.

Enlisted members of the present-day Royal Marines normally enlist for nine years. They may enter and serve in three different categories: Junior Marines, who enter service between the ages of 16 and 17; Junior Buglers, who enter between the ages of 15 and 16½; and Marines, who enter between the ages of 17 and 28.

Known as the "Long Service" engagement, the nine-year enlistment contract includes only service performed beyond the individual Marine's 16th birthday. A Junior Bugler, for example, enlisting in the Royal Marines at 15½, actually serves 11½ years during his first enlistment if he accepts the option of transferring to General Service. This opportunity is offered him at the age of 17.

Upon completing nine years of service after the age of 18, enlisted Royal Marines may volunteer to "re-engage" for five years. During this five-year re-engagement period, they are given an opportunity to volunteer for additional service.

Normal retirement occurs after 22 years of service. Opportunities for further re-engagement are available to outstanding Royal Marines, allowing them to serve more than 22 years. Those accepted for further re-engagement receive increased pensions on retirement.

Enlisted ranks are marine, corporal, sergeant, color sergeant, quartermaster sergeant, and regimental sergeant major.

Royal Marine officers are commissioned from the ranks, or upon graduation from civilian schools at the high school level. If commissioned from civilian schools, new officers receive the rank of 2d lieutenant and are immediately assigned to a Royal Marine training school. The young officers receive two years intensive training, corresponding to US Marine Corps Basic School, and are then assigned to field units.

Commissions from the ranks can be obtained in two ways. Outstanding Royal Marine recruits under 22 years of age may be selected for "General List Commissions," which correspond to regular unrestricted commissions in the US Marine Corps.

Much as in the US Marine Corps Limited Duty program, highly qualified specialists up to the age of 38 may obtain commissions on the "Special Duties List." Ranks in the Special Duties List include 2d lieutenant, lieutenant, captain, and major, with appropriate letters after the rank-title to indicate the nature of the officer's duties.

General List commissioned ranks are 2d lieutenant, lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, major general, lieutenant general and general. Three acting brigadier ranks are authorized under the current structure. These correspond to our brigadier general, and are conferred on senior colonels assigned as brigade commanders.

The Royal Marine "boot camp" is located at Deal, in Kent. During the 15-week basic recruit training period, Royal Marines receive training comparable to that given at Parris Island and San Diego.

Following basic recruit training, all Royal Marines attend a two-week course in basic seamanship aboard one of Her Majesty's ships at Portsmouth. Three other



RM detachment aboard HMS Cleopatra. Sea duties are similar to those of our own seagoing Marines

phases of recruit training follow.

The first of these is known as the "Amphibious Warfare Acquaint" course. This phase, lasting one week, is conducted by the British Joint Services Amphibious Warfare Center at Poole.

The next phase corresponds to training given in the Infantry Training Regiments at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton. This phase, lasting ten weeks, is conducted at the Infantry Training Center at Lympstone.

The final phase, also conducted at Lympstone, is devoted to commando training. This rugged seven-week course includes cliff climbing, stream crossing, rubber boat training, and parachute training. Parachute training, however, is restricted to selected individuals who will be assigned to special units. (See p. 53)

All elements of this intensive training are useful to the Royal Marine during his nine-year Long Service Engagement. Normal service includes tours afloat and ashore, in each of three categories.

Royal Marines provide seagoing detachments in Her Majesty's cruisers, aircraft carriers, and other ships of the Fleet. In each of these ships Marines man part of the armament and usually one or more of the ship's boats.

Prior to assignment aboard ship, each man completes a Sea School course. In addition to spit and polish training, instruction is given in gunnery. Gunnery training is limited to that required to man the guns of the ship to which the Marines are to be assigned.

Ship's Detachments are also always ready to act as landing parties when required, to render assistance in case of disaster, or to restore order where there is unrest.

All Royal Marines also serve as members of a Commando Brigade sometime during their Long Service Engagements. Many US Marines recall vividly the valiant service of the men of the 41 Royal Marine Commando who served with the 1st Marine Division in the black early days of Korea, at the time of the Hungnam withdrawal.

The third main task of the Royal Marines is carried out by what are called Amphibious Units. These units man the Navy's small landing craft, which may be required to carry Commandos to the beaches. Amphibious Units also provide raiding and beach parties. Some of their members also perform duties similar to U.S. Navy UDT teams and USMC reconnaissance companies. These men receive special training as underwater swimmers and as canoeists.

The Royal Marines are divided into two branches—the General Duties Branch and the Technical Branch.

Most men belong to the General Duties Branch, which consists of ten categories. These categories are: Assault Engineer, Cliff Leader, Drill Instructor, Heavy Weapons, Landing Craft, Naval Gunnery, Parachutist, Physical Training Instructor, Platoon Weapons, and Swimmer Canoeist.

The Technical Branch consists of two principal categories: Tradesmen and Non-Tradesmen.

Tradesmen sub-categories, 14 in number, consist of duties which have civilian counterparts. Included, for example, are such specialists as topographical draftsmen.

All military Non-Tradesmen sub-categories, three in number, consist of duties which are either exclusively military, or are broad application and not considered "Trades by the British. "Signaller" is considered to be exclusively military, while the remaining two, "clerk" and "cook," belong to the latter category.

Assignment to specific branches and categories normally occurs during recruit training or immediately following.

The Royal Marines have no air arm. Close air support is provided by the Fleet Air Arm. Helicopters for Commando operations are normally provided by the Fleet Air Arm. Some Royal Marine officers, however, are now receiving training as helicopter pilots.

The Royal Marines number about 9,000 men, less than half the pre-WWII strength of the U.S. Marine Corps. Many old-timers will no doubt recognize characteristics of this small, hard-hitting force reminiscent of "The Old Corps." USMC

ROLES AND MISSIONS

In the United Kingdom, responsibility for amphibious warfare is a joint services matter. Nevertheless, the Royal Marines are the only amphibious troops and play a major role in the organization and execution of this joint services responsibility.

The missions of the Royal Marines are to provide: (1) Detachments in Her Majesty's Ships; (2) Commando units; (3) Crews for minor landing craft; (4) The Naval Shore Party; and (5) Special boat sections.

—Extracted from "Marine Corps' of the World," MCEC, MCS, Quantico, Va.

FMF 1965

Proposed Organization and Major Equipment





FORCE ARTILLERY FLEET MARINE FORCE

CONCEPT—Force Artillery, located in Force Troops of FMF Lant and Pac, is normally organized into one or more field artillery groups. FAG consists of a headquarters battery and 8" howitzer (SP), 155mm gun (SP), and heavy artillery rocket batteries as assigned for any particular mission. FAG may operate as an entity, with mission of reinforcing fires organic to one or more divisions.

It may be attached to a division, operate as a G/S or reinforcing battalion of Artillery Regiment.

In larger operations where more than a single FAG would be present, groups of varying composition would normally operate under control of Force Artillery headquarters (not shown).

MISSION—To provide additional general support artillery for Fleet Marine Force.

COMMAND AND STAFF—Command functions are exercised through group headquarters section of headquarters battery, and the commanders of separate batteries.

COMMUNICATIONS—Internal group headquarters communications is normally by wire; to firing batteries by voice radio; to higher echelons via radio.

INTELLIGENCE—Group has organic target acquisition capability in air observer section of HqBtry (four artillery AOs). S-2 section of group headquarters has counter-battery officer, two photo interpreters, intelligence assistants.

FIRE POWER—Group has composite inventory of howitzers, guns and rockets varying from minimum 100-yd direct fire to maximum range of improved 762mm rockets. Other: infantry weapons for security patrols and local perimeter defense; man-portable SAM (Surface-to-air missile) system.

MOBILITY—Self-propelled (SP) guns and howitzers; truck-mounted rocket launchers.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Internal structure of Force Artillery batteries as recommended by MCLFDC is exactly the same as present "M" Series. There is, however, a recommended change in number of batteries in Force Troops (Note comparison on facing page). This is caused primarily by moving 155mm howitzer batteries, currently in Force Troops artillery, to General Support Battalion of proposed Artillery Regiment (see FMF 1965, GAZETTE: July '61). Since batteries remain essentially the same we have omitted "M" Series T/O charts for portion of this report devoted to Force Artillery batteries. (Also, see *Force Artillery*, page 26.)

HQ BTRY, FAG

CONCEPT—Consists of group headquarters which directs tactical operations of assigned batteries; a comm platoon; fire control elements which provide fire direction, survey and meteorological information to batteries; service support elements; a battery headquarters. Physical layout, support and displacements incident to group headquarters are directed toward providing the group commander and his staff with the most effective means for directing and controlling assigned batteries.

FIREPOWER—Infantry weapons for security patrols, local perimeter defense; man-portable SAM for low level anti-air defense.

MOBILITY — Uses organic vehicles. Transportation is provided from pool of general purpose vehicles maintained within headquarters section. Vehicles transport command and staff, comm gear, survey crews, supplies to firing batteries, make emergency medical evacuations.


PROPOSED
HEADQUARTERS BATTERY
FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP
USMC Off 22 Enl 121
USN Off 2 Enl 2
GROUP HQ
**22 Off **107 Enl
HQ SECT 2 Off 3 Enl
OPNS PLT 5 Off 34 Enl
COMM PLT 1 Off 39 Enl
BTRY HQ 2 Off 16 Enl
S-1 SECT 2 Off 7 Enl
FD SECT 3 Off 7 Enl
PLT HQ 1 Off 4 Enl
WIRE SECT 0 Off 8 Enl
HQ SECT 2 Off 11 Enl
S-2 SECT 6 Off 4 Enl
SURVEY SECT 1 Off 16 Enl
RADIO SECT 0 Off 20 Enl
MSG CENT 0 Off 7 Enl
MESS SECT 0 Off 5 Enl
S-4 SECT 3 Off 4 Enl
METRO SECT 1 Off 11 Enl
MED SECT *2 Off **2 Enl
SUP SECT 1 Off 14 Enl
ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
ORDNANCE
35 Pistol
112 M14 Rifle
4 M60 MG
2 3.5" RL
VEHICLES
8 1/4T 2-Wh Trlr
4 3/4T Trlr
2 1 1/2T Trlr
3 Water Tr Trlr
10 1/4T Trk
4 3/4T Trk
7 2 1/2T Trk
1 1/4T Ambulance
COMMUNICATIONS
3 AN/MRC-83 Radio
2 AN/MRC-37 Radio
4 AN/TRR-5 Receiver
4 AN/GRC-9 Radio
6 AN/PRC-6 Radio
2 AN/PRC-9 Radio
2 MAY-1 Radio
1 AN/GND-1A RAWIN (Metro device)
*Abbreviations: OPNS—Operations; FD—Fire Direction; METRO—Meteorological; MSG CENT—Message Center
**Includes 2 USN

HAR BTRY

CONCEPT—Consists of battery headquarters and two launcher platoons, two 762mm rocket launchers (Honest John) each. Platoons can operate independently. Liaison section is provided. Battery delivers nuclear and highly lethal HE warheads within and beyond range of general support guns and howitzers. Firing data prepared at both battery and platoon level.

MISSION—Same as 8" How Btry.

COMMUNICATIONS—Same as 155 mm Gun Btry.

INTELLIGENCE—Same as 155mm Gun Btry.

FIREPOWER — Four truck-mounted rocket launchers and two helicopter-transportable launchers (XM33). Only four launchers are operated during operations. HJ rocket delivers medium yield nuclear warhead, conventional HE warhead. Range depends on type of warhead used. Other: Same as 155mm Gun Btry.


PROPOSED
HEAVY ARTILLERY ROCKET BATTERY
FORCE ARTILLERY
USMC Off 12 Enl 152
USN Off 0 Enl 3
BTRY HQ 4 Off **49 Enl
ROCKET PLT 4 Off **53 Enl
HQ SECT 1 Off *10 Enl
FD SECT 2 Off 4 Enl
PLT HQ & FDC SECT 3 Off **8 Enl
RAL SECT 1 Off 8 Enl
LN SECT 1 Off 1 Enl
COMM SECT 0 Off 14 Enl
COMM SECT 0 Off 7 Enl
LAUNCHER SECT 0 Off 13 Enl
MAINT SECT 0 Off 15 Enl
MESS SECT 0 Off 5 Enl
SURVEY SECT 0 Off 4 Enl
ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
ORDNANCE
25 Pistol
136 M14 Rifle
6 M14 (Mod)
13 M60 MG
6 3.5" RL
4 HJ Rocket
COMMUNICATIONS
3 AN/MRC-83 Radio
3 AN/MRC-37 Radio
2 AN/TRR-5 Receiver
4 AN/GRC-9 Radio
6 AN/PRC-6 Radio
8 AN/PRC-9 Radio
VEHICLES
4 1/4T 2-Wh Trlr
10 3/4T Trlr
4 1 1/2T Trlr
2 Water Tk Trlr
6 1/4T Trk
11 3/4T Trk
10 2 1/2T Trk
4 5T Wrecker
1 1/4T Ambulance
4 Rocket Trlr
*Abbreviations: FD—Fire Direction; LN—Liaison; RAL—Rocket Assembly and Load; HJ—Honest John; FDC—Fire Direction Center
**Includes 1 USN

FMF 1965

8" HOW BATTERY

CONCEPT—Consists of battery headquarters and three platoons, two howitzers each. Self-propelled guns and nuclear capability permit diversity in employment. Normally operates as unit but platoons are easily detached for separate missions, e.g., general support for division, reinforcing fires of other artillery units, general support of or attachment to a task groupment.

MISSION—To provide general artillery support and reinforcing fire to units of a force, division or task groupment

INTELLIGENCE—No organic target acquisition or intelligence gathering capability. Target information is provided via normal artillery fire direction and intelligence channels.

FIRE DIRECTION—Capable of setting up a battery FDC which is used in centralized battery fire control. Platoons can set up own FDC.

FIREPOWER—Six 8" howitzers (SP) having direct fire capability of 91 meters minimum; maximum range: 16,850 meters. Battery has low yield nuclear delivery capability. Other: infantry weapons for security patrols, local perimeter defense; low level anti-air defense capability is provided by man-portable SAM (Surface-to-air missile).



155MM GUN BTRY

CONCEPT—Consists of battery headquarters and two platoons, four guns each. Battery can sub-divide into two units for independent operations. Liaison section is provided. Battery may be attached to a division or a force field artillery group.

MISSION—To provide artillery support beyond range and effective capabilities of division general support artillery and reinforcing fire to units of force, division or task groupment.

COMMUNICATIONS — Primarily wire, internally. External communications normally via radio. Battery is capable of entering prescribed FAG (Field Artillery Group) or reinforced unit nets.

INTELLIGENCE—Fire missions (targets) received from field artillery group, artillery regiment to which attached or artillery unit which battery is reinforcing.

FIREPOWER — Eight 155mm guns (SP) having direct fire capability of 90 meters; maximum range: 23,400 meters. Other: infantry weapons for security patrols, local perimeter defense; low-level anti-air defense capability is provided by man-portable SAM



FORCE RECON COMPANY

CONCEPT—Does not function as a tactical unit; small scout teams acquire information of enemy, weather and terrain for landing force via special missions or by setting up OPs at vantage spots.

Recon teams dropped by parachute or landed from submarine report raw information via radio directly to landing force commander; do not produce intelligence.

Teams can also guide initial helicopter waves to LZ, perform pathfinder missions within general landing area, not including LZ traffic control.

(Recommended ForReconCo doubles capability of each FMF for pre-assault and distant post-assault reconnaissance; bigger, more flexible capability for pathfinder terminal guidance missions is assured; six-platoon structure meets small unit requirement for concurrent support of widely separated forces.)

MISSION — Conduct pre-assault and distant post-assault recon in support of landing force.

COMMAND AND STAFF—Company commander, small executive type staff plan, direct and supervise execution of assigned missions.

COMMUNICATIONS—Aerial relay via hand-held survival type UHF radio, submarine relay via underwater sound equipment, naval comm facility relay via man-portable HF gear and sky-wave propagation techniques.

INTELLIGENCE — Limited intelligence production to serve company commander; S-2 section prepares patrol reports, briefs and debriefs patrols.

FIREPOWER — No offensive combat capability. Side arms (pistol or SMG). Support Marines carry M14 rifle.

MOBILITY—Strategic movement via plane/parachute or submarine/swimmer-boat.

LOGISTICS—S&S Platoon carries only authorized allowances, FSR provides additional supplies, maintenance, medical support and transportation.

ADMINISTRATION — Simplified self-administration.

MAINTENANCE — 1st echelon on company gear, 2d echelon on engineer, MT, ordnance and electronics. Parachute maintenance.

TRANSPORTATION—Small, organic multi-purpose vehicles for comm; vehicles for resupply in secure area.

SUPPLY—30-day operational level of replenishment of parachutes. Capable in field of 5-day operational level of replenishment supplies and equipment. Capable of aerial delivery resupply of deeply emplaced teams.


PROPOSED
FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
USMC Off 12 Enl 148
USN Off 0 Enl 2
CO HQ 5 Off 27 Enl
†OPNS SECT 2 Off 7 Enl
COMM SECT 1 Off 15 Enl
HQ SECT 2 Off 5 Enl
†S&S PLT 1 Off °39 Enl
PLT HQ 1 Off °4 Enl
SUP SECT 0 Off 9 Enl
MESS SECT °0 Off 3 Enl
†PM&R SECT 0 Off 10 Enl
MT SECT 0 Off 10 Enl
†AMEM SECT 0 Off 3 Enl
RECON PLT 1 Off 14 Enl
PLT HQ 1 Off 2 Enl
RECON TEAM 0 Off 4 Enl
ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
ORDNANCE
9 Pistol
53 M14 Rifle
100 M3A1 SMG
2 50cal MG
18 Demolition
VEHICLES
3 ¼T 2-Wh Trlr
5 1½T Trlr
1 Water Tk Trlr
6 2½T Trk
5 ¼T Trk (Mighty Mite when available)
COMMUNICATIONS
1 AN/MRC-83 Radio (Veh)
2 AN/GRA-6 Radio
20 AN/PRC-47 Radio
20 AN/URC-10 Radio
22 AN/PRC-42 Radio
20 AN/PRC-41 Radio
OTHER
45 Diving Set
24 CO2 Landing Boat
248 Parachute
8 Outboard Motors
150 Panel Marker
20 35mm Camera (Still Picture)
7 35mm Camera (Movie)
20 M110A Camera (Polaroid)
2 70mm Camera
1 Slide Projector
1 Movie Projector
†Abbreviations: OPNS—Operations; S&S—Supply and Service; PM&R—Parachute Maintenance and Repair; AMEM—Amphibious Equipment Maintenance
°Includes 2 USN


"M" SERIES
FORCE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY
USMC Off 14 Enl 147
USN Off 0 Enl 2
†PP PLT 4 Off 33 Enl
PLT HQ 1 Off 3 Enl
†LZP TEAM 1 Off 10 Enl
CO HQ 4 Off 33 Enl
†AMREC PLT 2 Off 23 Enl
PLT HQ 2 Off 3 Enl
†AMREC TEAM 0 Off 4 Enl
†PAREC PLT 3 Off 23 Enl
PLT HQ 3 Off 3 Enl
†PAREC TEAM 0 Off 4 Enl
†S&S PLT 1 Off °37 Enl
ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
ORDNANCE
36 Pistol
52 M1 Rifle
75 M3A1 SMG
8 30cal MG
2 50cal MG
VEHICLES
3 ¼T 2-Wh Trlr
3 ¾T Trlr
2 1½T Trlr
1 Water Tk Trlr
5 ¼T Trk
3 ¾T Trk
3 2½T Trk
COMMUNICATIONS
1 AN/MRC-35A Radio (Veh)
15 MAY-1 Radio
5 AN/GRC-9Z Radio
30 AN/PRC-6 Radio
20 AN/PRC-10 Radio
OTHER
4 NANCY C-3 Infra Red Receiver
6 M110A Camera (Polaroid)
28 Diving Set
18 CO2 Landing Boat
218 Parachute
†Abbreviations: PP—Parachute Pathfinder; LZP—Landing Zone Pathfinder; AMREC—Amphibious Reconnaissance; PAREC—Parachute Reconnaissance; S&S—Supply and Service
°Includes 2 USN

EDITOR'S NOTE: Recommended ForReconCo is first of several reports covering Phase II, (Intelligence and Combat Support) of Troop Test Program. It's included here because GAZETTE this month is featuring Force Troops. Next month we return to Phase I, give readers a look at Tank Bn and AmTrac Bn, circa 1965, as proposed by MCLFDC. (They're Force Troops now; wouldn't be under proposal.)

FMF 1965




"M" SERIES
COMMUNICATIONS BATTALION
FLEET MARINE FORCE
USMC Off Enl 45 720
USN Off Enl 1 11
†RR&C CO 10 Off 215 Enl
HQ CO *12 Off **119 Enl
COMM CO 17 Off 236 Enl
COMM SUPT CO 7 Off 161 Enl
CO HQ 3 Off 14 Enl
BN HQ *11 Off **114 Enl
CO HQ 2 Off 14 Enl
†ECMC SECT 3 Off 12 Enl
CO HQ 2 Off 12 Enl
†RR PLT 5 Off 115 Enl
CO HQ 1 Off 5 Enl
†CC PLT 9 Off 74 Enl
RADIO PLT 2 Off 64 Enl
†CC PLT 3 Off 36 Enl
†CONSTN PLT 2 Off 86 Enl
†AGNGF SECT 0 Off 20 Enl
WIRE PLT 1 Off 52 Enl
RADIO PLT 1 Off 61 Enl
WIRE PLT 1 Off 52 Enl
ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT
ORDNANCE
72 Pistol
705 M1 Rifle
8 50cal MG
VEHICLES
22 ¼T 2-Wh Trlr
12 1½T Trlr
29 ¼T Trk
7 ¾T Trk
19 2½T Trk
COMMUNICATIONS
15 AN/MRC-6 (Veh)
15 AN/MRC-30 (Veh)
11 AN/MRC-32 (Veh)
2 AN/MRC-38 (Veh)
16 AN/MRC-62 (Veh)
6 AN/MRC-63 (Veh)
5 AN/MRC-35A (Veh)
2 S-126/G Shelter
*Includes 1 USN
**Includes 11 USN
†Abbreviations: RR&C — Radio Relay and Construction; RR—Radio Relay; CONSTN — Construction; ECMC — Electronics Countermeasures Control; AGNGF—Air and Naval Gun Fire; CC —Communications Center

COMM BATTALION
FLEET MARINE FORCE

CONCEPT—Three identical communication companies each designed as a complete comm package to furnish comm facilities for task organized field headquarters; a battalion headquarters, within a headquarters company which directs and coordinates action of battalion. Multi-channel, point-to-point radio (MUX) is primary means of communications. Capable of providing comm facilities for:

A corps of two divisions, one reinforced wing.

Two MEF, each having a division and a wing; three brigades.

Several MEUs.

MISSION — Provide comm facilities and support for field headquarters of a corps, MEF, or MEB.

COMMUNICATIONS—Furnished by comm company supporting field headquarters to which battalion is attached.

FIRE POWER—Individual weapons for local security.

MOBILITY—Primarily ground movement. Company MT sections have general and special purpose vehicles for comm operations. Can also move by helicopter and fixed wing transport.

LOGISTICS—Comm companies have basic load, handle internal distribution of supplies, perform organizational and limited field maintenance.

ADMINISTRATION — Battalion S-1 section handles formal personnel accounting and maintains personnel records of entire battalion. Comm companies are capable of self-administration.

MAINTENANCE—1st echelon maintenance on all organic gear; 2d echelon on MT, small arms, electrical generators; 3d echelon (less stockage of repair parts) on organic electronics gear.

MEDICAL — Field dispensary for treatment of minor illnesses and injuries; prepares battalion casualties for evacuation. Medical services for comm companies provided by supported field headquarters.

TRANSPORTATION—General and special purpose vehicles are maintained within respective MT sections and Comm platoons.

SUPPLY—Bn Hq supply section performs organic supply functions for Bn. Comm Co supply sections receive and make internal distribution of supplies received from Bn or directly from FSR (Force Service Regiment) if operating apart from Bn.

MESSING—Battalion mess in garrison. Each comm company is provided messing facilities by field headquarters it supports, augmented by battalion mess section.

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

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OBSERVATION POST

This department is for new, constructive ideas. They may be controversial; they must be short. Payment: $30. Length: 250-950 words.

Let's Fly the AOC

By 1stLt R. M. Browne, III

HAVING BEEN IN THE PROCUREMENT business now for only a year I may not be as qualified to speak as an old hand who knows the game inside-out . . . if there exists such a person. But I am aware of one problem area and offer my two cents' worth.

The problem is the Aviation Officer Candidate. Not the candidate himself, but rather his procurement.

The Aviation Officer Candidate Course is a commissioning program for college graduates who can meet the requirements for flight training. This program is not the main source of Marine aviators. But it is a source which I feel has a greater output potential than is now realized.

AOC's attend ten weeks of training at the Training and Test Regiment, Quantico. This is basically a good practice. It weeds out a few and in general, grounds all OC's on the same fundamentals.

However, increased emphasis is being placed on the program. Difficulty is being experienced by Officer Selection Officers in finding applicants. So it may be well to consider the need of a change.

First, we should try to understand the AOC applicant. He is a young college graduate who faces a six-year military obligation. By and large, he is not motivated for a military career. He boils down to an obligated young man who, rather than wait for the draft, decides to make the most of his education and try for a commission.

If he wants to be a pilot he is interested in getting in the sky ASAP. Many, faced with a ten-week delay, turn to our sister service which can get him to Pensacola from the start. Additionally, a Marine AOC has only two classes a year open to him. For a June graduate this means another three months delay. Once again, he is likely to look elsewhere.

It is fine to say, "If he can't wait, we don't want him anyway." But the fact is, we do want him. We need him. To find a prospect in whom our love of Corps is already instilled and who is willing to sacrifice to become a Marine is rare indeed. We must understand that it takes awhile to think like a Marine; most of these men don't during their "shopping" period. They want to fly and they want to do it now!

Thus, it has been my experience, the Marine Corps loses many possible AOC's because our program is not designed to meet the desires of an air-minded young graduate.

What can be done to increase the quality and quantity of the AOC applicant pool? From a recruiting standpoint I think a change in the current program is certainly worth consideration. I would like to see some thought given to the feasibility, practicability, and overall benefits if the AOC training were altered so that the candidates reported directly to NAS, Pensacola, for pre-commissioning training and screening. I would also like to see some aspects of flight training incorporated into the current syllabus. At least let the AOC's see some aircraft, hear some noise and sniff some fumes. [Ed: Quantico's SATS should do this. See *SATS As a Recruiter,* NEWSLETTER: Sep '61.] I would like to see an additional class established so that the convening dates would be April, July, and October.

This change, of course, would bring with it many problems of a financial and personnel nature. Don't all big jobs incur problems? I feel that the results would most assuredly increase interest in the program. And I think eventually it could become a major source of Marine aviators. It would certainly be of greater motivation to the prospect if the Corps could say, "Be a Marine AOC and go directly to Pensacola for training."

Further ground training and indoctrination could be accomplished after commissioning by sending the new officer/pilots through a modified Basic Course or an equivalent.

The idea of having ALL Marine officers attend the Basic Course or at least receive some infantry training is good. This has long been the foundation of the officer corps. However, with the strength of the Corps apparently on the increase and with stepped up demands for new pilots, the Marine Corps must consider the problem of ways in which to increase the stock of aviation officer applicants.

We do it with MARCAD's . . . why not AOC's? USMC

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Code DPO, Headquarters Marine Corps
Washington 25, D. C.

Who's Got the Ball?

By GySgt H. J. LaRussa, Jr.

"THE PLATOON COMMANDER IS RESponsible for the discipline, TRAINING, control, and tactical employment of his platoon."

Aha! The key word: TRAINING. Training controls all. The platoon might take the form of a prize fruit-bearing tree; the trunk being training, and branching from it, discipline, control and tactical employment. The fruit represents the end result. If this tree dies or fails to produce fruit, it's the fault of the one responsible for its upkeep. The reason being that he and only he knows in what condition it is and what food is needed for producing or staying alive. Therefore, the platoon commander knows what training food his platoon needs to both stay alive and produce. The training of his platoon must not be intruded upon. He must have complete control of it. If he does not, then he can not and should not be held responsible for his platoon.

It is sad to say, but in some units in the Marine Corps, platoon commanders are losing this vital responsibility. How?

Let's start with the platoon commander receiving the company training schedule. He reads it and discovers that everyone but he and his NCOs are teaching his platoon. As a result, he and his platoon sergeant sit in the platoon office at the end of the week, look at one another, and ask: "What have we done to train our platoon this week? What have we or our junior NCOs actually taught the platoon?" Many platoon leaders have been reduced to troop handlers.

CMC's message of 4 January 1961 was direct and to the point. It was written in the language that we Marines understand. His message will be quoted and interpreted for many years to come. In keeping with the spirit of my statement I would like to draw upon his message: Quote, in part, "Let's place properly weighted responsibility and requisite accompanying authority where they belong. Make a corporal do a corporal's job, and on up the line. . . . Give the officers and enlisted men junior to you their heads—tell them what you want done, by when, then let them go to it. Let's make our mistakes while we're not 'shooting for record.'"

I interpret this portion of his message to mean just what it says. Place the weight of "training responsibility" where it belongs, upon the shoulders of the Platoon Commander.

More from CMC's message: "I want every commander to identify the training required by each of his Marines and not simply schedule all hands for all training. To do so is wasteful, boring and degrading. Young officers and noncommissioned officers should be given every opportunity to use their imagination and initiative in developing interesting and informative training for individuals as members of a team."

In my opinion, based upon my experience, the only way this can be done is to publish a training schedule informing the platoon commander what the company commander wants taught. From this schedule the platoon commander prepares his training program. In setting up his program, he uses Marines he knows, his platoon sergeant and junior NCOs. He can assign the right NCO to give the right period of instruction. He can assign to the classes the men who need the instruction and for the others he can set up training in the subjects in which they are weak. After all, who knows better than the platoon commander and his NCOs which member in the platoon is weak and in what subject?

How do the company commander and the squad leader fit into the picture? How do they fulfill their responsibility?

They have the same responsibility on their level as the platoon commander on his. Let's start with the latter first. The squad leader tells the platoon commander where his squad is weak. The company commander fulfills his responsibility by controlling training through his platoon commanders this way:

He tells them what he wants taught by publishing the company training schedule.

Platoon commanders turn in lesson plans on the subjects.

Lesson plans are checked for proper format and against references for accuracy.

The platoon's instruction is monitored from time to time by the company commander or his representatives.

Webster defines "responsible" as "liable for, having obligations, capable of trust, mature." In regard to training, let's place this misplaced word back where it belongs—squarely upon the platoon commander's shoulders. He would welcome the load.

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MCG-10

OBSERVATION POST CONTINUED

Training Can Have More Realism

By Maj Fredric A. Green

SUDDENLY MASSED SMALL ARMS FIRE explodes on the flank—sporadic fire of a few moments ago increases in tempo to cover the final assault. Marines have moved unseen to the enemy's flank. The signal for the assault has been given.

Weapons blazing, the Marines attack; they are a fearsome sight. Camouflaged utilities and grease-painted faces herald *esprit* and preparation; bared teeth and rapidly firing weapons display determination. In a massed rush the Marines overrun the enemy position leaving enemy dead, prisoners and deserted automatic weapons behind them as they charge. As the last of the enemy disappears, the Marines fire a few more rounds to speed them on their way and then relax. Cigarettes are lit, canteens opened, and conversation resumed.

Another problem has been successfully completed. Tactically, the operation is a complete success; the enemy has been routed. But don't yell "secure" just yet. Let's see what else happens.

As the Marines stand around talking a fire fight breaks out on a new flank and an enemy counterattack begins. Marines are caught milling around, key areas left undefended; their weapons are empty, ammunition still boxed. Automatic weapons are unemplaced, caught in the open without ammunition. One of the enemy "dead" rolls over and shoots a platoon leader in the back. Prisoners revolt, overpower their guards, and commence fire at the rear of the line. Infiltrating enemy seize previously deserted automatic weapons and fire into disorganized troops. All is chaos.

When the firing settles down, Marines are more cautious. They hastily assume the defense, emplace weapons, distribute ammunition, and seek cover and concealment. Battle is now over, but the business of war continues. A Marine guard tells a prisoner to sit down, but the prisoner does not obey. In fact, he looks as though he does not understand what is being said. Further attempts at interrogation prove equally fruitless; the prisoner just doesn't seem to understand English.

A prisoner is taken before the company commander. Since the prisoner was not properly searched, he produces a small pistol from his jungle kit and pumps four rounds into the hapless CO before being subdued.

In another corner of the temporary CP, a prisoner is observed chewing. What? Just a piece of paper he had in his pocket. Of course, he swallows it when he is challenged.

Thoroughly rattled now, the Marines decide to evacuate the prisoners. Putting them all together, they give them some water to drink and a cigarette before starting. Then, off to the rear they go, tramping into the dust what looks like an officer's insignia as they clear the area. The man who dropped that insignia has been swallowed up in the group.

Unfortunately, the foregoing does not represent a typical training exercise. I say "unfortunately" because, in many cases, our training exercises lack this kind of realism. We place great emphasis on laying down a base of fire. We advance realistically by fire and maneuver or by stealth. Our assault is torn from the pages of field manuals. And here is the sonic barrier.

Here the lazy senior secures the problem and runs the critique.

Or here the conscientious commander instills in his men those tactical principles which lead to successful accomplishment of a mission.

Here the lazy commander fights his own little war, ignoring anyone else.

Or here the conscientious commander instills those principles of basic combat intelligence which contribute to larger and large victories.

I will not insult the experience of readers by pointing out errors made in our hypothetical attack of a few paragraphs ago I would, however, like to recommend a few devices for better training our troops for the realities of combat.

Don't secure that problem shortly after the assault begins. When the assault begins, so does the real training.

Previously instruct your aggressor troops on just what you want done. Let them know who is to "drop dead," who is to surrender, who will abandon weapons, who will carry documents of value.

Under no circumstances should any of them acknowledge an understanding of English. (As Marines have made their desires known in every sea and clime, so can they communicate their desires to "enemy" POW's.)

If possible, have your aggressor abandon foreign weapons; if not, American automatic weapons will suffice. It's amazing how many Marines will pass up an abandoned automatic weapon, firing single shots from the hip as they go. It is equally amazing how no one seems to recall how to load and fire an abandoned BAR or LMG despite all of the schooling they have recently had.

Organize a good-sized counterattack to be executed when the milling around has reached its height. Instruct your aggressors that anyone not previously disarmed but left behind should again join the fight.

Number documents and hide them on troops, even requesting some troops to destroy them rather than permit capture. See how many documents are returned to you prior to the prisoners being marched off.

And as the *coup de main*, secrete a small weapon—blank cartridge pistol, derringer cap pistol—somewhere on an aggressor (maybe in his boot) and have him gun down a Marine leader.

These are just some ideas. You who have been in combat, you with combat intelligence training, or you with initiative and good common sense can add more ideas. Your critiques become training experiences in themselves, not just rehashes of the exercise. Novelty enhances training. And lessons learned—in an atmosphere as closely resembling combat as possible—will prove invaluable to your troops. In real combat, it may save lives and even help to win battles or wars. USMC

MCLFDC, MCS
Quantico, Va.

It's Your Decision

By Capt L. B. Myers

Dear Editor:

Much has been said of retaining qualified enlisted men in the Corps, hence our career advisory program.

How about young, undecided, well qualified junior officers?

A few months ago I had occasion to counsel a young lieutenant in my battery concering a career as a regular Marine Corps officer.

The accompanying article was hastily written for his benefit and guidance. These few words were enthusiastically received by him and and by others since that time.

These remarks as then written are forwarded to your (correction, our) magazine for publication if you consider them deserving.

The Author

CONSIDERATION OF A MARINE CORPS Career must of necessity include the following advantages:

Taxable Income
Allowances
Leave
Travel
Medical Service
Dental Service
Social Security
Shipment of Household Effects
Loan Guarantees
Preferred Risk insurance
Medicare for Dependents
Privileges (MX, Commissary)
Recreation
Education
Disability Benefits
Survivor Benefits
Burial Expenses
Navy Mutual Aid
Navy Federal Credit Union
Per Diem
and finally
Retirement

It should not, however, be so limited. Many of the above are concerned primarily with salary or "fringe" salary benefits. In considering choice of careers, many of us are inclined to initially think $$$$—this is true whether we are paupers or independently wealthy—an American capitalistic trait, let's call it!

We are not so narrow minded, however, in executing our chosen careers. During such time, we must really scrutinize our chosen lives against some common standards which others, also, consider important.

Such standards or goals, if you will, were very candidly listed and explained in an article on careers and vocations I read some years ago. These "career measuring" standards (as shown in the order of preference) by the vast majority of career men and women—in all walks of life—were found to be as follows:

1. Job Security
2. Job Satisfaction
3. Job Recognition
4. Job Advancement
5. Job Salary

I concur with the general public, not only in their standards, but in their preferences. Perhaps reflection by you would paraphrase the titles shown, or perhaps juggle the order of preference shown—but I feel sincerely you would not arbitrarily add to nor delete from the basic standards indicated.

For the purpose of discussion, let's call the above "career ingredients" and blend them together, one by one, into a Marine Corps Career as a Commissioned Officer—and while we're doing it, mentally compare any other civilian career which springs to mind against the same standards. I shall merely list some comments—it's your decision; therefore, you should weigh the merits.

1. *Job Security.* No strikes, walkouts, lockouts, or passionate dismissals allowed here. This one should be self-explanatory; Federal service is probably the most secure career in the world for the average person. Even disability retirement will not detract from security. Further, it's one of the few careers to offer dependents/survivor security of any proportion.

2. *Job Satisfaction.* I believe it to be undisputed that the greatest job satisfaction to be found will be found in service to one or all of these three: God, Mankind, or Country. All require one thing in common; dedication. Without it, we would have no priests, no ministers, no martyrs, no doctors, no scientists, no educators, and indeed, no career officers. Every man does not have his price when it comes to buying dedication.

3. *Job Recognition.* Within the military society in which we live and labor, we are aware of the esteem in which we, as commissioned officers, are held—from second lieutenant to general officer. Likewise, our status is held highly by the majority of civilian communities, and by state, Federal, and local governments. Further, the brotherhood of officers does exist—as does trust and confidence. And daily, I feel, our roles become more responsible and important.

4. *Job Advancement.* Observation will quickly reveal that this can take two readily apparent forms: financial advancement and advancement of job responsibility/job opportunity. In no other career that I know of is one so well groomed or schooled for progressive advancement as in a military career; broad experience is gained day by day in many fields. All this experience becomes our credentials. Financial advancement is a matter of course—and is sure to come.

5. *Job Salary.* Computation of base pay plus allowance plus tax savings plus fringe benefits will amaze you. To live under "civilian circumstances" in the manner to which you are accustomed would require, I'd venture, a salary in the neighborhood of $200 per month for you above your basic pay. Additionally, in the Marine Corps, "keeping up with the Joneses" is merely paid lip service. Who are we kidding? Even an admin clerk can determine in a few minutes whether or not we are living beyond our income! Similarly, it's no disgrace to say "I can't afford it"—your friends really can't either.

These, then, are basic "career ingredients" which must be compared individually and collectively when weighing a career. I feel that a commissioned officer's Marine Corps career stacks up well with the greater majority of careers available on the "outside."

The decision is, however, one which must be made by you—and by your wife. By and large. she's happy when you are.

Find another profession which offers me these many advantages—and so few disadvantages—which allows me to associate with educated men and women with interests similar to my own—which provides such comradeship and mutual understanding—which offers a greater challenge—and which—when the "organizational flag" is waved and the "organizational" anthem is played—causes me to stand more erect, causes me to feel more spirit and more dedication—find me this and I'll resign and join you. USMC

C Btry, 1st LAAM Bn
MCB, 29 Palms, Calf.

THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

(Answers to questions on page 12)

Note: References designated as TIP (Tentative Instructional Precis), SM (Supplementary Material, and MCS (Marine Corps Schools Publication) are manuals written by the staff of Marine Corps Educational Center as texts for MCEC schools.

BASIC

1 b. Reference: MCS 1-10, "Staff Organization and Functions," paragraph 11b. In units of less than brigade size, duties corresponding to those of the general staff group are assigned to an executive staff group normally composed of the following officers:

Executive Officer
Personnel Section—S-1/Adjutant
Intelligence Section—Intelligence Officer (S-2)
Operations and Training Section—O&T Officer (S-3)
Logistics Section—Logistics Officer (S-4)

Staffs of many smaller units i.e., separate companies/squadrons, are of such limited size that the executive officer may be charged with the duties of two or more staff sections.

2 b. Reference: MCS-10, "Staff Organization and Functions," paragraph 93a. Any action by a unit requires that certain steps be taken by its commander. These steps must be taken in logical sequence. The commander makes his estimate of the situation, announces his decision, and evolves a plan to effect his decision. Once the decision has been made, the process of preparing the resultant plans and orders varies between wide limits.

3 b. Reference: FM 21-26, paragraph 12b. Friendly positions are always shown by symbols marked in blue and enemy positions are always marked in red. The colors green and yellow are the same for both friendly and enemy. Green is used for obstacles including minefields, friendly or enemy. Yellow is used for all deadly contaminated areas.

THE CHECK HONORED 'ROUND THE WORLD

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JUNIOR

4 b. Reference: TIP (ARM)2, 6, 8. The artillery regiment is armed with light artillery weapons and contains the minimum amount of artillery required to support widely separated tactical units of the division. Force artillery units possessing weapons with greater range and lethality are provided as necessary to meet the division's requirements for long range, large caliber, high explosive fires, and ground-delivered nuclear fire support.

5 c. Reference: MCS 1-6, page 1-12, paragraph (j). Forces assigned to unified and specified commands may not be transferred therefrom except by authority of the Secretary of Defense on recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6 a. Reference: DA Pamphlet 39-1, 7.1. The primary consideration in the employment of nuclear weapons will be the degree of tactical advantage resulting from their use. They must be employed with care and decisiveness to ensure the most effective use on profitable targets.

7 c. Reference: TIP (S)2, 31a, 38c. The helicopter is the most easily damaged. In order to ensure the safety of all aircraft which are not involved in delivery, the employment of a nuclear weapon must be coordinated to a radial distance sufficient to protect helicopters, the aircraft requiring the greatest degree of protection.

8 a, b, d. Reference: TIP (LOG)3, 27a. To handle situations such as outlined, the HST will establish communications with adjacent HSTs and the shore party supporting the surface landed units. Either of these could be contacted. If the items are not available from either of these sources, they could be obtained from outside the objective area by use of fixed-wing aircraft.

SENIOR

9 a, b. Reference: TIP (LOG)2, 10a. Force service units are individually organized on a functional basis (Engineer Battalions, Bridge Companies, Hospital Companies, Motor Transport Battalions, etc.). However, their combat employment usually requires that they be task organized to fulfill specific requirements. They may be employed in the same or different logistic support areas from those containing the division service support units. If they are in the same logistic support area, they *may* be attached, placed in direct support, or retained under the control of the landing force commander.

★ General Officers ★

Nominated for LtGen

Luckey, R. B., (Succeeds **LtGen J. C. Burger** as CG, FMFLant 1 Nov 61).

Transfers

Chapman, L. F., Jr.
Fr FMFLant
To HQMC (Asst C/S, G-4) By1Oct
Berkeley, J. P.
Fr 2dMarDiv
To MCB, CamLej (CG) 3Nov
Rottet, R. K.
Fr 2dMAW
To MCS, Quant (Dir, MCEC) WD3Oct

Deaths, Retired

Bemis, J. A.
USNH CamPen 21Aug

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Binney, A. F., DepCdr, FMFLant
Buse, H. W., Jr., Asst C/S G-3, HQMC
Condon, J. P., Cdr, FMF, 7thFlt
Cushman R. E., Jr., CG, 3dMarDiv
Kyle, W. B., CG, ForTrps, FMFLant
Masters, J. M., Sr., CG, 1stMarDiv
Miller, J. C., Jr., DirMCLFDC
Simpson, O. R., ADC, 3dMarDiv
Wade, S. S., LnO, VCNO

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Anderson, N. J., Dep C/S, G-3, HQMC
Bradshaw, J. T., Dir COS, MCS Quant
Buckner, J. H., Inspector, MCS Quant
Carey, J. F., CO, MAG-16
Davenport, W. K., REP CMC PRC, NavyDept
Dooley, G. E., CO MAG-13
Flourney, W. N., Emergency Action Center, HQMC
Grider, R. Q., Sup Off 2dMAW, MCAS, Cher Pt
Griffin, D. R., Dir Exercise Control & Inspection Group, CamPen
Lowell, A. C., BuWeps, Navy Dept
Laster, C. G., DepDir, MCLFDC
McCutcheon, K. B., Dir DivAvn, HQMC
McNichol, P. B., Asst Cof S, G-4, MCRD, San Diego
Myers, A. C., Ofc CNO
Owens, R. G., Jr., Plans Br, G-3, HQMC
Parry, F. F., CO, 11th Marines
Platt, J. M., CO 6th Marines
Quillici, C. F., CO WTBn, MCRD SDiego
Quilter, C. J., C/S, FMFPac
Ritzau, E. W., CO HqBn, MCS Quant
Ryffel, G. G., Foreign Services Inst, Arlington, Va.
Seeley, H. W., Dir MatDiv, Albany, Ga.
Schlesinger, F. R., CO, 2dField Arty Gp, ForTrps, CamLej
Shuler, C. W., Dir PolAnal Div, HQMC
Sutter, A., CO, 4th Marines

Colonels

Transfers

Dew E. S. 9907
Fr FMFPac WDOct
To 1stMAW
Durant, E. W., Jr. 9906
Fr CG FMFLant
To Duke Univ Sep
Ellis, J. H. 9906
Fr MCRD SDiego
To 3dMarDiv By15Nov
Fuller, R. 9906
Fr HQMC
To 3dMarDiv Sep
Harris, L. P. 9906
Fr MB NB Chasn
To 3dMarDiv By15Nov
Jensen, O. T., Jr. 9906
Fr 3dMarDiv Sep
To HQMC
Low, S. D. 9908
Fr 2dMarDiv
To 3dMarDiv By20Nov
Millichap, P. H. 9908
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMarDiv
Twitchell, J. S. 9906
Fr HQMC
To MB Brem Sep
Wyczawski, R. W. 9907
Fr 1stMAW
To Inst NavStud Mass By1Nov

Retired

Berger, S. S. 9906
MCS Quant 31Aug
Dean, R. L. 9906
MCS Quant 31Oct
Figuers, H. H. 9906
MB NS SFran 31Aug

Death

Burkhardt, J. W. 9907
USAFRC Fort Derussy 10Aug

Permanent Promotions, Reserve

Moss, K. A. Sep
Reeder, J. A. Sep
Vaughn, F. A. Sep

Lieutenant Colonels

Transfers

Barker, E. L. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMAW
Ezell, D. E. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCS Quant
Gehri, D. J. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMAW
Gilson, L. A. 0302
Fr NAG Korea WDOct
To LFTULant LCreek
Lee, H. M. 3002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCB CamLej
Randall, T. L. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv
Sadler, M. O. 3002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To HQMC
Schultz, L. L. 3002
Fr MCRD PI
To 3dMarDiv By20Nov
Shenaut, D. L. 2002
Fr MCSC Albany Ga WDOct
To 3dMarDiv
Willcox, J. 7333
Fr 3dMAW Sep
To CINCEUR, Paris

Retired

Bourgeois, H. M. 7307
HQMC 30Sep
Forsyth, T. M., Jr. 7331
2dMAW 31Aug
Hemingway, E. R. 7307
3dMAW 30Sep
Johnson, C. M. 0802
MCB CamPen 31Aug
Lee, H. M. 3002
MB NS SFran 31Oct
Magruder, M. M. 9907
12thMCRRD 31Aug
Medford, E. L., Jr. 0302
Monterey Calif 31Aug
Parker, G. K. 3002
MCB CamPen 30Sep
Schroeder, C. L. 7307
3dMAW 30Sep
Shoop, W. G. 0302
HqBn, HQMC 21Jul
Skinner, J., Jr. 7333
HQMC 30Sep
Swartley, J. N. 7335
2dMAW 30Sep
Van Evera, D. A. 0302
LFTUPac 31Aug

Permanent Promotions, Reserve

Andreae, O. A. Aug
Anger, A. Aug
Baesel, D. E. Aug
Barnard, H. Aug
Barrick, R. C. Aug
Bazemore, W. F. Aug
Beaudry, C. J. Aug
Beckett, R. C. Aug
Bladergroen, R. J. Aug
Bodine, E. N. Aug
Bonino, B. W. Aug
Bowen, A. C. Aug
Bromm, J. C. Aug
Brown, J. O., Jr. Aug
Brown, K. D. Aug
Calhoon, H. M. Aug
Chalke, C. T. Aug
Chandler, W. H. Aug
Clark, F. W. Aug
Collett, R. A. Aug
Collins, D. J. Aug
Craigmiles, J. P. Aug
Daly, J. M. Aug
Dargonne, A. J. Aug
Dasher, R. T. Aug
Davis, J. K. Aug
Deyoe, F. S., Jr. Aug
Didier, C. P. Aug
Easton, F. B., Jr. Aug
Everett, C. J., Jr. Aug
Ferren, R. S. Aug
Fitts, J. W., Jr. Aug
Fox, H. E., Jr. Aug
Freeman, W. Y. Aug
Freeman, O. L. Aug
Fuller, P. W. Aug
Galiskis, E. A. Aug
Gardiner, M. S., Jr. Aug
Gattis, A. P. Aug
Gerrish, F. J. Aug
Gray, J. E. Aug
Gross, M. Aug
Gunn, D. M. Aug
Hake, L. M. Aug
Hamm, B. A. Aug
Hance, D. J. Aug
Hargrave, E. M. Aug
Harshbarger, G. K. Aug
Hayden, E. A., Jr. Aug
Herbert, L. P. Aug
Hines, P. Aug
Hipkens, T. P. Aug
Holland, K. S. Aug
Holowitt, M. P. Aug
Houston, W. J. Aug
Hughes, J. H., Jr. Aug
Hulse, C. R. Aug
Hundley, J. C. Aug
Jamison, J. D. Aug
Jenkins, R. Aug
Jessup, F. H. Aug
Johnson, E. R., Jr. Aug
Johnson, H. A., Jr. Aug
Jones, T. S. Aug
Keck, R. L. Aug
Kernu, J. P. Aug
Kooken, C. H. Aug
Lancaster, G. G. Aug
Lepionka, F. J. Aug
Liles, E. H., Jr. Aug
Lindsay, T. K. Aug
Linenbom, V. J. Aug
Livingston, E. N. Aug
Lohsen, R. H. Aug
Luck, W. R., Jr. Aug
Lyons, L. E. Aug
Magee, C. R. Aug
Magin, W. J. Aug
Manley, H. L. Aug
Mayers, M. A. Aug
McCarthy, C. R. Aug
McCaffrey, C. J. Aug
McDaniel, H. J. Aug
McLaughry, R. D. Aug
McLane, M. F. Aug
McNiff, J. A. Aug
McReynolds, W. H. Aug
Miller, D. B. Aug
Moe, C. R. Aug
Moffett, R. E. Aug
Moss, H. Aug
Muntz, B. W. Aug
Murken, N. J. Aug
Newland, W. M. Aug
Niketh, R. F. Aug
Nordling, J. S. Aug
Olszyk, L. M. Aug
Ooley, C. E. Aug
Oster, J. L. Aug
Parkins, C. W. Aug
Perskie, M. D. Aug
Pertle, L. C. Aug
Peterson, C. E. Aug
Pierce, J. H. Aug
Price, R. H., Jr. Aug
Rackerby, A. B. Aug
Redding, C. E. Aug
Reed, D. W., Jr. Aug
Remigio, D. R. Aug
Rinehart, J. H., Jr. Aug
Robinson, G. B. Aug
Ruud, M. F. Aug
Sands, H. R. Aug
Scarborough, C. L. Aug
Scatena, I. J. Aug
Schmidt, W. G. Aug
Shaeffer, J. B. Aug
Selfridge, W. J. Aug
Shotwell, C. W. Aug
Shutt, B. B. Aug
Slick, D. D. Aug
Smith, R. W. Aug
Smith, H. R. Aug
Smith, E. D. Aug
Spence, R. M. Aug
Stanley, M. B. Aug
Steinmeyer, H. A. Aug
Stevenson, H. E. Aug
Strauss, R. H. Aug
Tamulis, J. J. Aug
Taylor, R. C. Aug
Taylor, G. E. Aug
Taylor, S. B. Aug
Thornton, J. C. Aug
Turnipseed, M. F. Aug
Vanbuskirk, W. G. Aug
Vangundy, E. A. Aug
Walker, B. L. Aug
Watts, W. V., Jr. Aug
Webb, M. C., II Aug
Weidner, W. D. Aug
Wheeland, G. P. Aug
Witt, W. S. Aug
Wood, L. M. Aug
Wright, V. B., Jr. Aug
Zimmerman, A. W. Aug

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Bilheimer, R. L., Jr. Aug
Dobbins, R., Jr. Aug
McClellan, G. B. Aug
McGrand, J. P. Sep
Range, J. N. Sep
Rose, J. R. Sep
Sims, A. C. Sep
Swaney, H. O. Sep
Wilson, K. J. Aug

Death, Retired

Kieren, F. S. 0512
USNH Bethesda Md 23Aug

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Augeri, R. T., ComElecBr, G-4, HQMC
Bale, E. L., Jr., OrdBr, G-4 HQMC
Bolish, R. J., Av Log & Mat, Div Avn, HQMC
Bruce, H. K., CO VMO-6, CamPen
Carey, E. P., Insp Div, HQMC
Carpenter, J. B., Jr., CO 3rd Recon Bn, 3dMarDiv
Corbett, L. V., O/C Plans Br, 3dMarDiv
Finn, H. J., Plans Br, G-3, HQMC
Hale, M. J., Asst XO, G-4, HQMC
Johnson U. M., CO, 8thCommBn ForTrps, CamLej
Matthews, M. T., Plans & Trng Br DivRes, HQMC
Miller, W. T., JCS, Pentagon
O'Keefe, A. F., Asst, Personnel Br, Pers Dept, HQMC
Pierce, R. H., Comptroller, MCAS, CherPt
Scheer, R. A., Hd Discipline Br, Pers Dept, HQMC
Wasson, G. E., CO, MARS-17, MCAF, Iwakumi
Wegley, D. E., Avn Ctl Off, Pers Dept, HQMC
West, C. L., G-4 Div, HQMC

Selected for Promotion to Col

Campbell, R. A. 07885
Payne, J. S. 011234
Maguire, J. B., Jr. 07508
Prowell, J. P. 08483
Peltzer, V. A. 08469
Sachs, C. A. 08500
Hahn, P. H. 08365
Baughman, L. D. 08260
Hay, H. 08031
Doswell, G. H. 09305
Maas, J. B., Jr. 09017
Teller, R. W. 08684
Irish, H. J. 08768
Leineweber, T. M. 08803
Fisher, T. H. 08709
Matsinger, H. 08812
Grady, T. T. 08734
Curtis, W. W. 08675
Wolf, G. P. Jr. 08964
Hood, W. R. 08760
Anderson, R. W. 08606
Bartram, V. L. 08620
Neville, R. B. 08852
Codrea, G. 08662
Dutton, T. C. 08696
Fairburn, R. R. 08705
McBroom, R. B. 08814
Reynolds, W. E., Jr. 08888
Juett, J. G. 08779
Barrett, D. J., Jr. 08619
Cochran, R. L. 08718
Barrett, C. D. 08720
Armitage, G. T. 08992
Lawrence, J. F., Jr. 07913
Ridlon, W. J., Jr. 07777
Bright, C. L. 09474
Sims, W. J. 09396
Wolverton, G. D. 09008
Peters, H. A. 09432
Walter, H. L. 09400
Richards, S., Jr. 09022
Hollowell, G. L. 010182
Dawes, G. M. 09378
Blackmun, A. W. 09419
Mahon, J. L. 010130
Hill, H. S. 010931
Lemke, W. C. 09429
Read, R. R. 09392
Moore, C. H. 09418
Nehf, A. N., Jr. 09391
Herzog, L. L. 010203
Johnson, J. E. 010213
Pierce, R. H. 010140
Cook, M. M., Jr. 010237
Grow, L. D. 09937
Winters, J. B. 09997
Dukes, W. P. 011058
Noble, J. D. 010212
Babashanian, J. G. 08611
McDonald, J. E. 010134
Hood, H. E. 010569
Wagner, J. F., Jr. 010246
Etheridge, J. A. 010128
Schutt, R. W. 09719
Joslin, H. V. 010149
London, L. K. 010192
Cuenin, W. H. 08674
Harr, H. A. 09441
Johnson, F. M., Jr. 010193
Douglass, G. T. 07871
Hoffman, C. W. 09472
Weir, R. R. 010328
Bale, E. L., Jr. 010162
Thomas, R. L. 011060
Hartley, D. S., Jr. 010349
McCombs, G. W. 010284

Majors

Transfers

Bahner, R. H. 7335
Fr HQMC WDAug
To 3dMAW
Burroughs, C. R. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv
Church, C. H. 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To NABTC NAS Pncla
Collen, F. R. 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW
Conard, J. W. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To NABTC NAS Pncla
Curtis, P. F. 1802
Fr MB China Lake WDOct
To 3dMarDiv
Darracott, C. M. 1803
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 2dAmTracCo USMCR
David, M. A. 0195
Fr HQMC WDOct
To 3dMarDiv
Davis, M. C. 6402
Fr NAS NorVa WDOct
To 1stMAW
Duncan, E. F. 0302
Fr StfCINCLantFlt WDOct
To Lima Peru
Fiander, W. A. 1302
Fr MCB CamLej WDOct
To Camp S D Butler
Hill, W. L. 1302
Fr Korea WDOct
To 1stMarDiv
Hughes, J. A. 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMAW
Hyneman, J. R. 7331
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW
Keeling, H. A., Jr. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAS CherPt
Koehler, E. F. 9901
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAS CherPt
Krewer, J. W. 7333
Fr 3dMAW
To 1stMAW By1Nov
Lindall, A. L., Jr. 0302
Fr 5thMCRRD WDOct
To 3dMarDiv
Losse, R. N. 2502
Fr 9thMCRRD WDOct
To 3dMarDiv
Martz J. G., III 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW
McCarthy, T. E. 3002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCB CamPen
Mickelson, R. D. 0302
Fr 12thMCRD WDOct
To 3dMarDiv
Moise, F. V., Jr. 0195
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCSC Albany Ga
Nesbitt, C. E. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCS Quant
Pates, B. A., Jr. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCS Quant
Reames, J. A. 7333
Fr 1stMAW By3Oct
To HQMC WashDC
Salser, C. A. 3002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 2dMAW
Scribner, R. G. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAAS Yuma Ariz
Shank, J. W. 7304
Fr 2dMAW WDOct
To 1stMAW
Sparks, W. F. 0302
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To HQMC
Vance, R. N. 3002
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW
Voth, S. B. 7333
Fr 1stMarBrig Sep
To MCS Quant
Walker, R. A. 7302
Fr 2dMAW Aug
To NOTS China Lake
Walker, J. W. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To FMFLant
Weaver, C. A. 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW
Witte, K. B. 7333
Fr 3dMAW WDSep
To MCAAS Yuma Ariz
Youngs, C. A. 2715
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCRD SDiego

Retired

Hauge, O. C., Jr. 0302
MCSC Barstow 30Sep
Knack, F. J. 6602
Point Mugu Calif 30Sep
Kohl, C. G., Jr. 0302
MCSC Barstow 31Aug
Lenffer, G. W. 0302
MCS Quant 30Sep
Mitchell, J. A. 2002
ForTrps FMFLant 31Aug
Smith, G. N. 3002
MCB CamPen 30Sep

Deaths

Schomers, W. H. 7302
MCAS El Toro 22Aug
Woerner, R. E. 7335
MCAF Futema Okinawa 11Aug

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Calder, J. C. Aug
Chott, P. D. Aug
Davies, E. D., Jr. Aug
Frease, J. M. Aug
Reynolds, C. L. Aug
Sims, W. M. Sep

Death, Reserve

Egan, R. M.
Aiken County, S. C. 8Jul

Deaths, Retired

Benskin, G. H.
New York, N. Y. 16Aug
Dunkley, C. J.
VA Hosp Richmond Va 13Jul
Wells, O. B.
Seattle, Wash. 12Aug

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Alexander, J. C., CO ASDBn, Camp Kinser, Okinawa
Armstrong, C. B., Jr., Avn, Log & MatBr, DivAvn, HQMC
Barclay, J. N., Depot Exchange Off, MCRD, PISC
Belknap, E. W., 1stBn 1st Marines
Bowen, E. D., S-2, RTR, MCRD, PISC
Grant, H. L., Insp Div, HQMC
Hirt, P. L., CommElecBr, G-4, HQMC
Kaufer, E. E., Asst Depot Sup Off, MCRD, PISC
Koontz, G. C., OrdBr, G-4, HQMC
Lubka, B., G-4 Div, HQMC
Maiden, R. F., Special Services Off, 3dMarDiv
Nastasi, J., HQCommSect, Admin Div, HQMC
Neuman, J. L., Hd, Pictorial Unit, HQMC
Probst, A. E., CO 2nd LSCo
Schmidt, C. M., XO, 3rd RTB, MCRD, PISC
Snell, A. W., Enlisted Detail Sect, Pers Dept, HQMC
Vosnik, J. M., CO, 1stBn, 11th Marines
Wildey, R. L., BuWeps, Navy Dept
Wiley, N. C., AvnElectBr, DivAvn, HQMC

Captains

Temporary Promotions

Abraham, L. R. Aug
Adams, T. G. Aug
Alexander, R. E. Aug
Bode, D. H. Aug
Bowlin, J. T. Aug
Campbell, G. N. Aug
Carlton, J. D. Aug
Carroll, J. E., Jr. Aug
Carroll, E. P. Aug
Cronin, T. J., Jr. Aug
Cruz, F., Jr. Aug
Edens, A. R. Aug
Erickson, B. R. Aug
Franklin, R. M. Aug
Hamilton, G. S. Aug
Harwell, E. N. Aug
Hatfield, C. D. Aug
Hey, J. M. Aug
Hornsby, M. T., Jr. Aug
Kartchner, O. R. Aug
Lee, V. M. Aug
Levan, R. L. Aug
Loney, E. H. Aug
Loop, J. S. Aug
Lundberg, D. D. Aug
Martin, B. A. Aug
Martin, D. M. Aug
Mitchell, R. G. Aug
Morgan, H. J. Aug
Mulronney, M. J. Aug
Musilli, J. A. Aug
Nolan, J. L. Aug
Noll, R. A. Aug
Rackham, R. N. Aug
Reese, J. A. Aug
Regan, F. C., Jr. Aug
Russell, E. B. Aug
Smith, R. W. Aug
Soesbe, K. E. Aug
Spaete, R. P. Aug
Spooner, R. T. Aug
Strain, W. L. Aug
Sullivan, M. P. Aug
Taylor, R. B. Aug
Van Gorder, J. H. Aug
Vogel, P. J. Aug
Weitz, C. A. Aug
Williams, J. P. Aug
Zeterberg, D. P. Aug

Transfers

Albert, K. V. 7331
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDOct
To 2dMAW
Anderson, I. C. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW
Ausley, W. H. 2501
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCS Quant
Baggett, J. C., Jr. 3010
Fr MB NS Jax WDOct
To MB Pt Lyautey
Benner, T. F., Jr. 0302
Fr 9thMCRRD
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov
Bressler, A. L., Jr. 3302
Fr MCB CamLej
To 1stMAW By20Nov
Brookshire, P. E. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To AirFMFPac
Brown, J. W. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To CINCLANTFLT By1Nov
Brown, R. M. 3402
Fr NS SFran
To 1stMAW By20Nov
Brubaker, R. E. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To CNAVANTRA CorpC
Budd, T. C., II 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To NAS LeMoore Calif Sep
Cameron, C. H. 3060
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By20Nov
Canzano, P. J. 3402
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 3d MAW AirFMFPac
Cassidy, B. J. 0302
Fr USS Washburn WDOct
To 12thMCRRD
Cleland, G., Jr. 0302
Fr NAD McAlester
To 3dMarDiv By26Nov
Clements, F. D. 0185
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To JAG
Coggins, J. D. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCB CamPen
Courtney, D. G. 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFPac
Croasdell, T. P. 3502
Fr 1stMarDiv WDOct
To MCSC Barstow
Csik, T. G. 6709
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMAW FMFLant
Cusimano, J. 0130
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To NAS Los Alamos
Daley, R. F. 0302
Fr 1stMCRRD Sep
To VMI, Lexington, Va.
Gillick, R. O. 0802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To Ft Sill Okla By9Oct
Godfrey, E. J. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv
To S Charleston W Va By15Nov
Green, R. P. 0802
Fr 2dMarDiv
To 1stMCRRD Sep
Gregerson, J. O. 0702
Fr PHIBRON-3
To Ft Bliss Tex By20Nov

Hafey, R. J. 7333
Fr FMFLant
To 2dMAW By2Oct

Hanly, A. S. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To 4thMCRRD

Henderson, W. J. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDOct
To MCS Quant

Hertberg, E. C. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW

Hook, R. A. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCAS El Toro

Horn, D. R. 0702
Fr MCB CamLej
To Ft Bliss Tex By20Nov

Hudson, D. L., Jr. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAS Beaufort SC

Jennings, J. A., Jr. 7332
Fr NAATC NAS CorpC WDOct
To 2dMAW

Johnson, L. E. 7305
Fr NAATC NAS CorpC WDOct
To VMI Lexington Va By10Sep

Damone, W. F. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To PHIBGRU-10 By1Nov

Davis, J. A. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCS Quant

Dawson, F. G. 7305
Fr NAATC NAS CorpC WDOct
To 2dMAW

DeLong, G. J. 0302
Fr MCB CamLej
To USS Enterprise By19Sep

Dettmeier, A. A., Jr. 7331
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDOct
To 3dMAW

Dilley, D. E. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To NABTC NAS Pncla

Dinse, W. J. 1803
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCS Quant

Foley, W. M. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAS CherPt

Frey, H. I. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCB CamLej

Gartrell, C. B. 0302
Fr 11thMCRRD WDOct
To 1stMarBrig

Gavin, L. T. 6401
Fr MAD NABTC NAS WDSep
To 1stMarBrig

Gill, B. A. 0302
Fr 1stMCRRD
To 3dMarDiv By26Nov

Jones, J. A. 7332
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDOct
To 3dMAW

Jurancich, J. M. 3510
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Keyes, G. W. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMAW

Kimball, A. B. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW

Lane, J. P. 7335
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla
To NAV ATC PaxRiv By30Oct

Lanning, C. G., Jr. 2502
Fr NavFac Cyprus WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

Larson, E. R. 1802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To SDiego MCOSO By15Sep

Lee, P. B. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MARTC NAS Oak

Lloyd, J. F. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMAW

Long, E. E., Jr. 1360
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

McInnis, J. A. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To I&I 5thATCo USMCR By10Nov

Marks, R. M. 1302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To Asst RCOSO Jax By15Sep

Marshall, L. A. 7302
Fr MAD NABTC NAS WDOct
To 3dMAW

Martin, F. E. 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To VMO-6 CamPen

Marvel, J. W. 7335
Fr MCAAS Yuma Ariz WDOct
To 3dMAW

McManaway, J. L. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDSep
To MCOSO LosA

McMillan, W. W., Jr. 2002
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To MCRD SDiego

McFerren, K. A. 7332
Fr 1stMAW
To Ft Holabird Md By30Nov

McGlone, V. P. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCS Quant

Merriam, B. A. 6602
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMAW

Mitchells, W. L. 7333
Fr MCAS El Toro
To 1stMAW By1Nov

Monteau, H. A. 7302
Fr MCAS CherPt WDOct
To 3dMAW

Moog, D. C. 0302
Fr 1stMCRRD
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov

Morris, C. S. 7331
Fr MAD NABTC NAS WDOct
To 2dMAW

Morris, H. L., Jr. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

Neilson, R. B. 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDOct
To NAG Korea

Nelson, F. M. 0702
Fr HQMC WDOct
To ForTrps FMFPac

Newkirk, C. T. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Newton, D. T. 7302
Fr 2dMAW WDSep
To Castle AFB

O'Holleran, R. J. 0115
Fr FMFPac WDOct
To MCRD PISC

Olson, C. W. 7335
Fr MCAAS Yuma Ariz WDOct
To 3dMAW

Peden, J. W., Jr. 3060
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To FMFLant NorVa

Powell, L. E. 3310
Fr MCB CamLej
To 3dMarDiv By20Nov

Radtke, P. G. 1802
Fr LFTUPAC SDiego
To 3dMarDiv By26Nov

Reiniche, H. T. 0185
Fr JAG WashDC WDOct
To 3dMarDiv

Reppert, J. G. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMAW

Ritchie, R. G. 7302
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDOct
To 3dMAW

Robbins, M. G. 7331
Fr NorVa WDOct
To 2dMAW

Roberts, J. W. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To NABTC NAS Pncla

Ryan, J., Jr. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To NABTC NAS Pncla

Sagar, H. L. 4130
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAS CherPt

Seabrook, C. C. 0302
Fr MCRD PI
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov

Seaver, R. A. 7302
Fr 2dMAW
To MCAS El Toro By1Nov

Sims, G. R. 7307
Fr MCAS El Toro
To 1stMAW By1Nov

Skinner, W. E. 7331
Fr MAD NABTC NAS WDOct
To 2dMAW

Slee, D. J. 7302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDOct
To 1stMAW

Smith, D. G. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW

Spence, C. E., Jr. 0185
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

Starbuck, W. E. 0802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 3dMarDiv By3Nov

Stevens, J. W., Jr. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCS Quant

Strickland, G. E. 1320
Fr MCB CamLej
To 3dMarDiv By20Nov

Styles, M. J., Sr. 4302
Fr 11th MCRRD
To 3dMarDiv By3Nov

Talley, J. B. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Terwilliger, J. W. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To Indian Head Md By18Nov

Thompson, J. R. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To CNAVANTRA CorpC

Thompson, J. S. 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMAW

Threlfall, W. L. 0302
Fr 9thMCRRD
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov

Turner, J. S. 0302
Fr MAAG Vietnam WDOct
To 2dMarDiv

Ultsch, H. E. 3510
Fr FMFLant
To 1stMAW By3Nov

Vugteveen, H. L. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To I&I 55RflCo USMCR By15Nov

Walters, H. L. 3402
Fr 1stMarBrig
To 3dMarDiv By20Nov

Wendt, J. G. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMAW

Whitehead, C. F. 7302
Fr 3dMAW
To MCAS El Toro By1Nov

Winder, C. R. 2502
Fr I&I Stf 1stCommCo
To 3dMarDiv By3Nov

Retired

Allemann, J. G. 6402
3dMAW 30Sep

Dermako, L. L. 3010
MCSC Albany Ga 30Sep

Johnson, R. M. 2502
FMFLant 31Aug

Mahan, D. L. 0302
MCS Quant 31Aug

McClung, H. S. 6402
2dMAW 31Aug

Parsons, F. M. 7305
US NavHosp Bethesda 31Aug

Sullivan, J. J. 0130
MCB CamLej 30Sep

Turner, R. D. 0202
MB NS SFran 31Aug

Vittitoe, J. A. 7335
3dMAW 30Sep

Williams, F. C. 3060
3dMAW 31Aug

Deaths

Bergey, H. W. 7333
MCAS El Toro 8Aug

Harwell, R. W. 3010
Camp Courtney Okinawa 12Aug

O'Rourke, W. T., Jr. 7302
Tokuyama Japan 30Aug

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Breen, W. F. Aug
Brown, B. E., Jr. Sep
Giles, R. H. Aug
Grant, J. P. Sep
Harris, R. L. Aug
Hecox, L. A. Aug
Herbster, W. G. Aug
Melving, E. C., Jr. Aug
Perrere, C. J. Sep
Ryan, D. K. Aug
Schulte, J. B. Aug
Shane, D. L. Aug
Shealy, L. F., Jr. Sep
Smith, K. E. Aug
Soulen, D. L. Aug
Stonecipher, E. H. Aug
Stube, J. L. Sep
Sullivan, A. D. Aug
Thomas, E. D. Aug
Westhead, G. K., Jr. Aug

Deaths, Retired

Gibbons, J.
Somers Point NJ 6Mar
Riekers, H. A. 0828
VAHosp Bay Pines Fla 25Jun

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Arsenault, R. W., DivInfo, HQMC
Colby, D. A., I&I 90th RifCo
Colla, J., Gnd Control Off, Div Res, HQMC
Cook, M. H., PMO, MCAS, K-Bay, Hawaii
Kelly, E. F., Plans, Policy & Budget Br G-1, HQMC
Louder, J. J., Asst S-3, RTR, MCRD, PISC
Milligan J. F., Data Processing Div, HQMC
Morrisey, R. B., ISO, 1stMarBrig
Shoup, J. D., TechBr, SupDept, HQMC

1st Lieutenants

Permanent Promotions

Carlson, C. J. Aug
Carroll, N. A. Aug
Dick, N. T. Aug
Roberts, R. N. Aug
Schleichert, D. A. Aug
Vertalino, C. A. Aug

Transfers

Adamo, N. J. 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW

Aiken, T. H. 1302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDSep
To Camp SD Butler

Alford, D. F. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDSep
To Ft Holabird Md

Allerton, G. N. 6702
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW

Anderson, H. F., Jr. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW

Baker, O. C. 7333
Fr 1stMarBrig WDOct
To 1stMAW

Bingham, H. P., III 6720
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW

Brennan, W. F. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCB 29 Palms

Brown, L. K. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To Ft Holabird Md By9Nov

Chew, A. B. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFPac

Cone, F. J. 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCS Quant

Curd, J. H. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MB WashDC

Dahlquist, M. J. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDOct
To MB Lake Mead

Dailey, J. R. 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW

Dalberg, J. E. 1802
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To Ft Knox Ky By11Sep

Dasch, R. D. 1803
Fr USS Tulare WDOct
To MCS Quant

DiFiore, H. J. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To NABTC NAS Pncla

Eikenbery, T. L. 0302
Fr FMFLant
To USS Canberra By1Nov

Enos, G. A. 6709
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 2dMAW

Fricker, J. T. 2501
Fr 2dMarDiv
To MCS Quant By22Aug

Friedland, A. S. 1803
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Gailey, L. E. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To CNAVANTRA CorpC

Gardner, B. W. 0302
Fr HqBn HQMC
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov

Getchell, J. A. 0302
Fr MCSC Barstow WDSep
To MCRD SDiego

Gregor, R. C. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To NAS Miramar SDiego

Hansen, A. G. 7398
Fr NAAS New Iberia WDSep
To 2dMAW

Herskind, C. C. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To I&I 3d EngrCo

Honeycutt, J. G. 9901
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Hudson, J. E. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMAW

Jackson, H. D. 3502
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAS El Toro

Lindsey, A. L., Jr. 0802
Fr 1stMarBrig WDAug
To 1st ANGLICO

Ludwick, W. B. 2502
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

McRoberts, J. C. 7399
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MAD NABTC Pncla By18Oct

McBride, E. J., III 9901
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

McNamara, J. D. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Miller, H. J. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW AirFMFPac

Mittrick, C. L. 0130
Fr MCB CamPen WDSep
To MCAS El Toro

Morris, G. S. 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To CNAVANTRA CorpC

O'Brien, R. V. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To USS Enterprise By19Sep

O'Brien, P. M., Jr. 0302
Fr AirFMFPac WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Phillips, R., Jr. 2502
Fr H&SBn FMFPac WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

Richter, E. P. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCRD SDiego

Rivera, J. C., Jr. 2502
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 3dMarDiv By3Nov

Robinson, L. C. 3502
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Scarbrough, H. D. 3502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To 1stMAW By6Nov

Shuman, W. D. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDOct
To MCRD SDiego

Simpson, P. S. 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDSep
To 3dMAW

Steffen, A. J. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Stewart, D. M. 6709
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 3dMAW

Stingley, P. R. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFPac

Tara, R. B. 9901
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Tiffany, R. B. 0302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDOct
To MCRD PI

Tobia, J. P. 3503
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To 1stMAW By6Nov

Topping, R. W. 9901
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 2dMarDiv

Waters, A. L. 2502
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Retired

Schmidt, C. J., Jr. 0302
MCB CamPen 31Aug

Deaths

Henderson, D. H.
CamPen, Calif 15Aug

McDuff, C. D.
CamPen, Calif 15Aug

Permanent Promotions, Reserve

Campbell, J. M., Jr. Sep
Chancey, J. A. Sep
Dammrose, G. L. Sep
Ferris, D. M. Sep
Haas, G. W. Sep
Heinzerling, C. W. Sep
Keller, F. H. Sep
McBrien, T. P. Sep
Reves, S. S. Sep

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Anthony, R. J. Aug
Bean, G. S. Aug
Bragan, D. F. Aug
Calkins, R. L. Aug
Cannon, T. W. Aug
Chapple, B., III Aug
Comstock, J. S. Aug
Cooper, W. J. Aug
Cummins, C. T. Aug
Dill, L. L. Aug
Fallon, T. J. Aug
Gallegos, D. M. Aug
Girouard, R. Aug
Gordon, B. W. Aug
Hickman, D. C. Aug
Horton, A. S. Aug
Huckaby, R. H. Aug
Pfrimmer, R. E. Aug
Sales, J. R. Aug
Thomson, R. T. Aug
Tristany, J. P. Aug
Vanes, J. M. Aug

2d Lieutenants

Transfers

Anderson, W. T., Jr. 0702
Fr ForTrps FMFPac
To Camp SD Butler By3Oct

Anthony, R. J. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 2dMarDiv

Bacon, J. N. 6702
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAS-1 MCAAS Yuma

Balash, S. R., Jr. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov

Bishop, J. P. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

Bryden, D. P. 3095
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMAW By20Nov

Colburn, R. D. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 2dMAW

Cook, V. E., II 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCB 29 Palms

Cowan, G. H. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 2dMarDiv

Detombe, R. F. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 2dMAW

Duggan, A. J. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 2dMarDiv

Eckert, J. D. 4602
Fr MD USS Boxer WDSep
To HqBn HQMC

Elrich, D. G. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov

Evans, G. L., Jr. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

Gilchriest, B. J. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDAug
To 8thMCRRD

Heath, R. A. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

Holmquist, J. L. 1305
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Holt, J. M. 1390
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

Huckaby, R. H. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCAF Santa Ana

Jackson, J. M. 3501
Fr MCS Quant
To 3dMarDiv By3Nov

Jerbasi, J. T. 1301
Fr MCS Quant
To 3dMarDiv By3Nov

Joyce, J. E. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 6th105MMHowBn

Kemp, B. C. 3010
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To 3dMarDiv By20Nov

Marshall, D. E. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCS Quant

McCaughey, W. I. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCB 29 Palms

McNair, G. Y., Jr. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 3dMAW

Munzo, P. 3502
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 1stMAW By6Nov

Pennewill, C. 3501
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

Quinlan, D. A. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov

Rippelmeyer, K. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov

Sattler, A. J., Jr. 2502
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

Secules, T. W. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov

Snyder, R. E. 1802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFLant

Swyney, T. E. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Thompson, A. 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov

Vanvelzer, H. B., Jr. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Weigand, P. S. 1802
Fr MB NS SFran
To 1stMarDiv By1Nov

Wheeler, K. G. 9901
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 9thMCRRD

Deaths

Adams, N. M. 7333
MCAS El Toro 8Aug

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Roberson, W. G., Data Processing Div, HQMC

Barton, A. R., Asst BusMgr, MC Gazette

Warrant Officers

W-1

Transfers

Baird, M. K., Jr. 0130
Fr MB Brem WDOct
To 1stMAW

Beaver, D. S. 0130
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAS El Toro

Edelin, K. D. 6730
Fr NATTU Olathe Kans WDSep
To 3dMAW

Gore, H. E. 7102
Fr MB NAS Lakehurst WDSep
To 1stMAW

Haynes, J. L. 2045
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To MCS Quant

Holbrook, J. H., Jr. 0130
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAS El Toro

Johnson, W. D. 6730
Fr NATTU Olathe Kans WDSep
To 2dMAW

Mattox, L. 0130
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAS El Toro

McDermott, P. L. 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To ForTrps FMFPac

Merritt, J. M. 3060
Fr MAD NATTC MFS
To 1stMAW By13Nov

Shutak, E. M. 4302
Fr 2dMAW WDSep
To 1stMAW

Stone, T. 6730
Fr NAS S Weymouth WDSep
To 2dMAW

Wyenandt, J., Jr. 3010
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 3dMarDiv By13Nov

Yale, C. R. 0130
Fr 1stMAW WDOct
To MCAS El Toro

W-2

Transfers

McVeigh, L. J. 3402
Fr Camp SD Butler WDOct
To MCB CamPen

Work, R. G. 0130
Fr 2dMarDiv
To HQMC By18Sep

Permanent Promotion

Durfee, N. E. Aug

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Shirley, J. D., TechnicalBr, Sup Dept, HQMC

Retired

Foster, G. E. 4915
1stMarDiv 31Aug

Sprague, L. N. 3010
MB NS SFran 30Sep

Wayne, J. H. 3402
MCB CamLej 30Sep

Zarkos, T. A., Jr. 6402
3dMAW 31Aug

Death, Retired

Ledoux, L.
USNH Bethesda Md 13Aug

W-3

Transfers

Houser, J. J. 1310
Fr 3dMarDiv WDOct
To 1stMarDiv

Jensen, K. R. 2010
Fr MCSC Albany Ga WDOct
To 3dMarDiv

Pollock, J. H. 1320
Fr MCSC Albany Ga
To HqBn HQMC By15Sep

Retired

Drennen, H. K. 3302
MCB CamLej 31Aug

Williams, R. G., Jr. 0406
2dMarDiv 31Aug

W-4

Transfers

Gray, E. T. 3302
Fr MCAS CherPt
To MAD NATTC MFS By23Nov

Permanent Promotions

Gidlewski, A. C. Aug
Roberson, F. R. Aug

Permanent Promotion, Reserve

Lindbloom, S. W. Aug

Retired

Amos, W. H. 1320
HqBn HQMC 30Sep

Embrey, A. D. 3402
1stMarDiv 31Aug

Mangum, T. R. 0130
HQMC 31Aug

Morehead, R. A. 5802
MCB CamLej 30Sep

Richardson, C. W. 6402
3dMAW 31Aug

Timms, J. H. 2010
MCS Quant 30Sep

Wesson, W. T. 6602
HQMC 30Sep

Death, Retired

Martis, E. C.
Brockton Mass 22May

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The Kaman HUSKIE was designed to be a rugged, reliable rescue helicopter. It was bred for the boondocks. The number, nature and difficulty of the rescues it has completed since entering operational service prove it was bred right. Rescues involving Kaman helicopters which hit the headlines recently follow below, with on the spot photos to the right.

A. LARSON AFB, WASH.— A Huskie hovering over the burning wreckage of a B-52D used its rotor downwash to keep flames away from the bomber's 128,000 pound fuel load until all 10 crewmen had been safely evacuated. (Air Force Photo)

B. CAPE HATTERAS, VA.— When the tanker Pine Ridge broke up off shore, a Kaman HUK operating from the Valley Forge rescued 9 crew members and returned them safely to its carrier base. (U.S. Coast Guard Photo)

C. RANDOLPH AFB, TEXAS USAF H-43 on standby alert reached the crash scene of a KC-97 tanker and worked with fire fighting crew to prevent flames from spreading to 4,000 gals. of spilled fuel, saving the aircraft. (San Antonio Field Photo)

THE KAMAN AIRCRAFT CORP., BLOOMFIELD, CONN.


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
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
C.

in national defense
KAMAN is a part of the rescue pla

This demonstration photo became a reality at PLATTSBURG, N.Y., when one of the crewmen who bailed out of a crippled B-52 was injured when landing in an isolated area of 100 foot trees. The crew of a Huskie saved his life by hovering over the spot and lowering a medic to give first aid until rescuers on foot reached the scene.